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Introduction
This work is a collection of papers on innovation, a broad theme that covers several but interconnected issues. Inno-
vation is one of the main determinants of firms’ performance in advanced economies and it is also an important driver
of growth ((Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992, Acemoglu 2002, Jones 2002). Firms often invest huge amounts
of resources in R&D to improve their production technology (process innovation, aiming to a cost reduction), create
new products and increase the quality of the existing ones (product innovation); in this way, firms aim to increase their
market shares and profits. Sometimes R&D investment is necessary to enter the market or simply not to exit. Firms’
innovative activities contribute to make the surrounding economic system more competitive and stimulate further in-
vestment and innovation. At the same time, consumers enjoy the benefits accrued by lower prices, better quality and
more variety. Despite of the beneficial effects they bring to the society, innovative activities are often associated with
a non competitive market structure (harmful for consumers) and with externalities, meaning that innovation is strictly
related to situations that bring to market failures and to not socially desirable outcomes (in terms of prices, quantities
produced and R&D effort). These considerations often justify the request of government intervention in terms of
subsidies to R&D and patent protection.
The level of innovation of an economic system is affected by the interaction of several agents and also influenced
by external factors. Understanding how the different forces at work interact and which factors enhance or prevent
innovation is of primary importance from the point of view of policy makers; aware of the possible incentives and
obstacles to innovation, they can develop policies aimed to create an environment that favor investment and growth.
In this work I investigate the role of agents’ heterogeneity in innovation processes, an issue that has received
attention in the literature on innovation only quite recently, tough its importance has been recognized for a long time.
I treat this topic from both a theoretical and empirical point of view, though applied to different subjects.
In the theoretical part of the work (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), I focus on a particular aspect of the issues related to
innovation and market failure, namely the spillover externality problem and the use of R&D cooperation agreements
(RJV use of the term) as a way to enhance innovation and lead the level of investment closer to its socially optimal level.
The positive externality is caused by non-complete appropriability of the results of R&D activity and is responsible
for R&D underinvestment. Since d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992), the positive effect of
R&D cooperation agreements in presence of high spillovers has been widely analyzed. However, most of the previous
works only consider symmetric firms, discarding the potential relevant impact of asymmetries on firms’ decisions.
The empirical literature has emphasized the role of asymmetries in terms of gains from cooperation, that in turn affect
decisions about RJV membership (Kogut 1991, Röller, Tombak and Siebert 1998), but these issues have been scarcely
taken into account in the theoretical literature, with few exceptions (Baerenss 1999, Atallah 2005). So, in this part of
the work I try to fill this gap in the literature taking into account firms’ heterogeneity. Firms can be heterogenous in
many respects: efficiency level, type of technology, experience, market size etc. Here, firms’ heterogeneity regards the
efficiency of R&D effort.
In the empirical part, I study a quite different aspect of innovation, namely the link between immigration and
innovation. Owing to the size that the phenomenon of immigration has assumed in the advanced countries in the last
decades, immigration has been recently at the centre of the political and economic debate. Economists have studied
extensively the potential impact of immigration on a variety of economic and social indicators of host countries, such
as natives’ wages (Borjas 2003; 2005, Ottaviano and Peri 2012) and employment opportunities (Pischke and Velling
1997, Card 2001; 2005), firm productivity (Peri 2012), trade creation (Gould 1994, Rauch and Trinidade 2002, Peri
and Requena-Silvente 2010) and crime (Bell et al. 2010, Bianchi et al. 2012), just to take a few examples. Until very
1
recently the effect of immigration on innovation and technical change was instead much less studied. Although new
evidence is progressively accumulating, it remains nonetheless mostly limited to the impact of skilled immigration in
the U.S (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010, Stuen et al. 2012, Lewis 2011, Peri 2012).
Immigration can affect local innovation in several ways. First of all, immigration entails an inflow of foreign
population into a region, and produces changes (i) in the size of the population; (ii) in the average skill level of
the population; (iii) in the age structure of the population. All these variables have been recognized to be powerful
predictor of innovation. Immigration has also a direct effect on innovation through cultural diversity (spillovers may
arise from complementary abilities and different backgrounds, with a positive effect in the production of new ideas). At
the same time, greater difficulties in communication and reduction of social capital can act as obstacles to innovation
and growth (these negative effects are more likely to arise in presence of low skilled immigrants). Finally, immigrants
flows affect firms’ choices concerning technology adoption and investment in physical capital, according to the change
in the average skill level they cause in the population.
So, in this part of the work, heterogeneity concerns the greater cultural ‘diversity’ and the changes in the average
skill level of the population induced by large immigration flows.
The thesis has the following structure: Chapeter 1 provides an overview of the way in which the main issues related
to innovative activity have been treated in the theoretical literature. Starting from earlier works on innovation, mainly
focused on the value attached to innovation in monopolistic and competitive markets, it develops analising the two
main fields in the literature on innovation: patent race and spillover externality. The part related to spillovers and R&D
cooperation is treated in a more extensive way, since the theoretical models I present in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 belong
to this strand of the literature. This chapter contains also a review of the past literature on incomplete information in
R&D models.
In Chapter 2, I extend standard models on R&D competition vs R&D cooperation in a context of non-complete
appropriability of the results of R&D activity. In a Cournot duopoly model with R&D investment stage and spillovers,
I introduce asymmetries in R&D productivity between firms that may engage in R&D cooperation. Also, with the
introduction of a further stage, I analyze the incentive to cooperate in R&D by forming a RJV. While the existent
literature focuses on the comparison between two scenarios exogenously given, I endogenize the formation process
and show that, when spillovers are high, due to firms’ asymmetries, RJV is not formed for most of the parameters’
values and does not fulfill the aim of stimulating innovation. This contributes to explain the relatively low diffusion of
cooperative agreement in R&D and supports some empirical findings about and the determinants of RJVs formation.
Also, in line with the theoretical literature, I find that, when spillovers are low, R&D cooperation reduces the total
level of investment; in this case allowing this kind of agreements can be harmful, since in some regions of parameters
both symmetric and asymmetric firms have incentive to cooperate in order to avoid investment.
Chapter 3 presents a further extension of the model discussed in Chapter 2, namely the introduction of the in-
complete information assumption. Here, I investigate the role of R&D cooperation agreements (RJVs) in a context of
incomplete information with asymmetric firms, where firms, in addition to set the optimal R&D investment under two
regimes (R&D competition and RJV), have also to take decisions about RJV membership. Some interesting results
arise from this extended model. (i) When firms compete in R&D, incomplete information about rival’s R&D pro-
ductivity leads to inefficient investment choices in some regions of parameters; in particular, when firms are actually
symmetric, asymmetric information further reduces the investment, with respect to the complete information setting.
(ii) A signaling role of cooperation agreements emerges, in addition to the already recognized role in reducing the
inefficiencies arising from free riding problem. Revealing its willingness to participate, the efficient firm to signal its
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type, thus increasing the investment level (innovation enhancing effect) and improving total welfare. (iii) When firms
are asymmetric, for most of the parameters’ values, RJV is not formed and does not fulfill the role of stimulating
innovation.
Chapter 4 (joint with Massimiliano Bratti1) investigates the causal effect of foreign immigration on innovation
(patents’ applications) in Italian provinces. We provide evidence for a country which was exposed to a very fast and
large wave of immigrations during the 2000s, using a very small geographical scale of analysis (NUTS-3 regions),
which enables us to better control for differences in institutional and socio-economic factors which are difficult to ob-
serve but which may simultaneously contribute to both attracting new immigrants and increase the innovation potential
of a region. Moreover, unlike most papers in the literature which only considered the effect of skilled immigration, (i)
we first focus on the general impact of immigration, and then (ii) separately look at the effects of low-educated and
high-educated immigrants on innovation. Using instrumental variables’ estimation (and instruments based on immi-
grant enclaves), we find that the overall stock of immigrants has a significant negative effect on innovation of Italian
provinces: rising the share of immigrants by one percent point (p.p.) decreases patenting by 0.064 percent. However,
distinguishing the effect between low and high-skilled migrants shows that the aggregate negative effect is driven by
the prevalence in Italy of low-educated immigrants. In fact, our estimates suggest that an increase of 1 p.p. in the share
of low skilled foreign migrants on the population induces a reduction in patents’ applications per 1000 inhabitants in
a range between 0.094 and 0.186 percent, according to the method used to classify immigrants by skill level. Instead,
presumably due to the extremely low presence of high skilled immigrants in Italy and to the underutilization of their
competencies, the impact of high skilled immigrants on innovation is positive, but cannot be precisely estimated.
1Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, Università degli Studi di Milano, Via Conservatorio 7, 20122 Milano, Italy,
and CHILD (Turin), IZA (Bonn), Ld’A (Milan).
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Chapter 1
Innovation and Market Failures: a review
of the literature
Introduction
One of the features of advanced economies is competition on innovation: the now prevalent view is that firms become
industry leaders by conducting research and development (R&D) to improve either their production technology (pro-
cess innovation, aiming to a cost reduction) or the products they provide (product innovation, usually associated with
improved quality). R&D is crucial not only in the analysis of an individual industry, but also form an economy-wide
point of view. Solow discovery (1957) that only a small fraction of per-capita growth was associated with an increase
in the ratio of capital and labor called economists’ attention to the role of technological progress in improving welfare.
Innovation is thought to be beneficial for society, since it should lead to more variety, lower prices, better quality,
etc. At the same time, innovative activities are often associated with a non competitive market structure (harmful for
consumers) and with externalities, meaning that innovation is strictly related to situations that bring to market failures
and to not socially desirable outcomes (in terms of prices, quantities produced and R&D effort). These considerations
often justify the request of government intervention in terms of subsidies to R&D and patent protection.
It is not surprising that this topic has generated a huge amount of theoretical and empirical works. After early stud-
ies on innovation focused on the relationship between market structure and incentive to innovate (Schumpeter, 1943;
Arrow, 1962; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), the analysis of the issues related to innovative activities has developed in
several fields. Two main strands can be identified in the literature. The first one is related to the degree of protection
of innovation from imitative competition and deals with issues such as the nature of innovation as public good and
the potential negative consequences of patent race, among which the waste of resources and the adoption of exces-
sively risky technologies (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986; Judd, 1985; Klette and De Meza, 1986) and the persistence
of monopoly (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Lee and Wilde, 1980; Loury, 1979; Rein-
ganum, 1982; Fudenberg et al., 1983). The other field of analysis, instead, focuses on the positive externality caused
by non-complete appropriability of the results of R&D activity (spillovers problem), responsible for R&D underin-
vestment, and on R&D cooperation (RJV) as a way to lead the level of investment closer to its socially optimal level.
After the seminal papers of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), a huge literature on R&D cooperation in presence
of spillovers has developed. The basic model has been extended in several ways, assuming endogenous spillovers,
asymmetric firms or asymmetries in outcomes. Since these models confirm the result concerning the desirability of
R&D cooperation in presence of spillovers (see Kamien et al., 1992, Suzumura, 1992, Amir, 2000, Lambertini and
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Rossini, 2009, just to take some examples), over the last twenty years there has been an increasing interest in the role
that R&D collaboration agreements might play in helping to overcome some of the market failures associated with
R&D and innovation. In recent years, increasing attention has been devoted also to the structure of R&D agreements
and to the process of RJV formation and partner selection.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the way in which the main issues related to innovative activity
have been treated in the theoretical literature. Section 2 starts to describe the earlier works on innovation, mainly
focused on the value attached to innovation in monopolistic and competitive markets. Section 3 and Section 4 are
dedicated to the analysis of the two main fields of the literature in innovation: patent race and spillover externality,
respectively. The part related to spillovers and R&D cooperation will be treated in a more extensive way, since the
theoretical models I present in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 belong to this strand of the literature. The aim of Section 5 is to
review the past literature on incomplete information in R&D models, since the model presented in Chapter 3 assumes
asymmetric information about R&D productivity. Finally, Section 6 briefly discusses the role of firms’ asymmetries
in RJV formation process, a theme scarcely taken into account in the literature, that inspired the models described in
the next two chapters.
1.1 Market structure and incentive to innovate
Early studies on innovation focused on the relationship between market structure and incentive to innovate, mainly
analyzing the value attached to innovation. An important issue raised by Schumpeter (1943) concerns the market
environment more conductive to R&D activity. In his view, (i) R&D efforts are more likely to be undertaken by large
firms and (ii) monopolistic or oligopolistic firms pursue more aggressively innovative activity than firms with little or
no market power. According to a report of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (2000), the top ten companies in terms
of the number of patents granted are fairly large companies. However, this does not mean necessarily that large firms
do more R&D; instead, it could imply that firms that do more R&D become large. This is a quite complicate issue to
analyze since it involves many strategic considerations. In fact, there are different forces at work: innovation may be
necessary to stay on (enter) the market, but at the same time the introduction of a new product by a firm undermines
the marketability of existing products and the development of a new production process requiring new equipment
reduces the value of existing productive capacity (what Schumpeter called “creative destruction”). Arrow (1962)
tried to isolate the “pure” incentive to innovate, independent of any strategic considerations of preemptive innovation.
Without considering the threat of entry, both competitive and monopolistic firms undervalue the innovation compared
to a social planner interested in maximizing total welfare, because they only consider the profit they can earn as a result
of the innovation and ignore the additional benefits that innovation can lead to consumers. So, from the point of view
of the society as a whole, there is the risk of too few innovation. However, competitive firms value the innovation more
than the monopolist. The reason is that a competitive firm is just breaking even prior to adopting the innovation and
so it values the innovation at the full additional profits it will generate. By contrast, the monopolist is already earning
a monopoly profit with its existing technology and the introduction of the new process undermines that investment
(replacement effect)1. This result can be reversed introducing a potential entrant along with the assumption that, if
entry occurs, the monopolist compete as a high-cost firm in a Cournot duopoly2. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) show
1This theoretical result is quite general (it holds for drastic and non drastic innovation, for any demand function and for Cournot or Bertrand
competition).
2This is because the entrant invests in R&D and develops a new technology that allows to lower the marginal cost with respect to the incumbent.
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that, in this case, the monopolist has the bigger incentive to innovate. This is because not only the innovation allows to
lower the costs and earn higher profits, but also because the monopolist has to take into account the fact that if it does
not innovate the entrant will, wiping out the monopolist’s dominant position (efficiency effect). However, Reinganum
(1983) shows that this conclusion may not hold when the timing of the successful breakthrough is uncertain. The
replacement effect induces the incumbent to wait and enjoy its current profit. This effect, instead, does not delay the
innovative activity of the potential entrant.
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) develop a model in which the decision to spend on R&D is an explicit part of firms’
strategies. They assume an industry composed of n symmetric Cournot firms that choose the level of output and the
amount they will spend on R&D, this latter aiming to lower the unit cost of production. They show that an increase in
the number of firms in the industry will decrease the amount each firm is willing to spend in R&D and that the share
of industry’s total sales revenue devoted to R&D is likely to be smaller in less concentrated industries. This supports
Schumpeter’s basic claim that imperfect competition is good for technical progress.
Empirical evidence suggests that R&D intensity increases along with industry’s concentration, but only up to a
rather modest value, after which R&D efforts appear to level off or even decline as a fraction of firm revenues.
1.2 Innovation and patents protection
After the first studies concentrated on the relation between market structure and innovation, the analysis of the inno-
vative activities has developed in several fields. One of most studied issues is related to the degree of protection of
innovation from imitative competition. Innovation is often considered a public good, the supply of which must be
encouraged through a system of patents. An innovation created by one firm provides usable information to the other
firms at little or no cost. While all firms stand prepared to use such information none is willing to pay the amount of
money (often huge) necessary to produce it without compensation. This compensation is often granted by a patent
that gives the innovator temporary monopoly power. The implied trade-off between incentive to innovate and efficient
market structure continues to stimulate an intense debate.
The studies on the optimal extension of patents rights have developed along two dimensions: the length of time
for which a patent right extends (patents length) and the range of products to which the patent applies (patent breadth).
With respect to the first dimension, the issue is to find a balance between the innovator’s ability to earn a return on its
R&D investment and the benefits that will accrue to consumers once the patent expires and competition emerges. The
basic model is due to Nordhaus (1969); according to this model, the optimal patent duration is finite. An initial increase
in patent duration induces a greater R&D effort and a greater discounted net surplus to producers and consumers;
beyond a given point, however, increases in the duration of the patent reduces the net social surplus, even though
they lead to more R&D. This is due to the assumption of diminishing returns of R&D and to the fact that with very
long duration of time the present value of consumers’ benefits (which arise after the expiration of the patent) will be
very small. As for the optimal breadth of patents, it has to be noted that the larger is the required minimal degree of
difference from an existing process or good in order for the new one to be patentable, the more difficult it is for the
other firms to “invent around” the patent and to make an attempt on inventor’s dominant position. Unfortunately, there
is not a clear method for measuring patent breadth, so it is very difficult to analyze this point.
Though a patent system is thought to be necessary to correct a market failure and enhance innovation, Bessen
and Maskin (2009) argue that, when discoveries are “sequential”3, patents protection is not as useful for encourag-
3meaning that successive inventions build in an essential way on their predecessors.
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ing innovation as in a static setting. Indeed, society and even inventors themselves may be better off without such
protection.
Some additional problems arise when the market is characterized by competition on innovation protected by
patents. In this context, coming first is all that matters since patents awards have a “winner-take-all” feature. This
can generate a race to obtain the patent, often associated with non desirable consequences. The point is that patents
create a rent in the form of monopoly profit, and every time the market or a regulatory agency engenders a rent, there
is competition for it; the effect of this competition is that the rent tends to be partially dissipated by the additional
costs incurred in the attempt to appropriate it. In addition, patent races can result in an inefficient amount of R&D
investment by the firms involved in the competition (Pepall et al., 2005).
There are also further dangers involved in patent race. The works of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Judd (1985) and
Klette and De Meza (1986) highlight that patent races lead firms to choose excessively risky R&D technologies (R&D
competitors pick technologies that involve a higher “variance” with respect to its social optimal level). Moreover,
patent race may affect the market structure itself. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) explain the persistence of monopoly
by showing that, whenever innovation by the monopolist can prevent a new firm to enter the market, the monopolist
has a large incentive to pursue it, so as to protect its monopoly profit. This effect is strengthened by the patent system
because it reinforces the ability of the incumbent to preclude entry. A simple model of patent race is the “memoryless”
or “Poisson” patent race, associated to the works of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Lee and Wilde (1980), Loury (1979)
and Reinganum (1982). The research technology is characterized by the assumption that a firm’s probability of making
a discovery and obtaining a patent at a given point of time depends only on firm’s current R&D expenditure, and not on
its past experience and competitor’s past research program. These models consider patent race between an incumbent
and a potential entrant and show that, in case of non drastic innovation, there is a tendency for the monopoly to persist,
because the established firm has an higher probability of obtaining a patent. Introducing experience in patent race4,
Fudenberg et al.(1983) show that the leader obtains a monopoly on R&D, even if it enters the race only a shot period of
time before the follower: so, competition in R&D may be strongly restricted by first-mover advantages and experience
effects.
Another way in which patent protection can affect the industrial structure is through the incentive to create the
so called “sleeping patents”. Very often a singe firm holds a large number of patents all related to the same process
or product, most of which are not used. The motivation behind a “sleeping patent” is to create a buffer of protection
for the monopoly profits generated by the truly valuable patent. By acquiring patents the incumbent strengthens its
monopoly position.
1.3 Spillover externality and R&D cooperation
Another field of analysis regards the spillovers generated by the R&D activity. When patent protection is not com-
pletely effective and innovation creates spillovers, firms that conduct R&D individually do not internalize the positive
externality on their rivals associated with an innovation. They thus tend to underinvest in R&D from an industry and
social point of view (Katz, 1986; d’Aspremont and Jaquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992). Jaffe (1986), finds empirical
evidence of the presence of spillovers, showing that firms benefit from R&D of rivals. Ornaghi (2006) highlights a
gap between private and social rate of returns of R&D, concluding that appropriability problems reduce investment
4At each moment of the patent race, the game can be summarized by the vector of experiences for all firms.
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in R&D. In this literature, firms’ cooperation in R&D is considered a tool to correct the inefficiencies generated by
spillovers, through the internalization of the externalities.
In the theoretical literature, a first attempt to analyze an oligopolistic market in terms of R&D cooperation was
made by Katz (1986). Katz proposed a multi-stage model of process innovation to examine the formation of a RJV.
His analysis shows that industry-wide cooperative agreements usually have socially beneficial effects when the degree
of product market competition is low, when there are information spillovers for the non-cooperating firms and when
the participating firms are able to share their research results.
However, the most influential paper in this strand of the literature has been that of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988); most of the theoretical works on R&D cooperation in presence of spillovers are based on their model. They
develop a 2-stage duopoly model in which, at the first stage, firms decide the amount of R&D effort and in the second
stage they choose the quantities to be produced in order to maximize their profit. Undertaking R&D investment, a
firm aims to reduce its initial marginal costs (process innovation): however, the rival firm benefits from a fraction
(identified by the spillover parameter) of this cost reduction. The output of each firm is an increasing function of its
own R&D expenditure, since this expenditure reduces a firm’s costs and makes a higher output more profitable. By
contrast, the effect of the rival’s R&D effort on a firm’s production can go either way: it makes the rival a tougher
competitor, but at the same time it has an expansionary effect on firm’s profit since rival’s R&D activity spills over
and lower its costs. The net result depends on the extent of the spillovers; the amount of research done by each firm
is decreasing in the spillover parameter. When spillovers are low, research expenditures of the two firms are strategic
substitutes (firms’ output and profit are decreasing functions of the R&D expenditures of their rivals); yet, this gives
each firms an incentive to spend aggressively in R&D to avoid being the loser in the war. When spillovers are high,
research expenditures are strategic complements; the more one firm spends in R&D, the more the rival is induced to
spend. Even if a firm spends only a little in R&D, it knows that this will induce the rival to do a fair bit of research
activity, from which it can obtain some benefits. Hence, firms’ incentive to invest in R&D can be quite small as
each firm seeks to free ride on the other’s efforts. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) claim that, when the spillover
problem is severe, R&D cooperation allows to internalize the spillover externality, increasing the total investment and
leading it closer to its socially optimal level5. Indeed, the authors compare the amount of R&D expenditure under
two different scenarios: R&D competition regime, in which firms act non-cooperatively in both stages, and R&D
cooperation regime, in which, at the first stage, firms choose research intensity to maximize the joint profit (tough
cooperation is not allowed in the production stage). They find that when spillovers are large, cooperation increases
R&D expenditure and, as consequence, the produced quantities. This is because the agreement forces each firms to
internalize the external benefits that such spending has upon its rival and eliminates the free-riding problem. This
means also that the two firms will enjoy a profit at least as great as that earned in absence of cooperation and that
consumers will benefit from the the cost reduction induced by a greater R&D effort. This happens because in this
case the primary effect of R&D cooperation is to correct a market failure. However, the outcome under the single
coordination plan may not necessarily be good for consumers. In particular, consumers are hurt by the technology
cooperation when spillovers are small, since in this case the total investment is lower in RJV regime than in R&D
competition, and a lower rate of innovation implies higher prices. The policy implication of this model is that, if
the spillover problem is relevant, RJV should be encouraged so long as the antitrust authorities can assure that such
cooperation on research effort will not also extend to cooperation in production and prices (price fixing cartel).
Kamien et al. (1992) show that this results extends to a n-firms oligopoly, where firms produce differentiated
5They find that, with high spillovers, the extent of R&D effort is under the social optimal level in both regimes.
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goods. They consider also the possibilities of joint production and of full information sharing (maximum spillovers).
The potential benefits of R&D cooperation in presence of spillover are among the reason why RJVs are not treated
as per se violations by the antitrust authorities and are encouraged by policy-makers6.
Starting from these seminal papers, a huge literature has developed. Several authors extended the basic model to
make the spillover parameter endogenous, confirming the beneficial effect of R&D cooperation when spillovers are
high. Increasing attention has been devoted also to the structure of R&D agreements and to the processes of RJV
formation and partner selection.
1.3.1 Endogenous spillovers
The literature has recognized the possibility that firms may be able to affect the degree of spillovers they send or
receive; in this case, the spillovers parameter is considered as a strategic variable set by firms. In fact, the amount of
spillovers from one firm to the other depends on two factors: the absorptive capacity of a firm (capacity to exploit
rival’s research outcomes, that may depend on its own R&D effort) and the amount of knowledge a firm is willing
to share with the other firms (information sharing). When firms act strategically, the incentive to share information
depends on the nature of the product market. If firms are in different but complementary industries, spillovers enables
the receiving firm to improve its product or technology, attract more consumers and increase its profits; this, in turn, has
a beneficial impact also on the profits of the sending firm. If firms are in the same industry, instead, spillovers simply
will make the receiving firm more competitive, reducing the profits of the sending firm. When firms act cooperatively,
then incentives to share information depend on the nature of the joint profit function.
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) endogenize the spillover chosen by the sender (that is the extent of information
sharing) and find that that sometimes firms in a RJV decide not to fully share information in order to prevent the
market from becoming too competitive.
The endogenous spillover is considered in terms of information sharing also in Poyago-Theotoky (1999); in this
model symmetric firms choose full information disclosure (maximal spillover) in RJV regime, where they maximize
the joint profit, while firms set the minimum value for the spillover parameter when they act non-cooperatively. Amir
et al. (2001) find similar results. Amir et al. (2003) assume that firms participating to a R&D cartel (whose aim is the
maximization of the joint profit) choose the level of the spillover parameter in addition to possibly asymmetric levels
of the R&D effort. They find that the optimal R&D cartel must be either a RJV with maximal spillover, or else call for
all R&D to be conducted by one firm only (in this latter case with minimal spillover).
Some authors (Beath et al., 1998; Baerenss, 1999; Atallah, 2005), simply claim that RJVs participation im-
plies information sharing, then spillovers should be larger when firms decide to cooperate than when they act non-
cooperatively; accordingly, in their models, the spillover parameter takes maximum value in RJV regime.
6EU and Japan have always had positive and permissive attitude towards cooperation in R&D; EU Commission involvement in the coordination
and in the financing of RJVs, and more generally of cooperative research programs, has substantially increased over the years. As for US, in 1984,
Congress enacted the National Cooperative Research Act, which was extended to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act in 1993 to
include joint production ventures. This act protects R&D joint ventures and certain qualifying joint production ventures from the strict application
of antitrust law (Sherman Act, 1890).
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1.3.2 RJV contracts and formation process
Another branch of research concerns the structure of R&D cooperation agreements and the participation process.
These models mainly focus on the optimal size of RJVs, partner selection, coalition stability and membership rules.
Atallah (2005b) addresses the issue of partner selection in R&D cooperation, taking into account three firms
characterized by different level of efficiency. He finds that firms’ preferences regarding a potential partner depend on
the extent of the spillovers and on cost differences between firms. With low (high) spillovers, a generic firm prefers
to cooperate with the most (least) efficient among the remaining firms. However, when spillovers are very high, firms
prefer to be excluded from R&D cooperation. As the cost differential between firms increases, efficient (inefficient)
firms prefer to cooperate with the most (least) efficient firm. The equilibrium configuration is such that the most
efficient firms cooperate for low spillovers, while all firms are willing to cooperate for intermediate spillovers. In
presence of high spillovers, all firms cooperate when the cost differential is sufficiently low, but if the cost differential
is high, firms’ willingness to cooperate depends on the bargaining mechanism.
Poyago-Theotoky (1995) shows that, depending on the magnitude of the spillovers, the market may not provide
enough incentive for the optimum degree of cooperation to take place. The equilibrium size of an RJV is usually less
than the optimum size, which requires all firms to be part of the RJV. According to the author, the policy implica-
tion is that there should be encouragement for firms competing in high-technology industries to form industry-wide
cooperative agreements.
Sometimes, RJVs have been found to act as anti-competitive device and strengthen, or even create, dominant
positions in the market. Yi (1998) claims that, in some cases, a joint venture could restrict competition with the
adoption of exclusionary membership rules. He studies the endogenous formation of joint ventures between symmetric
firms under two different access rule: under the open membership rule, the membership of a joint venture is open to
all firms, while the coalition unanimity rule allows exclusivity in membership. The results show that the industry-
wide joint venture (the socially efficient structure) is the unique stable outcome under the open membership rule,
because an outsider always benefits by joining a large joint venture. However, the grand coalition is frequently not
the equilibrium outcome under the coalition unanimity rule. While efficiency in production calls for a widespread
membership, strategic considerations may lead members of a large joint venture to restrict their membership ranks.
By admitting a new member, the existing members gain access to just one more unit of productive assets, but the
new member gains access to the total pool of assets of the venture. The new member gains a competitive advantage
against the existing members, that may earn lower profits (despite their lower production costs). Hence, the existing
members of a large joint venture may want to deny membership to the outsiders if they are allowed to do it. According
to this analysis, even though members of a large joint venture remain competitors in the output market, so that they
lack classical market power to raise price by restricting their own output, the refusal to expand membership gives
exclusionary market power to members of a large joint venture by disadvantaging rivals firms. Creane and Konishi
(2009) find that, with free entry, an efficient firm can find profitable to transfer its knowledge to their rivals because
such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive and have the effect of deter entry or force
exit.
Recently, some authors applied the network approach to the analysis of firms’ cooperation in oligopolistic markets.
This new models provide some insights on the evolution of the market structure deriving from firms’ decisions to set
up collaborative agreements; indeed, cooperation agreements alter the competitive position of firms, thus influencing
market structure and firms’ performance. Differently from the coalition approach, network analysis allows to take into
account cooperative relations that are not exclusive. An interesting analysis in this field is that conducted by Goyal
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and Moraga-Gonzales (2001). Noting that a significant proportion of inter-firm collaborations in R&D takes place
between firms exhibiting some degree of market rivalry, they study the incentives to cooperate for horizontally related
firms, using a strategic model of R&D network. One of the results of their work is that asymmetric networks (which
are those observed more frequently), such as the star or the partially connected network, perform quite well from the
social as well as the private point of view. They also find that asymmetric forms of collaboration may alter the market
structure by causing large disparities between firms, or even leading to the exit of firms, but that this not necessarily
detrimental from a social standpoint. Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) reconsider the Goyal and Moraga-Gonzales
model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government subsidies affects the stability and the efficiency of
networks of R&D collaboration among firms located in different countries (international collaboration). They also
allow for coalition deviations in the formation of R&D collaboration networks. In their model, a conflict between
stability and efficiency is likely to occur: firms’ incentives to form collaborative ties may be excessive with respect to
the socially optimal level. However, if the government subsidizes R&D activity, the likelihood of a conflict between
stability and efficiency decreases, leading to a better outcome in terms of social welfare. Moreover, with government’s
intervention, the aggregate level of effective R&D could increase considerably.
1.4 Incomplete information in innovation processes
Some authors have contributed to the theoretical literature on innovation introducing the hypothesis of incomplete
information. In most of the cases, incomplete information is related to information disclosure and optimal contract
design issues7.
d’Aspremont, Bhattacharya and Gerard-Varet (1998), in a context of contract arrangements for R&D collabora-
tion agreement, consider a RJV in which adverse selection and moral hazard may arise. Adverse selection concerns
information sharing, while moral hazard regards the choice of private development efforts aimed to translate privately
acquired and/or shared knowledge into marketable innovations. Brocas (2004) assumes incomplete information about
skills in a regulation context and designs the optimal contract to favor efficient sharing of skills and to encourage
socially optimal provision of effort. In this model, a regulator offers a cooperation contract entailing the develop-
ment by part of two firms of a subsied research project; the contract provides incentives to encourage skill-sharing,
which results in distorting R&D efforts with respect to the first best level8. Cassiman (2000) introduces incomplete
information between firms and the regulator in a context of optimal R&D policy. The policy-maker has two tools to
implement social welfare maximization: allowing R&D and giving subsidies. The extent to which there exist appropri-
ability problems between firms is private information. Firms have to declare the level of their spillovers (asymmetric
spillovers are possible), since their type is unknown to government and potential partner. In this model, asymmetric
information turns out to be responsible for the impossibility to implement first best policy.
Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonìs (1996) analyze the effect of asymmetric information on know-how disclosure in
RJVs, looking for a policy that favors the sharing of know-how. They consider RJVs facing technological uncertainty,
in the sense that the final cost of the projects is unknown when the RJVs are built up and the disclosure of know-how
7With some exceptions: Xue and Gong (2006) use asymmetric information in a model of R&D strategic investment; in Zhu and Weyant (2003)
incomplete information concerns strategic decisions on new technology adoption; Grishagin, Sergeyev and Silipo (2001) develop a patent race
model in which firms do not know their relative position; Kao (2002) assumes private information about firms’ R&D progress.
8This model differs from the standard Cournot model with spillovers; it entails a generic formulation of the payoff functions and spillovers are
not taken into account.
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makes the expected cost of the project lower. However, firms compete in other markets, so when a firm discloses its
know-how, the partner becomes a stronger competitor in the other markets. Since know-how is soft information, it’s
very difficult to impose its transfer by contract and this creates a moral hazard problem. They show that there are
many cases in which profitable RJVs do not start because of this moral hazard problem. Moreover they find that patent
subsidies can help to reduce this problem, whereas cost subsidies are useless or may even go against the objective of
solving the moral hazard problem regarding the disclosure of know-how.
Espinosa and Macho-Stadler (2003) study the impact of moral hazard on the equilibrium number and size of
firms. They model the formation of competing partnerships as a sequential 2-stage game with moral hazard within
coalitions9; at the first stage, partners can group into a ’big’ firms through a sequential process, while at the second
stage players choose their effort level. This model depart from the assumption that members maximize the coalition’s
payoff: partners decide individually on the effort level, though they are assumed to share the gross profits of the ’big’
firm equally. The level of gross profit is verifiable and thus partners can commit to an equal sharing rule in the first
stage. However, only the partnership’s total output is verifiable, so each firm faces a team incentive problem: a firm’s
realized output is dependent on the joint efforts of its members, whose effort and performance cannot be individually
verified, and this gives rise to the moral hazard problem. The authors show that, when moral hazard is very severe,
it can prevent partnership formation and reduce the equilibrium number of coalitions. In terms of industry profits, in
presence of moral hazard, too few coalition are formed in equilibrium, as compared to the efficient outcome.
Finally, Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2004), in a quite different context with respect those described above, intro-
duce incomplete information to analyze role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation. They consider
two types of firms, opportunistic and non opportunistic, and find that the higher the spillovers, the higher the level of
trust required to initiate R&D cooperation for non-opportunists, while the inverse holds for opportunists
1.5 Discussion
The theoretical literature on R&D cooperation in presence of spillovers agrees on the result that RJVs enhance inno-
vation and contribute to increase the total welfare. Also, some empirical works seem to confirm the positive effect
of R&D cooperation on innovation (Simonen and McCann (2008)) and on firms’ performance (Benfratello and Sem-
benelli (2002)). R&D cooperation literature may lead to believe that R&D cooperation between firms is quite common
and that collaboration, once initiated, is unlikely to fail. However, even in high-tech sectors cooperation at R&D level
is still more the exception that the rule. Furthermore, a large number of RJV break down before completion of the
project (Kogut, 1989). Empirical literature has emphasized the role of asymmetries in terms of gains from cooperation
and decisions on RJV membership. Firms can be asymmetric in many respects: efficiency level, type of technology,
experience, market size etc. Petit and Towlinsky (1999) show that the degree of size-related asymmetries between
firms influences participation decisions. Kogut (1991) stresses that firms have different “absorptive capacities” of
research results, which in turn determine their willingness to form a RJV. The absorptive capacity is determined by
factors such as size and past experience. Röller, Tombak and Siebert (1998) show that size symmetry and product
complementary between firms enhance the likelihood of RJV formation.
So, asymmetries seems to affect cooperative outcome and participation decisions, but this issue has been scarcely
9The quantity produced by a firm is the sum of the effort of all the firms in the coalition to which the firm belongs. In a partnership profits are
shared according to a fixed sharing rule
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taken into account in the theoretical literature, with few exceptions that confirm its relevance. Baerenss (1999) finds
that asymmetric firms, in terms of initial marginal costs, often fail to agree on RJV formation, even if the RJV generates
higher industry profits and turns out to be welfare improving. This is because asymmetric equilibria in production and
research stage may arise, and the gains from cooperation are distributed unevenly; accordingly, without side-payments,
the desire to cooperate does not coincide for a wide range of parameters. Another important result of this model is
that, when initial asymmetries are large, R&D cooperation may reduce the welfare, because it reinforces the initial
asymmetry in costs, and helps the larger firm maintain its dominant position. Atallah (2005a) analyzes the effect of
asymmetric spillovers (that represent different absorptive capacity) on the incentives to cooperate, and finds that, in
most of the cases, firms will not agree on cooperation since it reduces the profits of one of them. Atallah (2005b)
highlights the relevance of cost asymmetries in the selection of the RJV partner.
I tried to contribute to fill this gap in the literature by extending the model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
to take into account asymmetric firms in terms of R&D efficiency and their actual incentive to cooperate in R&D
activity. As further extension, I also introduced asymmetric information about rival’s R&D efficiency to analyze the
consequences of this assumption on the level of investment in the market and on firms’ willingness to form RJVs. My
contribution to the literature is presented in the following chapters.
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Chapter 2
Asymmetric firms, R&D spillovers and the
incentives to form RJVs
Introduction
Innovation is one of the main determinants of economic performance in advanced countries and is commonly thought
to be beneficial for society. At the same time, innovative activities are often associated with non-competitive market
structures and with externalities, meaning that innovation is strictly related to situations that bring to market failures
and that often justify government intervention. One of the most studied issues concerns the spillovers problem, that
affect the decisions about R&D investments and that can determine an inefficient level of R&D effort. In the theoret-
ical literature, since the seminal paper of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988; AJ thereafter), this problem has been
described using a 2-stage Cournot model in which R&D expenditures results in costs reduction. In this model, part
of the competitive advantage arising from costs reduction goes to the rival (through the spillover parameter), who
becomes a tougher competitor; the incentive to invest in R&D can be quite small as each firm does not internalize the
positive externality on its rival and seeks to free ride on the other’s efforts. The level of investment in R&D in a regime
of competition is compared to that arising in a regime in which firms cooperate in R&D choosing the R&D effort in
order to maximize the joint profit. The equilibria of the AJ model show that, when spillovers are high, cooperation
increases R&D expenditure (and, as consequence, industry output), since it allows to internalize the externality caused
by knowledge spillovers. This results in a welfare improvement since in the AJ model the extent of R&D effort results
to be below the social optimal level in both regimes. The policy implication is that RJV should be encouraged as long
as the antitrust authorities can assure that such cooperation on research effort will not also extend to production and
prices. Since several extensions of the AJ model confirm the result concerning the desirability of R&D cooperation in
presence of spillovers (see Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), Amir (2000), Lambertini and Rossini (2009) for
example), over the last twenty years there has been an increasing interest in the role that R&D collaboration agree-
ments might play in stimulating innovation and this can be a reason why RJVs are not treated as per se violations by
the antitrust authorities and are encouraged by policy-makers. The R&D cooperation literature may lead to believe that
R&D cooperation between firms is quite common and that collaboration, once initiated, is unlikely to fail. However,
even in high-tech sectors, cooperation at the R&D level is still more the exception that the rule. Furthermore, a large
number of RJV break down before completion of the project (Kogut, 1989). The empirical literature has emphasized
the role of asymmetries (basically in size) in terms of gains from cooperation, that in turn affect decisions about RJV
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membership. Petit and Towlinsky (1999) show that the degree of size-related asymmetries between firms influences
participation decisions. Kogut (1991) stresses that firms have different “absorptive capacities” of research results,
which in turn determine their willingness to form a RJV. The absorptive capacity is determined by factors such as size
and past experience. Röller, Tombak and Siebert (1998) show that size symmetry and product complementary between
firms enhance the likelihood of RJV formation. So, asymmetries seems to affect cooperative outcomes and participa-
tion decisions, but these issues have been scarcely taken into account in the theoretical literature, with few exceptions.
Almost all these models focus on symmetric firms and just compare their investment decisions under two different
regimes (R&D competition and R&D cooperation) to derive policy implications, without considering firms’ actual
incentive to cooperate in R&D when cooperation results to be welfare improving. Asymmetries have mainly been
associated to initial marginal costs or to the spillover parameter, interpreted in terms of absorptive capacity. Baerenss
(1999) finds that asymmetric firms, in terms of initial marginal costs, often fail to agree on RJV formation, even if
the effect on industry profit and welfare would be positive. This is because asymmetric equilibria in production and
research stage may arise and the gains from cooperation are distributed unevenly; accordingly, without side-payments,
the desire to cooperate does not coincide for a wide range of parameters. Atallah (2005a) analyzes the impact of
asymmetric spillovers on the consequences and the incentives for cooperation and finds that in most cases firms will
not agree on cooperating, because cooperation reduces the profits of one of them. As for RJVs formation process,
studies are mostly related to partner selection (Atallah, 2005b) or coalition stability issues (Goyal et al., 2001; Song
and Vannetelbosch, 2007).
In this work I try to contribute to fill this gap by extending the standard AJ model to take into account asymmetric
firms in an investment game in which they have also to decide about RJV membership. Differently from previous
models, firms are assumed to be asymmetric in the efficiency of R&D investment, that is, in the effective cost reduction
obtained from R&D investment. Firms start with identical marginal costs, but these are affected in different way by
investment decisions.
My model differs from that of AJ mainly in three aspects, in addition to the introduction of asymmetric firms. First,
the investment choice is discrete, that is firms have to decide if invest a fixed amount in R&D or avoid R&D activity1.
The use of a discrete variable for R&D investment choice implies that results have to be interpreted in terms of regions
of parameters’ values for the variable under consideration; if, under a certain regime, there is a larger region in which
an equilibrium with investment does exist, it can be said that in that regime the probability to observe investment is
higher, so there is more investment. Second, I do not assume joint profit maximization in RJV, since it would imply a
system of transfers in presence of asymmetric outcomes (Baerenss (1999), Salant and Shaffer (1998)); I assume that
in RJV firms have to coordinate their R&D effort, that is they have to agree on the same investment strategy. Third,
To analyze the incentive to form a RJV, I add a further step to the standard game, in which firms’ decisions about RJV
membership determine the regime in which they will end up in the investment stage2.
I solve the model not only for the case in which firms are asymmetric, but also for the case of symmetric firms;
from the comparison of the two cases it can be assessed the relevance of firms’ asymmetries in terms of outcomes.
Moreover, it will be shown that, in the particular case in which firms are symmetric, my version of the model replicates
the results of the standard model, that is there is more (less) investment in RJV regime when spillovers are high (low);
so, results arising from the extended (modified) model should hold also for standard models.
1This choice has been done mainly to make the model tractable; however it turned out to be useful since it allows for possible asymmetric
investment choices even in presence of simmetric firms, while in almost all the models where investment variable is continouos only symmetric
solutions are taken into account.
2The analysis of the incentive to cooperate in R&D is particularly interesting in presence of asymmetric firms; with symmetric firms and joint
profit maximization in RJV , firms have always incentive to cooperate, given that outcomes are symmetric (Lambertini and Rossini, 2009).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model; in Section 3 equilibria for each stage of the
game and for the whole game are derived for the case of high spillovers, while in Section 4 the case of low spillovers
is treated; Section 5 concludes.
2.1 The Model
The model is a modified version of the standard 2-stage investment game with spillovers (AJ model). As said before,
equilibrium outcome are computed for the case of asymmetric firms as well as for the case of symmetric firms. The
description of the game and the generic formulation of payoffs hold for both symmetric and asymmetric firms, with
minor differences.
There are two firms (firm 1 and firm 2) competing on quantities and facing the inverse demand function for an
homogeneous good:
P = a−Q = a−q1−q2
Each firm can decide to invest a fixed amount K > 0 in R&D in order to reduce the initial marginal cost c (assumed
identical for the two firms) by ti(i = 1,2). R&D investment can make firms asymmetric, even if they both invest; in
fact, firm 1 and firm 2 could not be equally efficient in R&D activity. When we analyze the case of symmetric firms,
we are considering two firms that are equally efficient in their R&D activity: R&D investment leads to the same costs
reducion, that is t1 = t2 = t. In the case of asymmetric firms, firm 2 obtains a lower cost reduction from investment: if
it invests K, the costs reduction is t2 = αt, with α ∈ (0, 1), while t1 = t, provided that firm 1 invests. The investment
of a firm also benefits the rival due to the presence of spillovers (non-perfect appropriability of the results of R&D
activity); this creates a positive externality problem leading to R&D under-investment3. In this model firms have the
possibility to form a Research Joint Venture (RJV) to jointly determine an investment strategy. In the following for a
RJV regime coordination is required in order to invest in R&D, that is, we observe investment only if both firms agree
on this decision; the choice of no investment by at least one firm in RJV prevents R&D investment. We characterize
the RJV in this way because this kind of agreement is considered a mean to internalize the externality arising from the
existence of spillovers and to eliminate the ’free riding’ problem. The preceding works model RJV as a situation in
which symmetric firms make R&D investment choices in order to maximize the joint profit (the variable describing
R&D effort/expenditure is continuous) and take symmetric actions. In this model, in which R&D choice is discrete,
we assume this kind of coordination in RJV to replace the ’joint profit maximization hypothesis’. Asymmetric firms
and discrete R&D choice may lead to asymmetric outcomes and the joint profit maximization would imply a system of
side payments (see Baerenss (1999) and Salant and Shaffer (1998)). So, in the RJV regime there are only two possible
outcomes: either both firm invest or none invests.
Coordination in production is not allowed. The spillover parameter is assumed to be exogenous: it is not a matter
of choice for firms (as in Poyago-Thoetoky (1999) and Amir et al. (2003)) and its value does not change when firms
are in RJV (in Beath et al. (1998), Atallah (2005), Kamien et al. (1992), Baerenss (1999) and Lambertini and Rossini
(2009), under RJV regime, the spillover parameter takes value one since it is assumed information sharing in addition
to coordination of R&D effort). I follow d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) in keeping the spillover exogenous. With
3d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), Brocas (2004).
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this assumption I don’t mean that information disclosure in RJV is not a relevant issue; simply, it could be realistic
to think that a firm (that maximizes its own profit in RJV) is not willing to share its knowledge with the other firm
(a rival in the production stage). Poyago-Theotoky (1999) show that, when firms can decide about the value of the
spillover parameter as measure of information disclosure and maximize their own profit, they will set the minimum
level4. While R&D expenditure is observable, information disclosure is not a contractible variable, so it makes sense
to assume that the extent of knowledge leakage is the same under both regimes.
Generic formulation for firm i’s profits (i = 1, 2) can be written as:
Πi = (P− ci)qi−Ki
where
Ki ∈ {0, K}, K > 0
ci = c− ti−β t j, with j = 1, 2 and j 6= i
0≤ β ≤ 1 is the spillover parameter
ti = 0 if Ki = 0, with (i = 1, 2)
t1 = t if K1 = K
t2 = αt with 0 < α ≤ 1 if K2 = K5
In the special case in which α = 1 we are assuming that firms are symmetric. The maximum cost reduction is
obtained when the two firms are symmetric, both invest, and the spillover is maximum; so the minimum level of the
marginal cost is (c−2t).
Assumptions:
(i) t > 0
(ii) t ≤ c2 (non-negative costs)
(iii) t ≤ (a− c)≡ θ (non-negative quantities)
(i), (ii) and (iii) imply 0 < t ≤ min{ c2 , θ}.
Assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) imply 0 < t ≤ min{ c2 , θ}.
Timing
The model is a three-stage game:
1. At the first stage firms have to decide about forming a RJV or not. Each firm chooses between IN (if it wants to
stay in RJV regime) and OUT (if it prefers to manage its own R&D strategy in a context of competition). RJV
is formed only if both firms agree on RJV formation.
2. At the second stage firms decide about the investment strategy. Two different regimes have to be considered:
(i) if the RJV has not been formed in the previous stage, firms decide non-cooperatively whether invest or not
in R&D (possible actions are Ki = 0 and Ki = K, i = 1,2); (ii) if firms are in RJV regime, they have to take
symmetric actions: invest or not. So the only possible outcomes are K1 = K2 = K or K1 = K2 = 0.
4The spillover parameter, when endogenously determined by firms, takes maximal value if firms maximize the joint profit, under the assumption
of symmetric R&D effort. Amir et al. (2001) find similar results.
5Remember that firm 2’ costs reduction depends on its R&D efficiency.
22
3. At the third stage firms compete à la Cournot; cooperation in production is not allowed even in the case in which
firms have formed a RJV.
At the beginning of each stage, firms observe the outcome of the previous stage (multi-stage game with observed
actions). The game is solved backward: equilibrium strategies for symmetric and asymmetric firms are computed for
each stage, starting from the last one and moving backward to find the equilibria of the whole game.
In the following, we divide the analysis in two cases treated in separate sections, namely the case of high spillovers
(β > 12 ) and the case of low spillovers. (β <
1
2 ). This distinction is common in the literature, since the value of
β larger or smaller than 12 determines the thresholds that will define the regions of parameters and, accordingly, the
results. We start by considering the case of high spillovers; this describes a situation in which a firm obtains large
benefits from R&D investment of the rival. However, in order to derive some policy implication about the desirability
of RJVs, the effects of R&D cooperation when spillovers are low need to be analyzed. Also, the limit case of low
spillovers (β → 0) represents a situation in which the externality problem does not exist and can be used to infer the
consequences of allowing R&D cooperation when the extent of spillovers is very limited.
2.2 The case of high spillovers
2.2.1 Stage 3: Cournot competition
Equilibrium strategies in this stage are given by the quantities that maximize each firm’s profits given the choice
of the rival. Firm i chooses qi that maximize
Πi = (P− ci)qi−Ki
given q j (i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j), Since c1 = c− t1−β t2 and c2 = c− t2−β t1, best responses are
q1 =
a−2c1+ c2
3
=
θ + t1(2−β )+ t2(2β −1)
3
(2.1)
q2 =
a−2c2+ c1
3
=
θ + t2(2−β )+ t1(2β −1)
3
(2.2)
with θ = (a− c). The resulting profits (payoffs) are
Π1 =
1
9
[θ + t1(2−β )+ t2(2β −1)]2−K1 (2.3)
Π2 =
1
9
[θ + t2(2−β )+ t1(2β −1)]2−K2 (2.4)
This is a generic formulation that holds for both symmetric and asymmetric firms; what makes different the two
cases is the value of t2 when K2 = K in the second stage6. Also, the final value of firms’ profits will depend upon
6Remember that, after investment, firm 2’s cost reduction is t in case of symmetric firms and αt in case of asymmetric firms.
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investment’s choices made at stage 2, which determine the actual value of K1, K2, t1 and t2. So, in the preceding stage,
firms can anticipate what will be their profits given their own investment strategy and the rival’s one.
Note that, when spillovers are high and both firms invest, the optimal quantity produced by firm 1 is lower when it
is facing the less efficient firm (t2 = αt): firm 1 is less aggressive when the R&D productivity of the rival is lower and
the latter has higher marginal cost. Even if the two firms are asymmetric, the higher is β , the more c1 and c2 converge
and firm 1 loses its competitive hedge; moreover firm 1’s cost reduction is lower with respect to the case in which it
faces an equally efficient firm.
2.2.2 Stage 2: Investment strategy
In this stage two possible regimes have to be analyzed: if the two firms have not formed the RJV in the first
stage, they make simultaneous decisions about R&D investment without coordination, that is, each firm i chooses
between Ki = 0 and Ki = K (i = 1, 2) in order to maximize its final payoff. If the two firms have set up a RJV, they
have to coordinate on the same action (invest or not). I assume that in RJV each firm i states its preference between
Πi(Ki = K j = K) and Πi(Ki = K j = 0), with j 6= i; if their preferences are not the same there is no investment in the
RJV and no further investment is possible7. The analysis of this stage allows comparisons with the literature on R&D
competition versus R&D cooperation, where most of the models (designed as two-stages games) just compare the
amount of R&D effort/expenditure chosen by firms under the two different regimes to derive policy implications. It
will be shown that this model generates similar results in case of symmetric firms, confirming the equivalence between
discrete and continouos models. In addition, investment strategies under the two regimes can be compared also for the
case of symmetric firms.
2.2.2.1 R&D competition regime
Let si = {0, K} be the strategy of firm i, i = 1, 2, in R&D competition; s = (s1, s¯2) is the strategy profile of the
players. The following propositions state equilibrium investment choices when firms do not coordinate their R&D
efforts.
Proposition 1. When firm 1 and firm 2 are symmetric and spillovers are high, in R&D competition: (i) if K <
(t/9)(2−β )(2θ + 3β t) ≡ τ , the SPE is such that both firms invest in R&D, whereas (ii) if K > τ , there is a unique
SPE in which none invests.
Proof.
Firms’ choices are symmetric. If s j =K, si =K iff (Πi|s¯i =K, s¯ j =K) = [θ+t(1+β )]
2
9 −K > [θ+t(2β−1)]
2
9 = (Πi|s¯i =
0, s¯ j = K), with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, that is iff
K <
t(2−β )[2θ +3β t]
9
≡ τ (2.5)
If firm j plays 0, firm i will play 0 iff (Πi|s¯i = 0, s¯ j = 0) = θ29 > [θ+t(2−β )]
2
9 −K = (Πi|s¯i = K, s¯ j = 0), with
i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, that is iff
K >
t(2−β )[2θ + t(2−β )]
9
≡ δ (2.6)
7This assumption is justified by the fact that a firm willing to invest can anticipate in the first stage the lack of coordination in RJV and decide
to compete in R&D in the second stage (choosing OUT in the first stage).
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Given that δ < τ , if K < δ , the unique SPE is such that both firms invest, and, if K > τ , there is a unique
SPE in which none invests. In δ < K < τ , both types of symmetric equilibrium are possible. Since, in this region,
(Πi|s¯i = K, s¯ j = K) > (Πi|s¯i = 0, s¯ j = 0), the Pareto Dominance concept can be used to select the equilibrium with
investment.
According to Proposition 1, symmetric firms adopt symmetric investment strategies: when the cost of investment
is under a certain threshold they both invest, while if the cost is above the threshold none invests. This is consistent
with the findings in the theoretical literature, where firms have to decide the amount of R&D expenditure (continuous
variable) and they are assumed to take symmetric strategies.
Proposition 2. When firm 1 and firm 2 are asymmetric (firm 2 has lower R&D productivity) and spillovers are
high, in R&D competition the unique SPE are: (i) if K < αt(2−β )[2θ+2t(2β−1)+αt(2−β )]9 ≡ h, both firms invest in R&D,
(ii) if h < K < δ 8, only firm 1 invests; (iii) if K > δ none invests.
Proof.
If s¯1 = K, s¯2 = K iff (Π2|s¯2 = K, s¯1 = K) = [θ+αt(2−β )+t(2β−1)]
2
9 −K > [θ+t(2β−1)]
2
9 = (Π2|s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = K), that is
iff
K <
αt(2−β )[2θ +αt(2−β )+2t(2β −1)]
9
≡ h (2.7)
Given s¯2 = K, s¯1 = K iff (Π1|s¯1 = K, s¯2 = K) = [θ+t(2−β )+αt(2β−1)]
2
9 −K > [θ+αt(2β−1)]
2
9 = (Π1|s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = K), that
is iff
K <
t(2−β )[2θ +2αt(2β −1)+ t(2−β )]
9
≡ g
Since h < g, s¯ = (K, K) is SPE when K < h.
If s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = 0 iff (Π2|s¯2 = 0, s¯1 = 0) = θ29 > [θ+αt(2−β )]
2
9 −K = (Π2|s¯2 = K, s¯1 = 0), that is iff
K >
αt(2−β )[2θ +αt(2−β )]
9
≡ f
Given s¯2 = 0, s¯1 = 0 iff (Π1|s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = 0) = θ29 > [θ+t(2−β )]
2
9 −K = (Π1|s¯1 = K, s¯2 = 0), that is iff K > δ . Since
δ > f , s¯ = (0, 0) is SPE when K > δ .
If K > g, s¯1 = 0 given s¯2 = K; if s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = K iff K < f . Since g > f , s¯ = (0, K) cannot be a SPE.
If s¯1 = K and K > h, firm 2 will play s¯2 = 0; when s¯2 = 0, s¯1 = K iff K < δ . Given that h < δ , s¯ = (K, 0) is SPE
when h < K < δ .
Also, given the order of thresholds, equilibria in each interval are unique.
Differently from the case of symmetric firms, when firms are characterized by different R&D productivity an equi-
librium with asymmetric investment choices may arise; there is a region of parameters in which only the more efficient
firm invest, whereas the other one exploits the spillover effect to reduce its costs without paying the investment’s cost.
It will be shown in the following that this asymmetric equilibrium strongly affects the decision to cooperate in R&D.
From Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 the following corollary can be stated.
Corollary 1. In presence of high spillovers, given that δ < τ , firm 1 invests in a smaller region of parameters when
it faces a firm that is less efficient in R&D activity.
8Where δ is defined in (6)
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Figure 1 shows R&D investment choices in R&D competition regime for the case of symmetric and asymmetric
firms. It is not surprising to observe less investment by part of the less efficient firm, made evident by the region
with asymmetric investment choices; however it can be noted that when spillovers are high also firm 1 is less likely to
invest if its rival is characterized by lower R&D productivity, with respect to the case in which the other firm is equally
efficient.
Figure 2.1: R&D investment choices in R&D competition regime (high spillovers)
h δ τ
KK K0 00
KK 00
Note: each outcome represents firms’ investment choices in an equilibrium of the continuation game started at the beginning of the second stage.
The first element refers to the choice of firm 1, the second to the choice of firm 2. Above the solid line is represented the case of symmetric firms;
below the solid line there are the outcomes for asymmetric firms.
2.2.2.2 Research Joint Venture regime
If the two firms formed a RJV at the first stage, coordination is required to invest in R&D, that is, we observe
investment only if both firms agree on this decision. So, in a RJV there are only two possible outcomes: either both
firm invest or none invests. I assume that each firm states its preference over ’invest’ (to which correspond the profits
after K1 = K2 = K), or ’not invest’ (to which correspond the profits after K1 = K2 = 0); in case of disagreement, no
firm can invest. Let s˜ = (s˜1, s˜2)) be the combination of actions taken by the players, with s˜1, s˜2 = {(00), (KK)}.
Firms’ feasible actions are named KK and 00 to indicate that the choice of a player refers to an outcome in which both
firms take the same investment strategy.
Proposition 3. If firm 1 and firm 2 are asymmetric and spillovers are high, in RJV regime the unique SPE are: (i)
the RJV invests if K < (1/9)[t(2β −1)+αt(2−β )][2θ + t(2β −1)+αt(2−β )]≡ ρ , (ii) the RJV does not invest if
K > ρ .
Proof.
Firm 2 prefers investment in RJV when (Π2|K2 =K, K1 =K)> (Π2|K2 = 0, K1 = 0), that is if [θ+αt(2−β )+t(2β−1)]
2
9 −
K > θ
2
9 , or
K <
[t(2β −1)+αt(2−β )][2θ + t(2β −1)+αt(2−β )]
9
≡ ρ. (2.8)
Firm 1 prefers investment in RJV when (Π1|K1 =K, K2 =K)> (Π1|K1 = 0, K2 = 0), that is if [θ+t(2−β )+αt(2β−1)]
2
9 −
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K > θ
2
9 , or
K <
[αt(2β −1)+ t(2−β )][2θ +αt(2β −1)+ t(2−β )]
9
≡ ρ ′ (2.9)
Since ρ < ρ ′ , the RJV invests only if K < ρ; in the interval [ρ, ρ ′ ], the preference of firm 2 prevents investment;
for K > ρ ′ both firms prefer not to invest in RJV.
If α was equal to one, the two thresholds ρ and ρ ′ would take the same value. This new threshold is named z:
z≡ t(1+β )[2θ + t(1+β )]
9
(2.10)
From Proposition 3, simply putting α = 1, the following corollary can be derived.
Corollary 2. If firm 1 and firm 2 are symmetric and spillovers are high, in RJV regime: (i) if K < z, the unique
SPE is such the RJV invests, whereas (ii) if K > z, there is a unique SPE in which the RJV does not invest.
Ordering on the same line the thresholds that define the regions of parameters for the equilibria in the two regimes,
it is possible to compare, for each interval, the outcomes under R&D competition and under RJV regime. This is
the way in which previous models evaluate how the possibility to coordinate R&D efforts changes the outcomes in
terms of investment. Figures 2-4 show the comparison of R&D investment decisions under the two regimes in case of
symmetric and asymmetric firms; given that ρ can be larger of smaller than δ , according to the parameters’ values,
two different figures are used to describe the case of asymmetric firms.
Figure 2.2: Symmetric firms: comparison of regimes (high spillovers)
τ z
KK 00
KK 00
Note: equilibria of the continuation game started at the beginning of the second stage. Outcomes above the solid line refer to symmetric firms’
investment choices in R&D competition regime; below the solid line are represented investment choices in RJV regime. The first element refers to
firm 1, the second to firm 2.
From Figure 2 it can be noted that, when firms are equally efficient in their R&D activity, the region of parameters
in which firms invest is larger under RJV regime (in the interval [τ, z] there is no investment in R&D competition),
that is, it is more likely to observe higher total investment in RJV regime. This is in line with the past theoretical
literature, according to which, in presence of high spillovers, RJV enhances investment in R&D through coordination,
that allows to internalize the spillovers externality. Figure 3 and Figure 4 highlight consistent results for asymmetric
firms: there is more total investment in RJV, given that in the interval [h, ρ] at least one of the two firms does not invest
in R&D competition, while in RJV the equilibrium is such that both firms invest.
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Figure 2.3: Asymmetric firms: comparison of regimes (high spillovers) - ρ < δ
h ρ δ
KK
K0
00
KK 00
Note: equilibria of the continuation game started at the beginning of the second stage. Outcomes above the solid line refer to asymmetric firms’
investment choices in R&D competition regime; below the solid line are represented investment choices in RJV regime. The first element refers to
firm 1, the second to firm 2.
Figure 2.4: Asymmetric firms: comparison of regimes (high spillovers) - ρ > δ
h δ ρ
.5.75
KK
K0
00
KK 00
Note: equilibria of the continuation game started at the beginning of the second stage. Outcomes above the solid line refer to asymmetric firms’
investment choices in R&D competition regime; below the solid line are represented investment choices in RJV regime. The first element refers to
firm 1, the second to firm 2.
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The analysis of the formation process allows to establish whether these beneficial effects can actually emerge, that
is if the RJV is going to be formed in the regions of parameters in which it enhances the total investment. This will be
done in the following subsection.
2.2.3 Stage 1: RJV formation
At the beginning of the game firms have to decide about the possibility to form a RJV that commit them to
coordinate their R&D effort. Let s = (s1, s2), with s1, s2 = {IN, OUT}, be a generic combination of actions taken by
firm 1 and firm 2 at first stage. Firm i (i = 1, 2) plays si = IN if it expects an higher profit from cooperation in R&D;
it plays si = OUT if it prefers to manage its own investment strategy in a context of competition. The RJV is formed
if s1 = s2 = IN.
Since the game is solved backward, in this stage each firm takes its decision about RJV formation comparing the
(possibly) different profits it expects to obtain under the two regimes. With reference to Figures 2-4, the analysis will
be developed only for the intervals in which the outcomes under the two regimes are different; in all the other intervals
the possibility to coordinate R&D efforts cannot change investment decisions and firms will be indifferent between
the two actions.
Proposition 4. When spillovers are high, symmetric firms have incentive to form a RJV in the region of parameters
in which this kind of agreement leads to different investment choices with respect to R&D competition. In the interval
[τ, z] the possibility to cooperate in R&D enhance innovation by increasing the total investment. This equilibrium is
welfare improving with respect to a situation in which only R&D competition is feasible.
Proof.
In case of symmetric firms, the two regimes differs in terms of outcome only in the interval [τ, z], where both firms
invest in RJV and none in R&D competition. It is straightforward that, in this region, firms will form the RJV, since
ΠKKi > Π00i (i = 1, 2) if K < z (see Proposition 3 and Corollary 2). The resulting equilibrium in which both firms
invest in RJV increases the total surplus since firms get higher profits and the lower costs induced by R&D activity
allow to produced larger quantities and reduce the price, thus increasing also the consumer surplus.
So, in case of symmetric firms, a region of parameters in which the beneficial effect of RJVs actually materializes
always exists. Unfortunately, this is not the case when firms have different R&D productivity. Even if from the simple
comparison of regimes RJV appeared to boost total investment9, equilibria of the whole game are such that there
is no incentive to cooperate by part of the the less efficient firm when the equilibrium in R&D competition entails
asymmetric investment choices. Asymmetric firms can find profitable to set up a RJV to invest only if the cost of
investment is such that the equilibrium in R&D competition entails no investment at all, while at the same time profits
are higher when both firms invest than when no firm invests. However, this equilibrium with RJV formation between
asymmetric firms does not necessarely exist: its existence depends upon parameters’ values. Proposition 5 states these
results in a formal way; as before, only the intervals with different outcomes in the two regimes are taken into account.
Proposition 5. When spillovers are high and firms are asymmetric (i) for h < K < δ the RJV is not formed; (ii) if
ρ > δ , in the interval [δ , ρ] the RJV will be formed and leads to more investment and higher total surplus.
Proof.
9The threshold below which the RJV invests (ρ) is higher than the threshold below which both firms invest in R&D competition (h).
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First of all, remember that the parameter ρ is always larger than h but can be larger or smaller than δ according to
the parameters’ values.
(i) When h < K < δ , the equilibrium in R&D competition is such that only firm 1 invests; this means that ΠK01 >
Π001 and Π
K0
2 > Π
KK
2 (see Proposition 2). So, whatever the equilibrium in RJV regime, one of the two firms will not
find profitable the adoption of the same investment strategy by part of both firm and will choose the action OUT .
(ii) If ρ > δ , in the interval [δ , ρ] there is no investment at all in R&D competition, but equilibrium in RJV regime
entails investment; this means that ΠKKi > Π00i for i = 1, 2. Hence both firms have incentive to choose the action IN
and the equilibrium of the whole game is such that RJV is formed and invests. If this is the case, firms’ profits are
higher and consumers benefit from the costs reduction (welfare improvement).
To sum up, due to the presence of asymmetric equilibria in R&D competition regime, for most of the parameters
values, a RJV between asymmetric firms is not going to be formed and so has not beneficial effects in terms of
enhancing innovation. This is because, in most of the cases, the less efficient firm prefers to exploit the benefits from
firm 1’s R&D activity (through spillover effect) without paying the cost of investment. As stated above, it might exist
a region of parameters in which the possibility to create a RJV between asymmetric firms enhances innovation; this
happens only if ρ > δ . It can be shown that the lower is α , the more it is likely that ρ < δ ; so, the more firms
are different in terms of R&D productivity, the less is likely to observe RJV formation. These results are consistent
with the empirical evidence according to which asymmetries between firms negatively influence RJV participation
decisions (see for example Petit and Towlinsky (1999) and Röller, Tombak and Siebert (1998)). Also, for a given
α , if the spillover parameter tends to its maximum value (β → 1), ρ tends to become larger than δ , implying that
if the spillover externality is very severe there is a region of parameters in which for the more efficient firm is not
profitable to invest when the rival just exploit the spillover effect, but both firms can be better off if, in RJV, they
commit themselves to invest.
2.3 The case of low spillovers
For the case of low spillovers, I only sketch the equilibria in second and first stage and comment the main findings.
The way in which equilibria are derived is the same as for the case of high spillovers; what it is different is just the
order of the relevant thresholds and, accordingly, the equilibrium strategies in some regions of parameters.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the equilibrium strategies in R&D competition and RJV regime for symmetric and
asymmetric firms. It can be noted from Figure 5 that, differently from the case of high spillovers, in R&D competition
there also equilibria that reflect asymmetric investment choices by part of symmetric firms. In the interval [τ, δ ]10there
are two possible equilibria in which only one of the two firms invests, and no one can be ruled out according to Pareto
dominance criterion. The threshold below which symmetric firms invest in RJV regime (z) is lower than τ when β < 12 ;
hence, consistent with the past literature, the total investment is lower in RJV regime when spillovers are low (it is
more likely to observe investment when firms choose investment strategies non-cooperatively). Qualitatively similar
results emerge for asymmetric firms. Figure 6 shows that the order of thresholds that characterize R&D competition
is the same as for high spillovers case, but here the value of K that defines the region in which the RJV invests (ρ) is
lower than h; so, there is less investment in RJV regime also for symmetric firms. These results could be explained by
the fact that if firms keep most of the benefits from R&D investment and act non-cooperatively, they are more willing
to invest in R&D to avoid being left behind. If this fear disappears, they reduce R&D activity (which means higher
10The thresholds τ and δ are defined in (5) and (6) respectively.
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Figure 2.5: Symmetric firms: comparison of regimes (low spillovers)
z τ δ
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KK 00
Note: equilibria of the continuation game started at the beginning of the second stage. Outcomes above the solid line refer to symmetric firms’
investment choices in R&D competition regime; below the solid line are represented investment choices in RJV regime. The first element refers to
firm 1, the second to firm 2.
Figure 2.6: Asymmetric firms: comparison of regimes (low spillovers)
ρ h δ
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Note: equilibria of the continuation game started at the beginning of the second stage. Outcomes above the solid line refer to asymmetric firms’
investment choices in R&D competition regime; below the solid line are represented investment choices in RJV regime. The first element refers to
firm 1, the second to firm 2.
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costs and consumer prices).
What is particularly important in this section is to see whether cooperation agreements (leading to less total invest-
ment) are actually established. In the following lemmas firms decisions in the first stage are stated for the region of
parameters in which the two regimes generates different outcomes.
Lemma 1. When firms are symmetric and spillovers are low, a RJV in which firms do not invest is formed for
z < K < τ . In the interval [τ, δ ] firms fail to agree on the same investment strategy and end up in R&D competition.
Proof.
The proof is straightforward. In the interval [z, τ] each firm has incentive to stay in RJV, given that the profit it
obtains in RJV, where firms jointly decide not to invest, is larger than the profit it get in R&D competition, where both
firms invest (Proposition ? show that Π00i >Π
KK
i for K > z, with i = 1, 2). For τ < K < δ the RJV cannot be formed
since in R&D competition two equilibria in which only one firm invests are possible, meaning that each firms prefers
an outcome with asymmetric investment choices to one with no investment at all.
Lemma 2. When spillovers are low, asymmetric firms establish a RJV in which there is no investment in the
interval [ρ, h]. When h < K < δ , the less efficient firm gets an higher profit in R&D competition, so the RJV is not
formed.
Proof.
The same arguments discussed in the proof of Lemma 1 for the regions with symmetric and asymmetric outcome
in R&D competition hold.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 it follows
Proposition 6. When spillovers are low, it always exist a region of parameters in which firms agree to form a RJV
with the aim of avoid investment; this happens irrespective of the fact that firms are symmetric or asymmetric.
According to these findings, when spillovers are low, allowing R&D cooperation agreements can be harmful if
the aim is that of enhancing innovation; if the externality is not severe, symmetric and asymmetric firms will have
incentive to collude to avoid investment in some regions of parameters.
Conclusions
In the previous sections, I develope a 3-stage duopoly model of R&D investment in the presence of spillovers, to
analyze firms’ willingness to form cooperative agreements to coordinate R&D efforts, taking into account possible
firms’ asymmetries in terms of R&D’s efficiency. Equilibrium choices at the first stage determines the regime under
which the two firms will define their R&D investment strategies: R&D competition or RJV. Analyzing the formation
process allows to go beyond a simple comparison of investment choices under the two regimes and establish whether
the outcomes under RJV regime can actually emerge.The analysis considered both the case of high and low spillovers.
When the externality arising from non complete appropriability of the results of R&D efforts is large and a firm
obtains large benefits from R&D investment of the rival (high spillovers case), RJV enhances investment when firms
are symmetric. It always exists a region of parameters in which firms agree to form a RJV and the resulting coordi-
nation effect leads to more total investment and higher profits (welfare improvement). When firms are asymmetric,
instead, R&D cooperation is not likely to fulfill the aim of stimulating innovation. In RJV regime there are larger
regions of parameters with equilibria entailing more total investment irrespective of possible asymmetries between
the two firms. However, for most of the parameters’ values, a RJV with investment is never formed when firms are
asymmetric and the alleged beneficial coordination effect does not actually emerge. This is due to the presence of
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equilibria with asymmetric investment choices in R&D competition regime; for values of the cost of investment such
that this kind of equilibria arises, the less efficient firm can exploit the spillover effect to become more efficient at no
cost, so it has no incentive to commit itself to invest. The larger the difference in terms of R&D productivity, the less
is likely to observe RJV formation. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence according to which asym-
metries between firms negatively influence RJV participation decisions (see for example Petit and Towlinsky (1999)
and Röller, Tombak and Siebert (1998)).
The possibility to create a RJV can even be harmful, if it is meant to increase total investment, when the extent
of spillovers is very limited; when spillovers are low, not only the total investment is lower in RJV regime, but also it
always exist a region of parameters in which firms agree to form a RJV with the aim of avoid investment. This result
holds in case of both symmetric and asymmetric firms.
So, RJVs can be a useful tool to overcome the problem of under-investment in R&D in presence of externality
only when the extent of this latter is large. Also, the innovation enhancing effect can be guaranteed just in case of
symmetric firms; the formation of a RJV aiming to invest is much less likely when firms are not equally efficient, and
does not even need to arise. If the externality is not severe, competition remains the better way to stimulate investment
and promote innovation.
33
Bibliography
[1] Amir R., 2000, Modeling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers, International Journal of Industrial Or-
ganization, 18, 1013-1032.
[2] Amir M, Amir R., Jin J., 2000, Sequencing R&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers, Economic
Theory, 15, 297-317.
[3] Amir R., Evstigneev I., Wooders J., 2003, Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover
rates, Games and Economic Behavior, 42, 183-207.
[4] Atallah G., 2005a, R&D Cooperation with Asymmetric Spillovers, The Canadian Journal of Economics, vol.38,
n.3, 919-936.
[5] Atallah G., 2005b, Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation, CIRANO Working Papers, n. 2005-s24.
[6] Baerenss A., 1999, R&D Joint Ventures: The Case of Asymmetric Firms, Center for Economic Analysis,
Department of Economics, University of Colorado, Working Paper n.99-17.
[7] Battagion M.R., Garella P.G., 2001, Joint venture for a new product and antitrust exemptions, Australian Eco-
nomic papers,vol.40, issue 3, 247-62.
[8] Beath J., Poyago-Theotoky J., Ulph D., 1998, Organization design and information sharing in a research joint
venture with spillovers, Bulletin of Economic Research, 50:1, 47-59.
[9] Benfratello L., Sembenelli A., 2002, Research joint ventures and firm level performance, Research Policy, 31,
493-507.
[10] Bensaid B., Gary-Bobo R.J., 1996, An Exact Formula for the Lion’s Share: A Model of Preplay Negotiation,
Games and Economic Behavior, 14, 44-89.
[11] Board O., 2009, Competition and Disclosure, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.57, n.1, 197-213.
[12] Bourreau M., Dogan P., 2010, Cooperation in product development and process R&D between competitors,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28, 176-190.
[13] Cramton P.C., Palfrey T.R., 1990, Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs, International Economic
Review, vol.31, n.1, 17-47.
[14] Creane A., Konishi H., 2009, The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by
proxy, International Journal of Industrial Organization 27, 379-389.
34
[15] d’Aspremont C., Jacquemin A., 1988, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers, The
American Economic Review, vol.78, n.5, 1133-1137.
[16] De Bondt R., 1996, Spillovers and innovative activities, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15,
1-28.
[17] Einy E., Moreno D., Shitovitz B., 2003, The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly, Games and
Economic Behavior, 44, 272-285.
[18] Erkal N., Piccinin D., 2010, Cooperative R&D under uncertainty with free entry, International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization, 28, 74-85.
[19] Flam S.D., Jourani A., 2003, Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing, Games and Economic Behavior, 43,
44-56.
[20] Goyal S., Moraga-Gonzalez J.L., 2001, R&D networks, RAND Journal of Economics vol.32, n.4, 686-707.
[21] Hagedoorn J., Link A.N., Vonortas N.V., 2000, Research Partnerships, Research Policy, 29, 567-586.
[22] Hernan R., Marin P.L., Siotis G., 2003, An empirical evaluation of the determinants of research joint venture
formation, The Journal of Industrial Economics vol.51, n.1, 75-89.
[23] Hinloopen J., 2000, Strategic R&D Co-operatives, Research in Economics, 54, 153-185.
[24] Jaffe A.B., 1986, Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms’ Patents, Profits and
Market Value, The American Economic Review, vol.76, n.5, 984-1001.
[25] Kamien M. I., Muller E., Zang I., 1992, Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels, The American Economic
Review, vol.82, n.5, 1293-1306.
[26] Katsoulacos Y., Ulph D., 1998, Endogenous Spillovers and the Performance of Research Joint Ventures, The
Journal of Industrial Economics vol.46, n.3, 333-357.
[27] Katz M.L., 1986, An analysis of cooperative research and development, RAND Journal of Economics vol.17,
n.4, 527-543.
[28] Kogut B., Walker G., Kim D.J., 1995, Cooperation and entry induction as an extension of technological rivalry,
Research Policy 24, 77-95.
[29] Kultti K., Takalo T., 1998, R&D spillovers and information exchange, Economic Letters, 61, 121-123.
[30] Lambertini L., Rossini G., 2009, The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers,
International Game Theory Review, vol.11, n.1, 1-9.
[31] Leahy D., Neary J.T., 1997, Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries, The American economic
Review, vol.87, n.4, 642-662.
[32] Lerner J., Malmendier U., 2010, Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements, American Economic
Review, vol.100, n.1, 214-246.
35
[33] Ornaghi C., 2006, Spillovers in product and process innovation: Evidence from manufacturing firms, Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 24, 349-380.
[34] Pepall L., Richards D.J., Norman G., 2005, Industrial organization: contemporary theory and practice, Mason,
Thompson South-Western, ch. 22-23-24.
[35] Pérez-Castrillo J.D., Sandonís J., 1996, Disclosure of know-how in research joint ventures, International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 15, 51-75.
[36] Petit M., Towlinski B., 1999, R&D cooperation or competition, European Economic Review, 43, 185-208.
[37] Poyago-Theotoky J., 1995, Equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with
spillovers, The Journal of Industrial Economics vol.43, n.2, 209-226.
[38] Poyago-Theotoky J., 1999, A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R&D Duopoly, Review of
Industrial Organization, 15, 253-262.
[39] Röller L.H., Tombak M., Siebert R., 1998, The Incentives to Form Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evi-
dence, CIG Working Papers, FS IV 98-15.
[40] Saha S., 2007, Consumer Preferences and Product and Process R&D, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol.38,
n.1, 250-268.
[41] Salant S.W., Shaffer G., 1998, Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures, International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 16, 195-208.
[42] Sang-Seung Yi, 1998, Endogenous Formation of Joint Venture with Efficiency Gains, The RAND Journal of
Economics, vol.29, n.3, 610-631.
[43] Sen D., Tauman Y., 2007, General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation, Games and Economic
Behavior, 59, 163-186.
[44] Silipo D.B., 2008, Incentives and forms of cooperation in research and development, Research in Economics,
62, 101-119.
[45] Simonen J., McCann P., 2008, Firm innovation: The influence of R&D cooperation and the geography of human
capital inputs, Journal of Urban Economics, 64(1), 146-154.
[46] Song H., Vannetelbosch V., 2007, International R&D collaboration networks, The Manchester School vol.75,
n.6, 742-766.
[47] Spulber D.F., 1995, Bertrand Competition when Rivals’ Costs are Unknown, The Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, vol. 43, n.1, 1-11.
[48] Suzumura K., 1992, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers, The American
Economic Review, vol.82, n.5, 1307-1320.
[49] Tishler A., Milstein I., 2009, R&D wars and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms
in oligopoly markets, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27, 519-531.
36
[50] Tirole J., 1994, The theory of industrial organization, MIT Press, ch.10.
[51] Westbrock B., 2008, Natural Concentration in industrial research collaboration, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research
Institute, Utrecht School of Economics, Discussion Paper Series 08-15.
[52] Xue M., Gong P., 2006, R&D strategic investment in an asymmetrical case, Jrl Syst Sci & Complexity 19,
547-557.
[53] Yi S., 1998, Endogenous formation of joint ventures with efficiency gains, RAND Journal of Economics vol.29,
n.3, 610-631. Asymmetric information in a duopoly with spillovers: new findings on the effects of RJVs
37
Chapter 3
Asymmetric information in a duopoly with
spillovers: new findings on the effects of
RJVs
Introduction
Innovation is one of the main determinants of economic performance in advanced countries. R&D, one of the key
driver of successful innovation, is crucial not only in the analysis of an individual industry, but also from an economy-
wide point of view. One of the main features of advanced economies is competition in innovation: the now prevalent
view is that firms become industry leaders by conducting R&D activity to improve either their production technology
(process innovation, aiming to a cost reduction) or the products they provide (product innovation, usually associated
with improved quality). Innovation is thought to be beneficial for society, since it should lead to more variety, lower
prices, better quality, etc. At the same time, innovative activities are often associated with a non competitive market
structure and with externalities, meaning that innovation is strictly related to situations that bring to market failures
and to not socially desirable outcomes. These considerations often justify the request of government intervention
in the form of subsidies to R&D activity or patents’ protection. It is not surprising that this argument, related to
several different but interconnected issues, generated a huge amount of theoretical and empirical works. One of the
most studied issues concerns the existence of spillovers, that affects the decisions about R&D investments and that can
determine an inefficient level of R&D effort. When patent protection is not completely effective and innovation creates
spillovers, firms that conduct R&D individually do not internalize the positive externality on their rivals associated
with an innovation. They thus tend to underinvest in R&D from an industry and social point of view (Katz, 1986;
d’Aspremont and Jaquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992). Jaffe (1986), finds empirical evidence of the presence of
spillovers, showing that firms benefit from R&D of their rivals. Ornaghi (2006) highlights a gap between private
and social rate of returns of R&D, concluding that insufficient appropriability reduces investments in R&D. In the
theoretical literature, starting from the seminal paper by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), this problem has been
described using a 2-stage Cournot model in which R&D expenditure results in cost reduction. Part of the competitive
advantage from the resulting costs reduction goes to the rival (spillover problem), that becomes a tougher competitor;
the incentive to invest in R&D can be quite small as each firm seeks to free ride on the other’s efforts. In d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin’s model, cooperation in R&D (RJV), requiring firms to choose the R&D effort in order to maximize
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the joint profit, increases R&D spending when spillovers are high, since it allows to internalize the externality caused
by knowledge spillovers. The policy implication is that RJV should be encouraged as long as the antitrust authorities
can assure that such cooperation on research effort will not also extend to cooperation in production and prices (price
fixing cartel).
Since several extensions of this model confirm the result concerning the desirability of R&D cooperation in pres-
ence of spillovers (Kamien et al., 1992; Suzumura, 1992; Amir, 2000; Lambertini and Rossini, 2009), over the last
twenty years there has been an increasing interest in the role that R&D collaboration agreements might play in help-
ing overcome the discussed market failure. This potential benefit can be a reason why RJVs are not treated as per
se violations by antitrust authorities and are encouraged by policy-makers. EU and Japan have always had positive
and permissive attitude towards cooperation in R&D; EU Commission involvement in the coordination and in the
financing of RJVs, and more generally of cooperative research programs, has substantially increased over the years.
As for US, in 1984, Congress enacted the National Cooperative Research Act, which was extended to the National
Cooperative Research and Production Act in 1993 to include joint production ventures. This act protects R&D joint
ventures and certain qualifying joint production ventures from the strict application of antitrust law (Sherman Act,
1890). Empirical works confirm the positive effect of R&D cooperation on innovation (Simonen and McCann, 2008)
and on firms’ performance (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002). R&D cooperation literature may lead to believe that
R&D cooperation between firms is quite common and that collaboration, once initiated, is unlikely to fail. However,
even in high-tech sectors cooperation at R&D level is still more the exception than the rule. The empirical literature
has emphasized the role of asymmetries (basically in size) in terms of gains from cooperation and decisions on RJV
membership. Petit and Towlinsky (1999) show that the degree of size-related asymmetries between firms influences
participation decisions. Kogut (1991) stresses that firms have different “absorptive capacities” of research results,
which in turn determine their willingness to form a RJV. The absorptive capacity is determined by factors such as size
and past experience. Röller, Tombak and Siebert (1998) show that size symmetry and product complementary between
firms enhance the likelihood of RJV formation. Therefore, asymmetries seems to affect cooperative outcomes and par-
ticipation decisions, but they have been scarcely taken into account in the theoretical literature, with few exceptions.
Asymmetries have been mainly associated to initial marginal costs (Baerenss, 1999) or to the spillover parameter,
interpreted in terms of absorptive capacity (Atallah, 2005a). As for RJVs formation process, past studies are mostly
related to partner selection (Atallah, 2005b) or coalition stability issues (Goyal et al., 2001; Song and Vannetelbosch,
2007).
Here I will start by imposing an asymmetry in the ability to do R&D and then I will introduce incomplete informa-
tion. In particular, I extend the Cournot-duopoly model with investment and spillovers of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) to allow for incomplete information in an investment game in which firms have also to decide about RJV mem-
bership. Differently from the original model, the investment choice is discrete, that is firms have to decide if invest a
fixed amount in R&D or avoid R&D activity; this allows for possible asymmetric outcome. Also, I do not assume joint
profit maximization in RJV, since it would imply a system of transfers in presence of asymmetric outcomes (Baerenss,
1999; Salant and Shaffer, 1998). I assume that in RJV firms have to coordinate their R&D effort, that is, RJV creation
implies investment by part of both firms. The fact that I use a discrete variable for R&D investment choice implies
that results have to be interpreted in terms of regions of parameters values for the variable under consideration; if,
under a certain regime, there is a larger region in which an equilibrium with investment does exist, it can be said that
in that regime the probability to observe investment is higher, so there is more investment. It will be shown that, in the
particular case in which information is complete and firms are symmetric, results are in line with the literature, that is
there is more investment in RJV regime when spillovers are high.
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Incomplete information in R&D literature is mainly related to contract arrangements (d’Aspremont, Bhattacharya
and Gerard-Varet,1998; Pastor and Sandonis, 2000; Brocas, 2004), knowledge disclosure (d’Aspremont, Bhattacharya
and Gerard-Varet, 2000), relative position in patent race (Grishagin, Sergeyev and Silipo, 2001; Kao, 2002) and new
technology adoption (Zhu and Weyant, 2003). Cassiman (2000) assumes asymmetric information between firms and
regulator about spillovers, while Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2004) considers two types of firms (private information)
to study the role of trust in R&D cooperation. Here incomplete information is about the efficiency of R&D investment,
that is the effective cost reduction obtained from a fixed R&D investment; this assumption implies that firms can
become asymmetric after the investment stage (they starts with identical marginal costs). It turns out that a less efficient
firm is more likely to free-ride, avoiding investment and exploiting spillovers from the rival firm. I assume that only
one of the two firms has private information; this assumption can be justified by the fact that R&D productivity may be
not directly observable, especially if a firm is “new” in the market (plausible in high-tech sectors). The hypothesis of
asymmetric information generates additional adverse effects in R&D competition. For example, in case of symmetric
firms, the under-investment in R&D competition regime is worsened by the presence of asymmetric information; also,
in some regions of parameters, the firm with incomplete information chooses an investment strategy that makes it
worse off with respect to the case in which it has complete information (in some sense incomplete information leads
to inefficient investment choices for the firm that has not private information).
To analyze the incentive to form a RJV, I add a further step to the standard game, in which firms’ decisions about
RJV membership determine the regime under which the will operate. At the beginning of the game one firm can
propose an agreement (RJV) involving commitment on R&D investment; the other firm will accept if it thinks that
the agreement will lead to higher profits than those attainable in R&D competition. Most of the previous models
just compare the outcomes under the two different regimes to derive policy implications, without considering whether
firms have incentive to cooperate when cooperation results to be welfare improving. This is particularly important in
presence of asymmetric firms; with symmetric firms and joint profit maximization in RJV, firms have always incentive
to cooperate, given that outcomes are symmetric (Lambertini and Rossini, 2009).
It is common in the literature to distinguish the case of high and low spillovers, since different values of the
spillover parameter can lead to different results. In this paper I focus only the case of high spillovers, which is the
most interesting case since under-investment and need for policy intervention arise when the spillover problem is
severe1.
Results contribute to support previous findings about the desirability of a positive attitude towards R&D cooper-
ation agreements by policy-makers: RJVs can increase the level of investment of efficient firms not only through the
internalization of the externality caused by spillovers, but also through their signaling effect. This model contributes
also to explain empirical findings about the determinants of RJV formation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model; in Sections 3 equilibria in R&D competition
regime are described, while Section 4 defines firms’ strategies regarding RJV formation and summarizes the results;
Section 5 concludes.
1However, I did all the computation also for the case of low spillovers; in the particular case in which information is complete and firms are
symmetric, results are consistent with the past theoretical literature. With asymmetric information, firms have no incentive to form the RJV and the
possibility to coopearate in R&D simply does not change anything with respect to the case in which only R&D competition is feasible. So, given
the positive effect of RJV when spillovers are high, it can be said that allowing RJVs cannot be harmful, even if the regulator does not know the
extent of the spillovers.
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3.1 The model
3.1.1 The set up
Two firms (firm 1 and firm 2) compete on quantities and face the inverse demand function for an homogeneous good:
P = a−Q = a−q1−q2
Each firm can decide to invest a fixed amount K in R&D in order to reduce the initial unit (marginal) cost c
(assumed identical for the two firms) by ti(i = 1,2). R&D investment can make firms asymmetric, even if they both
invest; in fact, firm 1 and firm 2 could not be equally efficient in R&D activity. The investment of a firm also benefits
the rival due to the presence of spillovers (non-perfect appropriability of the results of R&D activity); this creates a
positive externality problem leading to R&D under-investment2. Firms have the possibility to form a Research Joint
Venture (RJV) to coordinate their investment strategies: in RJV they commit to invest. I characterize the RJV in
this way because this kind of agreement is considered a tool to internalize the externality arising from the existence
of spillovers and to eliminate the “free riding” problem. In the literature on this issue, RJV is seen as a situation in
which symmetric firms make R&D investment choices in order to maximize the joint profit (the variable describing
R&D effort/expenditure is continuous) and take symmetric solutions. In this model, in which R&D choice is discrete,
I assume this kind of coordination to replace the “joint profit maximization hypothesis”3. Also, in this model, this
latter hypothesis could require asymmetric R&D efforts by the 2 firms and/or generate outcomes (in particular when
firms are asymmetric) that could be not optimal for a firm that is willing to maximize its own profit. This, in turn,
would require a system of transfers to compensate the firm that finds itself worse off (see Baerenss, 1999 and Salant
and Shaffer, 1998). So, in my model, agreement on RJV formation implies investment by both firms. Coordination
in production is not allowed. The spillover parameter is assumed to be exogenous: it is not a matter of choice for
firms (as in Poyago-Thoetoky, 1999 and Amir et al., 2003) and its value does not change when firms are in RJV4. I
follow d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) in keeping the spillover exogenous. With this assumption I don’t mean that
information disclosure in RJV is not a relevant issue; simply, it could be realistic to think that a firm (that maximizes
its own profit in RJV) is not willing to share its knowledge with the other firm (a rival in the production stage). Poyago-
Theotoky (1999) show that, when firms can decide about the value of the spillover parameter as measure of information
disclosure and maximize their own profit, they will set the minimum level5. While R&D expenditure is observable,
information disclosure is not a contractible variable, so it makes sense to assume that the extent of knowledge leakage
is the same under both regimes.
I only analyze the case of high spillovers; this describes a situation in which a firm obtains large benefits from
R&D investment of the rival. This is the more interesting case, since this literature is focused on R&D cooperation as
a way to handle the externality arising from non complete appropriability of R&D output, and this problem is more
serious the more the spillover is high.
The model is characterized by asymmetric information: firm 1 has incomplete information about the level of
R&D productivity of firm 2, that is it does not know the extent of cost reduction that the rival can obtain from R&D
investment, while firm 2 knows that when firm 1 invests K, its cost reduction is equal to t. We can think of firm 1 as
2See d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), Brocas (2004).
3This leads to equivalent results with respect to the previous models in case of symmetric firms and complete information.
4In the works of Beath et al., 1998, Atallah, 2005, Kamien et al.,1992, Baerenss, 1999 and Lambertini and Rossini, 2009, under RJV regime, the
spillover parameter takes value one since it is assumed information sharing in addition to coordination of R&D effort.
5The spillover parameter, when endogenously determined by firms, takes maximal value if firms maximize the joint profit, under the assumption
of symmetric R&D effort. Amir et al. (2001) find similar results.
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the “incumbent” firm, established in the market, whose productivity level is known; firm 2 could be a “new” firm, just
entered the market, so its productivity is still to be proved.
Let α > 0 denote the productivity of firm 2’s R&D investment6; then, firm 2 can be of two types, αL or αH , with
equal prior probability. If firm 2 is of type αL (low R&D productivity), the cost reduction generated by investing K
is t2 = tαL, with αL < 1, that is, it is less efficient than firm 1 once they have invested in R&D. If firm 2 is of type
αH , (high R&D productivity) the cost reduction is t2 = tαH with αH = 1; in this case firm 1 and firm 2 turn out to be
symmetric (t2 = t).
The generic formulation for firm i’s profits, with i = 1, 2, can be written as: Πi = (P− ci)qi−Ki, where
• Ki ∈ {0, K}, K > 0
• c1 = c− t1−β t2(α) and c2 = c− t2(α)−β t1 with α ∈ {αL,αH}
• ti = 0 if Ki = 0
• t1 = t if K1 = K, t2(α) = {αLt, t} if K2 = K
• β is the spillover parameter.
The maximum cost reduction is obtained when the two firms are symmetric, both invest, and the spillover is maximum;
so the minimum level of the marginal cost is (c−2t).
3.1.2 Timing and assumptions
The following assumpions are stated:
(i) 0 < t ≤ c2 (non-negative costs)
(ii) t ≤ (a− c)≡ θ (non-negative quantities)
(iii) αH = 1 and αL ∈ [0.2, 0.6]
(iv) Prob(α = αH) = Prob(α = αL) = 12 (prior probabilities)
(v) 12 ≤ β ≤ 17
The model is a three-stage game:
1st stage: RJV formation. Firm 1 (the “incumbent”) can propose to firm 2 to form a RJV; the agreement implies
that both firms commit themselves to invest K in the following stage (once RJV is formed, investment is observable
and no firm can deviate from the decision to invest). Obviously, it will make the proposal only if it expects that in
this way an higher profit is attainable; otherwise it will do nothing and firms go directly to R&D competition regime.
Possible actions of firm 1 are defined by “RJV ” (that means that it is willing to form RJV) and “nothing”. If firm 1
makes the proposal, firm 2 can accept (ending in RJV regime in the following stage) or not (R&D competition in 2nd
stage); its actions are called “accept” and “not accept”.
2nd stage: Investment. In this stage two different regimes are taken into account. If the RJV has not been formed
in the first stage, firms decide non-cooperatively and simultaneously whether invest or not in R&D (actions are Ki = 0
6The parameter α is a measure of cost reduction and is private information.
7In general the spillover parameter belongs to the interval [0, 1] and the threshold β = 12 separate low spillovers from high spillovers.
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or Ki = K, i = 1,2). If firms are in RJV, this means that they agreed on investing (K1 = K2 = K); accordingly, there is
no strategic interaction in this part of the game.
3rd stage: Cournot competition. Firms act non-cooperatively (coordination in production is not allowed) and set
the quantities to be produced in order to maximize their (expected) profit given the strategy of the rival.
At the beginning of each stage, firms observe the outcome of the previous stage (multi-stage game with observed
actions). The game is solved backward.
To arrive to the solution of the game I proceed in this way. First, I determine in separate subsections R&D
competition equilibria in case of complete and incomplete information. This allows to identify the consequences
of incomplete information assumption in a context in which cooperation in R&D is not possible; also, to solve the
game, we need to know equilibria arising in case of complete information since the payoffs obtained by the firms
under this assumption are the relevant ones following separating strategies (beliefs updating). Then, I determine
firms’ equilibrium strategies regarding RJV membership comparing the payoffs attainable in RJV regime with those
(expected to be) earned in R&D competition, and summarize the results of the whole game.
3.2 Equilibria under R&D competition regime
3.2.1 The case of complete information
In the game with incomplete information firm 2 can be of two different types: it could be as efficient in R&D
productivity as firm 1 or it can be less efficient. So, looking for equilibria under complete information, I consider
separately the case in which firms are symmetric and the case in which they are asymmetric. Since the game is solved
backward, we first compute equilibrium strategies in last stage (Cournot competition), where the strategic variable is
the quantity to be prodeced in order to maximize profits. These quantities allow to define a generic formulation of
firms’ profits (payoffs), used to find the optimal actions in the previous stage. In the second stage, firm i’s strategy
(i = 1, 2) in R&D competition is denoted by si = {0, K}; s = (s1, s¯2) is the strategy profile of the players.
In the last stage, equilibrium quantities are those of Cournot competition, with the difference that here c1 = c−
t1−β t2 and c2 = c− t2−β t1. So, best responses are
q1(αH) =
a−2c1+ c2
3
=
θ + t1(2−β )+ t2(2β −1)
3
(3.1)
q2 =
a−2c2+ c1
3
=
θ + t2(2−β )+ t1(2β −1)
3
(3.2)
and the resulting profits are, for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j,
Πi =
1
9
[θ + ti(2−β )+ t j(2β −1)]2−Ki (3.3)
Remember that Ki = K or Ki = 0 according to the investment choice made in the previous stage, and this in turn
determines the value of the (possible) cost reduction. So, the expression that define the profits can assume different
shape according to both firms’ investment strategies. Given the equilibrium strategies in the last stage, outcomes of
the strategic interaction in the investment stage are stated in Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1. Under complete information, if firm 1 and firm 2 are symmetric, in R&D competition: (i) if
K < (t/9)(2−β )[2θ +3β t ≡ τ , both firms invest in R&D, whereas (ii) if K > τ , there is a unique SPE in which none
invests.
Proof.
Firms’ choices are symmetric. If firm j plays K, firm i will play K iff (Πi|s¯i = K, s¯ j = K) = [θ+t(1+β )]
2
9 −K >
[θ+t(2β−1)]2
9 = (Πi|s¯i = 0, s¯ j = K), with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, that is iff
K <
t(2−β )[2θ +3β t]
9
≡ τ (3.4)
If firm j plays 0, firm i will play 0 iff (Πi|s¯i = 0, s¯ j = 0) = θ29 > [θ+t(2−β )]
2
9 −K = (Πi|s¯i = K, s¯ j = 0), that is iff
K >
t(2−β )[2θ + t(2−β )]
9
≡ δ (3.5)
Given that δ < τ , if K < δ , the unique SPE is such that both firms invest, and, if K > τ , we have a unique SPE in
which none invests. In δ < K < τ , both symmetric equilibria are possible. Since, in this region, (Πi|s¯i = K, s¯ j = K)>
(Πi|s¯i = 0, s¯ j = 0), Pareto Dominance concept is used to select the equilibrium with investment.
Note that in this case there are only symmetric equilibria: either both firms invest or none invest, depending on the
value of K. Moreover, there is a region of parameters’ values in which both firms would be better off investing (and
this would be also welfare improving), but this outcome does not arise because of the incentive to free-ride. Infact,
provided that
K < z≡ t(1+β )[2θ + t(1+β )]
9
(3.6)
(Πi|s¯i = K, s¯ j = K) > (Πi|s¯i = 0, s¯ j = 0); given that z > τ , if firms could coordinate their R&D efforts, they will
reach a better outcome in the interval [τ, z] for the parameter K, and this is what will happen if they could form a RJV.
As stated before, this is in line with the standard results in the literature where investment choice is continuous and
symmetric firms maximize the joint profit in RJV.
When firm 2 is less efficient in R&D activity than firm 1, the costs structures are such that c1 = c− t1−β (αLt2)
and c2 = c−αLt2−β t1, so at the last stage firms will produce
q1(αL) =
θ + t1(2−β )+αLt2(2β −1)
3
(3.7)
q2(αL) =
θ +αLt2(2−β )+ t1(2β −1)
3
(3.8)
and their profits, given the values of ti and Ki (i = 1, 2), are
Π1 =
1
9
[θ + t1(2−β )+αLt2(2β −1)]2−K1 (3.9)
Π2 =
1
9
[θ +αLt2(2−β )+ t1(2β −1)]2−K2 (3.10)
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Equilibrium investment strategies are described in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. When information is complete and firm 1 and firm 2 are asymmetric (firm 2 has lower R&D
productivity), in R&D competition the unique SPE are: (i) if K < (αLt/9)(2−β )[2θ +2t(2β −1)+αLt(2−β )]≡ h,
both firms invest in R&D, (ii) if h < K < δ , only firm 1 invests; (iii) if K > δ none invests.
Proof.
If s¯1 = K, s¯2 = K iff (Π2|s¯2 = K, s¯1 = K) = [θ+αLt(2−β )+t(2β−1)]
2
9 −K > [θ+t(2β−1)]
2
9 = (Π2|s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = K), that
is iff
K <
αLt(2−β )[2θ +αLt(2−β )+2t(2β −1)]
9
≡ h (3.11)
Given s¯2 = K, s¯1 = K iff (Π1|s¯1 = K, s¯2 = K) = [θ+t(2−β )+αLt(2β−1)]
2
9 −K > [θ+αLt(2β−1)]
2
9 = (Π1|s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = K),
that is iff
K <
t(2−β )[2θ +2αLt(2β −1)+ t(2−β )]
9
≡ g
Since h < g, s¯ = (K, K) is SPE when K < h.
If s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = 0 iff (Π2|s¯2 = 0, s¯1 = 0) = θ29 > [θ+αLt(2−β )]
2
9 −K = (Π2|s¯2 = K, s¯1 = 0), that is iff
K >
αLt(2−β )[2θ +αLt(2−β )]
9
≡ f
Given s¯2 = 0, s¯1 = 0 iff (Π1|s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = 0) = θ29 > [θ+t(2−β )]
2
9 −K = (Π1|s¯1 = K, s¯2 = 0), that is iff K > δ , (δ is
defined in (5)). Since δ > f , s¯ = (0, 0) is SPE when K > δ . This proves part (i) and (iii).
If K > g, s¯1 = 0 given s¯2 = K; if s¯1 = 0, s¯2 = K iff K < f . Since g > f , s¯ = (0, K) can never be a SPE.
If s¯1 = K and K > h, firm 2 will play s¯2 = 0; when s¯2 = 0, s¯1 = K iff K < δ . Given that h < δ , s¯ = (K, 0) is SPE
when h < K < δ (part (ii)).
Also, given the order of thresholds, equilibria in each interval are unique.
Before leaving the complete information setting, it is important to highlight two facts. First, differently form the
case of symmetric firms, here there is an interval for the values of K in which we observe asymmetric investment
choices: only the efficient firm invests and the less efficient one prefers to save on investments costs and exploit the
benefit of cost reduction through the spillover effect. Second, when both firms invest, the optimal quantity produced by
firm 1 when it is facing the less efficient firm is lower than firm 1’s optimal quantity when its rival is equally efficient
(firm 1 is less aggressive when the R&D productivity of the rival is lower and the latter has higher marginal cost).
These two facts drive the main results under incomplete information.
3.2.2 The case of incomplete information
3.2.2.1 Quantity stage
We first look for the quantities that maximize each firm’s profits given the choice of the rival, when in the last
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stage firm 1 cannot distinguish the types of firm 2 (BNE)8. Firm 2 has complete information (firm 1 can be of only
one type); it maximizes its profit with respect to q2, given q1. Its best reply is given by
BR2(q1) = q2 =
a−b1− c2
2
Firm 1 has incomplete information and maximizes its expected profit with respect to q1, given the expected value
of q2. Its best reply is
BR1(qe2) = q1 =
a−bqe2− ce1
2
Note that, since firm 2’s cost reduction (that is private information) affects also firm 1’s costs through the spillover,
incomplete information makes firm 1’s costs random. The NE is given by the intersection of firm 1’s reaction function
and firm 2’s expected reaction function q∗1 =
a−bqe2−ce1
2
qe2 =
a−bq∗1−ce2
2
Let µ indicate the belief held by firm 1, namely µ = Prob(α = αH). Then,
ce1 = c− t1−β t2α(µ)
ce2 = c− t2α(µ)−β t1
with α(µ) = µ+(1−µ)αL.
Accordingly, the equilibrium quantities (best responses) are
qµ1 =
θ + t1(2−β )+ t2α(µ)(2β −1)
3
(3.12)
qαL2 =
2θ +(2t1− t2α(µ))(2β −1)+3t2αL
6
(3.13)
qαH2 =
2θ +(2t1− t2α(µ))(2β −1)+3t2
6
(3.14)
where θ = (a− c)
The final payoffs under incomplete information are then
Π1(α2) =
1
18
[2θ +2t1(2−β )+ t2(2β −1)(3α2−α(µ))] ·
[θ + t1(2−β )+ t2α(µ)(2β −1)]−K1 (3.15)
Π2(α2) =
1
36
[2θ +2t1(2β −1)+ t2(3α2−α(µ)(2β −1))]2−K2 (3.16)
with α2 = αL, 1. Therefore, when firm 1 is not able to distinguish between the two types of firm 2, its expected
profit is
8If in previous stages the two types of firm 2 chose different actions (separating strategy) we have to consider the equilibrium quantities of the
complete information case. A separating equilibrium requires beliefs updating by part of firm 1, that is, it will be able to recognize the type of firm
2 after observing its action.
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E(Π1) =
1
9
[θ + t1(2−β )+ t2α(µ)(2β −1)]2−K1 (3.17)
Comparing equilibrium quantities in case of complete and incomplete information, it can be noted that, when there
is investment by part of both firms, type αH is better off under incomplete information, since q
(µ)
1 < q1(αH); the
opposite holds for type αL.
3.2.2.2 Investment in R&D stage
Consider now firms’ strategies when, at the second stage, they have to decide if invest or not in R&D. Let s1 =
K1 = {0, K} be the action chosen by firm 1 and s2 = (K2αL, K2αH), be the strategy of firm 2, where the first element
identifies the action chosen by type αL and the second one the action selected by type αH ; again, each type chooses
between 0 and K. Then, define s = (s1 ,s2) as the combination of actions taken by players at the second stage. Firm
2 knows its type, so it takes the action that leads to the higher profit, given the strategy of firm 1. Firm 1 cannot
distinguish between the two types, so it makes its decision to maximize its expected profit given the strategy of firm 2,
i.e. given the four possible combination of actions taken by the two types (s2 = {(0, 0), (0, K), (K, 0), (K, K)}). The
probabilities it assigns to each type are derived by the prior probabilities according to Bayes’ rule, when applicable;
when firm 1 has incomplete information at stage 2 (no beliefs updating9) the probabilities assigned to each type are
the same as prior beliefs, that is Prob(α = αH) = µ = 12 .
There are 8 possible combination of actions (s1, s2): I analyze each one separately to check if it can be an equilib-
rium in the continuation of the game and for which values of the parameter K.
Before analysing the possible configurations of equilibria, it is useful to fix the regions of parameters in which
the different types of firm 2 have a dominated strategy; this allows in some cases for a correct updating of beliefs in
the following stage and for the elimination of some strategies of firm 2. An action is dominated for player 2 at stage
j if it does not lead to higher profit for all possible beliefs held by firm 1 and any continuation satisfying sequential
rationality.
Consider type αL. Under some conditions, type αL will never invest.
Lemma 1. K2αL = K is dominated (strictly) if
K >
tαL(2−β )[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ tαL(2−β )]
9
≡ a (3.18)
Proof.
(In Appendix)
Consider now type αH . Under some conditions, type αH will always invest.
Lemma 2. K2αH = 0 is dominated (strictly) if
K <
t(2−β )[2θ + t(2−β )]
9
≡ δ
Proof.
If firm 1 plays K1 = 0, firm 2, when its type is αH , prefers K2αH = K if
9Firm 1 would have posterior probabilities different from prior probability if, in the first stage, it proposes RJV and the two types give different
answers.
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(Π2αH |K1 = 0, K2αH = 0, µ)> (Π2αH |K1 = 0, K2αH = K, µ)
that is, if
θ 2
9
<
[2θ + t(3−α(µ)(2β −1))]2
36
−K
namely
K <
t(3−α(µ)(2β −1))[4θ + t(3−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
This threshold is decreasing in µ and takes its minimal value for µ = 1; so, substituting µ = 1 in the above
inequality it turns out that if K < δ , where δ is defined in (5), type αH chooses K2αH = K when K1 = 0 for any µ . In
the same way, when K1 = K and K < τ , with τ defined in (4), type αH chooses K2αH = K when K1 = K for any µ.
For K < min{δ , τ} type αH never chooses K2αH = 0. Since, for β > 12 , δ < τ , K2αH = 0 is a dominated strategy for
type αH when K < δ.
These results allow to eliminate the combinations s= (0, (K, 0)) and s= (K, (K, 0)) as part of possible equilibria.
Indeed we can prove
Lemma 3. If a separating equilibrium exists, it has to be such that type αL does not invest and type αH invests, that
is s2 = (0, K).
Proof.
From the results stated in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and given that δ > a10, we can never have a situation in which
K2αH = 0 and K2αL = K.
It follows that possible separating equilibria are only s = (K, (0, K)) and s = (0, (0, K)). It has to be checked if,
and for which values of K, they are actually sustainable as part of an equilibrium strategy.
When the two types of firm 2 choose different actions, at the last stage firm 1 has complete information once it
has observed the investment choice of the rival (perfect updating). When firm 1 observes K2 = 0, it knows that it is
competing with type αL, whereas when it observes K2 = K, it knows that it is competing with type αH 11: then, the
final payoff are those computed for the complete information case. However, when firm 1 has to make the investment
choice (second stage), it doesn’t know the type of the rival and uses the prior beliefs to compute its expected profits
given s2 = (0, K).
Let sˆ2 be the separating strategy of firm 2 at stage 2, namely sˆ2 = (0, K). Given this strategy
E(Π1|K1 = 0, sˆ2) = 12
{
θ2
9
}
+ 12
{
[θ+t(2β−1)]2
9
}
= {θ
2+[θ+t(2β−1)]2}
18
E(Π1|K1 = K, sˆ2) = 12
{
[θ+t(2−β )]2
9 −K
}
+ 12
{
[θ+t(1+β )]2
9 −K
}
Hence, firm 1 plays K1 = K if
E(Π1|K1 = K, sˆ2)> E(Π1|K1 = 0, sˆ2)
that is, if
10By assumptions, αL ∈ [0.2, 0.6] and t ≤ θ .
11Posterior beliefs in the third stage will be (µ||K2 = 0) = 0 and (µ|K2 = K) = 1. Accordingly, BR1(a f ter K = 0) = qC1 (qαL2 ) =
a−2c1+cαL2
3 =
θ+t1(2−β )
3 and BR1(a f ter K = K) = q
C
1 (q
αH
2 ) =
a−2c1+cαH2
3 =
θ+t1(2−β )+t(2β−1)
3 , t1 = {0, t}.
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K <
t(2−β )[2θ + t(1+β )]
9
≡ γ (3.19)
while it plays K1 = 0 if K > γ . If K = γ , it is indifferent. For s = (K, (0, K)) and s = (0, (0, K)) to be part of an
equilibrium, it has to be checked that each type of firm 2 has no incentive to deviate (choosing the action played by
the other type, or any other mixed strategy), given updated beliefs of firm 1.
Lemma 4. The combination of actions s= (K, (0, K)) is part of a separating PBE in the continuation game started
at the second period, if ν < K < γ , with ν ≡ (t/36)(3αL+1−2β )[4θ +3t(3αL+2β −1)] .
Proof.
(In Appendix)
Lemma 5. When spillovers are high, an equilibrium in which s1 = 0 and s2 = (0, K) cannot exist.
Proof.
(In Appendix)
From Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, it follows
Proposition 3. If RJV is not allowed, or, equivalently, firms end up in R&D competition without beliefs updating,
the only possible separating equilibrium entails s = (K, (0, K)) at the second stage. If K /∈ [ν , γ], a separating
equilibrium cannot obtain.
The following step is the analysis of pooling PBE, in which the two types of firm 2 choose the same action, hence
s2 = (0, 0) or s2 = (K, K). We can have two types of pooling, namely s = (0, (0, 0)) and s = (K, (K, K)), as it will
be shortly shown below.
In this case, firm 1 cannot distinguish between the two types when, at the beginning of the third stage, it observes
the investment choice of the rival; this means that it cannot update its beliefs and the posterior beliefs are the same as
prior beliefs along the equilibrium path (final payoff are those of incomplete information).
Consider first s2 =(0, 0)12. The expected profits that firm 1 compares are E(Π1|(0, (0, 0)))= 19θ 2 and E(Π1|(K, (0, 0)))=
1
9 [θ + t(2−β )]2−K. It follows that, for K > t(2−β )[2θ+t(2−β )]9 = δ 13, K1 = 0 when s2 = (0, 0).
Lemma 6. The only possible pooling equilibrium in which both types of firm 2 do not invest is such that s =
(0, (0, 0)).
Proof.
Given s2 = (0, 0), K1 = K if K < δ . As stated in Lemma 2, for K < δ , K2αH = K is a dominant strategy for type
αH ; accordingly, it never plays K2αH = 0 in this region and the pooling equilibrium with s = (K, (0, 0)) can be ruled
out .
Proposition 4. A pooling equilibrium where no firm invests can exist only if K > δ .
Proof.
Given s2 = (0, 0), K1 = 0 only if K > δ . In this interval, type αL has no incentive to deviate from K2αL = 0 since
δ > a and for K > a will never play K2αL = K (see Lemma 1). Therefore, firm 1’s beliefs after observing K2 = K, are
such that (µ|K2 = K) = 1. Type αH does not deviate if Π2αH(K1 = K2 = 0, µ = 12 )≥Π2αH(K1 = 0, K2 = K, µ = 1),
that is if
12In this case, (µ|K2 = 0) = ((1−µ)|K2 = 0) = 12 and BR1(a f ter K2 = 0) = BR1(qe2) =
a−2ce1+ce2
3 =
θ+t1(2−β )
3 with t1 ∈ {0, K}.
13δ is defined in (5).
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1
9
θ 2 ≥ 1
9
[θ + t(2−β )]2−K
Since this inequality is satisfied for K > δ , we can conclude that a pooling equilibrium with s = (0, (0, 0)) may
exist for K > δ.
Consider now s2 = (K, K)14. Firm 1 will play K1 = K if
E(Π1|(K, (K, K)))> E(Π1|(0, (K, K)))
that is, if
[θ + t(2−β )+ tα(µ)(2β −1)]2
9
−K > [θ + tα(µ)(2β −1)]
2
9
that, with µ = 12 , is equivalent to
K <
t(2−β )[2θ + t(2−β )+ t(1+αL)(2β −1)]
9
= κ
′
(3.20)
Lemma 7. A pooling equilibrium such that s1 = 0 and s2 = (K, K) cannot exist. If a pooling equilibrium with
s2 = (K, K) exists, it has to be such that s = (K, (K, K)) at second stage.
Proof.
Given s2 = (K, K), K1 = 0 if K > κ
′
, where κ ′ is defined in (23). The strategy s2 = (K, K) can be taken into
account only for the interval [0, a], where a = tαL(2−β )[2θ+2t(2β−1)+tαL(2−β )]9
15, because, for K > a, type αL never
plays K. Since κ ′ > a, it cannot exist an interval in which the conditions that allow s = (0, (K, K)) to be part of an
equilibrium are satisfied at the same time. So, we can delete s= (0, (K, K)) as part of a possible pooling equilibrium.
The following Proposition identifies the region of parameters in which the pooling equilibrium with investment
does exist.
Proposition 5. A pooling equilibrium where both firms invest can exist only if K ≤ κ ′′αL, with
κ
′′
αL ≡
t(3αL− ( 1+αL2 )(2β −1))[4θ +4t(2β −1)+ t(3αL− ( 1+αL2 )(2β −1))]
36
(3.21)
Proof.
(In Appendix)
To sum up, the following investment choices can be sustainable as part of equilibria in the continuation game
starting in R&D competition regime with incomplete information:
• s = (K, (0, K)) f or ν < K < γ
• s = (0, (0, 0)) f or K > δ
• s = (K, (K, K)) f or K < κ ′′αL.
14Best reply after observing K2 = K will be BR1(a f ter K2 = K) = BR1(qe2) =
a−2ce1+ce2
3 =
θ+t1(2−β )+t 12 (1+α)(2β−1)
3 with t1 = {0, K}.
15See Lemma 1.
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It is easy to show that ν < κ ′′αL < δ < γ , so we can identify five regions with the corresponding equilibria as follows:
• K < ν entails s = (K, (K, K))
• ν < K < κ ′′αL entails s = (K, (K, K))and s = (K, (0, K))
• κ ′′αL < K < δ entails s = (K, (0, K))
• δ < K < γ entails s = (K, (0, K))and s = (0, (0, 0))
• K > γ entails s = (0, (0, 0)).
Equilibrium selection
There are two regions of parameters in which two different equilibria exist, namely the interval [ν , κ ′′αL] (where
both s = (K, (K, K)) and s = (K, (0, K)) are possible), and the interval [δ , γ] (where both s = (K, (0, K)) and
s = (0, (0, 0)) are possible). In what follows, I’m going to take into account only s = (K, (K, K)) in [ν , κ ′′αL] and
s = (K, (0, K)) in [δ , γ] (equilibria with more total investment). This choice can be justified using the concept of
“Interim Pareto Dominance”16 to select equilibria. Another reason to focus on these equilibria is that, in this literature,
object of interest is the possibility to increase the amount of R&D investment through coordination of R&D effort;
so, I concentrate on the comparison between RJV outcome and the best outcome (in terms of total investment) under
R&D competition regime.
Proposition 6. (i) The combination of actions s= (K, (K, K)) interim Pareto dominates s= (K,(0, K)) in [ν , κ ′′αL];
(ii) s = (K, (0, K)) interim Pareto dominates s = (0, (0, 0)) in [δ , γ].
Proof.
(In Appendix)
Taking into account the selection of equilibria, firms’ investment choices in R&D competition are summarized in
Figure 1.
Figure 3.1: R&D investment’s choices in R&D competition regime
κ ′′αL γ
K,KK K,0K 0,00
K
Note: each outcome represents the choices of each agents in an equilibrium of the continuation game started at the beginning of the second stage.
In particular the first element refers to the choice of firm 1, the second to the choice of firm 2 (type αL) and the third to the choice of firm 2 (type
αH ).
16See Holmström and Myerson (1983)
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3.2.3 Effects of incomplete information on R&D investment decisions.
Figure 2 displays on the same line the thresholds that define the equilibria in R&D competition under complete
and incomplete information and gives some insights about the consequences of incomplete information on investment
choices. Consider the case in which firms are actually symmetric. When information is complete, the equilibrium is
such that both firms invest when K < τ and none invests when K > τ; when information is incomplete, instead, both
firms invest when K < γ and none invests when K > γ17. Given that γ < τ , the region of parameters in which an
equilibrium with investment is sustainable is larger when information is complete, that is, there is a region, namely
[γ, τ], where incomplete information leads to an equilibrium with no investment. Here, firm 1 does not invest when
it considers the possibility that its rival is less efficient, and, given the choice of firm 1, the best reply of firm 2 is
to adopt a symmetric action. So, asymmetric information about rival’s R&D productivity intensifies the problem of
sub-optimal investment; if informational asymmetry could be eliminated, in the above mentioned region of parameters
symmetric firms would invest and obtain higher profits.
As for the case in which firms are asymmetric, the order of the relevant thresholds is such that κ ′′αL < h < δ < γ . It
can be noted that incomplete information increases the region of parameters in which we have an asymmetric outcome
(that is where only firm 1 invests): this outcome arises in [κ ′′αL, γ] under incomplete information and in [h, δ ] under
complete information. In the regions of parameters where asymmetric information generates different outcomes with
respect to the complete information setting, the more efficient firm (firm 1) is worse off. In the interval [κ ′′αL, h] the
less efficient firm (type αL) does not invest since, if it did it, firm 1 would not distinguish between the two types of
firm 2 in the last stage and would produce a larger quantity than in case of complete information; so investing is no
more a best reply for the less efficient firm, and firm 1 cannot exploit the cost reduction from rival’s investment. In
this region, both firms are worse off when information is asymmetric, and the total investment is lower. In the interval
[δ , γ], incomplete information leads to a non-efficient (ex post) investment choice by part of firm 1; this latter invests
because of the positive probability to face the efficient firm (that would invest), but, given that this is not the case,
firm 1 would be (ex post) better off avoiding investment. On the contrary, the less efficient firm is better off under
incomplete information.
Figure 3.2: Effects of incomplete information in R&D competition regime
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To sum up, this kind of informational asymmetry damages efficient firms (firm 1 and type αH of firm 2), while, for
some parameters’ values, it allows the less efficient firm to exploit the spillover effect and to reduce its costs, without
bearing the cost of investment.
17As in the case of complete information, in incomplete information setting two firms equally efficient will make symmetric investment choice
at equilibrium
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3.3 RJV formation
In this section we study firms’ equilibrium decisions regarding RJV membership (first stage). This allow to analyze
the actual incentives to form R&D cooperation agreements and to see in which way this can change the outcomes with
respect to those arising in R&D competition regime.
Firms act sequentially and have to decide about the possibility to form a RJV that commit them to coordinate their
R&D effort. The first mover is firm 1: it can propose or not the agreement to firm 2. Firm 1’s actions are defined by sˆ1 =
{RJV, nothing}. If it plays ”nothing”, firms end up directly in R&D competition regime, with the outcomes defined in
the previous section. If it plays ”RJV ”, firm 2 chooses between ”accept” (ending up in RJV regime) and not accept
(ending up in R&D competition); so, firm 2’s possible actions are defined as sˆ2 = (sˆ2αL, sˆ2αH) = {accept, not accept}.
A generic combination of actions taken by firm 1 and the two types of firm 2 is denoted by sˆ = ˆ(s1, ˆs2). To evaluate
firms’ best replies I analyze separately the intervals that define the equilibrium outcomes in R&D competition regime.
First, I find firm 2’s best reply to firm 1 (possible) proposal and then I check whether firm 1 has actually incentive to
propose the agreement, anticipating firm 2’s reaction. Each firm, in order to take its decision, will compare the payoff
that it is going to obtain in a certain interval in R&D competition regime with the payoff generated by the joint decision
to invest; payoffs arising under complete or incomplete information setting will be taken into account according to,
respectively, separating or pooling strategies by part of firm 2 after firm 1’s proposal.
Remember that there are three intervals with different equilibria in the continuation game starting at stage 2 under
R&D competition (see Figure 1). Let us start by considering what happens for K < κ ′′αL. Results are stated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 8. When K < κ ′′αL, equilibria involving separating strategies at the first stage cannot be attained. Each
combination of actions such that the two types of firm 2 take the same action can be part of a pooling equilibrium.
In particular, there are three possible equilibrium strategies in the first stage that are outcome equivalent, involving
investment by part of all firms, irrespective of RJV formation: (i) Firm 1 plays sˆ1 = nothing and firms end up in R&D
competition, whatever the pooling strategy of firm 2; (ii) Firm 1 plays sˆ1 = RJV and firm 2 choose sˆ2 = (sˆ2αL, sˆ2αH) =
(not accept, not accept), preventing RJV formation; (iii) Firm 1 plays sˆ1 = RJV and firm 2 choose sˆ2 = (sˆ2αL, sˆ2αH) =
(accept, accept); RJV is formed but total investment and profits are the same as in R&D competion.
Proof.
(In Appendix)
Lemma 8 makes clear that, for K < κ ′′αL, the possibility to form a RJV does not change the outcomes arising when
only R&D competition regime is feasible. It states that no equilibrium such that firm 1 is able to distinguish between
the two types of firm 2 does exist. Since in R&D competition investing is the best strategy for all firms given investment
by part of the rival, whatever the beliefs, and given that the RJV option entails the same investment strategy, type αH
will always have incentive to mimic the action of type αL because when µ = 0 the quantity produced by firm 1 is lower
and type αH would obtain a higher profit18. From this result, it follows that all the possible pooling equilibria entail
investment by part of all firms, and, without beliefs updating, profits will be those of incomplete information; this is
exactly the outcome that arises in R&D competition regime.
The second interval to be analyzed is [κ ′′αL, γ]. Remember that, when R&D competition starts with incomplete
information s = (K, (0, K)) is the equilibrium strategy in the second stage.
18Remenber that, when each player invests, Π2αH under incomplete information is decreasing in α(µ), so it is higher when µ = 0, since, due to
spillover effect, q1 is lower when firm 1 competes with the less efficient firm.
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Lemma 9. If κ ′′αL < K < γ , no pooling equilibrium such that the two types of firm 2 choose the same action after
firm 1’s proposal can exist.
Proof.
(In Appendix)
From Lemma 9, it follows that possible equilibria in [κ ′′αL, γ] involve separating strategies by part of firm 2, after
firm 1’s proposal. It has to be noted that, due to beliefs updating, this interval has to be further divided in sub-intervals
corresponding to the regions that identify the equilibria arising with complete information. The same consideration
holds to check the possible existence of separating equilibria for K > γ .
For κ ′′αL < K < γ , the sub-intervals pertain complete information equilibria for asymmetric firms19. We stated
before that the order of the relevant thresholds is such that κ ′′αL < h < δ < γ . Possible separating equilibria are
searched in each sub-intervals; the following lemmas show the results.
Lemma 10. If κ ′′αL < K < h, an equilibrium in which firm 2 plays a separating strategy after firm 1’s proposal
cannot exist. In this interval the only possible equilibrium is such that firm 1 plays sˆ1 = nothing and the game ends up
with the outcomes of R&D competition regime, namely firm 1 and type αH of firm 2 invest, while type αL does not.
Proof.
(In Appendix)
Lemma 11. If h<K < δ , the only possible equilibrium following sˆ1 =RJV entails sˆ2 =(sˆ2αL, sˆ2αH)= (not accept, accept);
firm 1 and type αH will invest in RJV (µ = 1) while, if α = αL, the RJV is not formed and in R&D competition only
firm 1 invests (µ = 0). There is another possible equilibrium in which firm 1 plays sˆ1 = nothing and R&D competition
starts with incomplete information. The two equilibria are outcome equivalent.
Proof.
(In Appendix)
Lemma 12. In the interval δ < K < γ , if
γ > φ ≡ t(2β −1+3αL)[4θ + t(2β −1+3αL)]
36
(3.22)
for max{δ , φ}< K < γ the equilibrium is such that sˆ1 = RJV and sˆ2 = (sˆ2αL, sˆ2αH) = (not accept, accept). In all
the other cases, the only possible equilibrium entails sˆ1 = nothing and, accordingly, nothing changes with respect to a
situation in which only R&D competition is feasible.
Proof.
(In Appendix)
When the equilibrium with sˆ1 = RJV arises in [δ , γ], the possibility to create a RJV allows to restore the complete
information setting before the investment stage. If α = αH , the two equally efficient firms will invest in RJV regime
and µ = 1 (nothing changes with respect to the outcome in R&D competition), while, if α = αL, in R&D competition
µ = 0 and no firm invests. In this latter case, without the possibility to propose the cooperation agreement, firm 1,
under incomplete information, would have made an inefficient investment decision (K1 = K) and get a lower profit.
As for the last interval to be analyzed, namely the values of K such that K > γ , it will be shown the existence of
separating equilibria that allow type αH to signal its type at no cost by accepting the cooperation agreement. This turns
19In this interval, symmetric firms with complete information will invest since τ > γ .
54
out to be welfare improving: we will observe more total investment and higher profits, provided that the two firms are
actually symmetric.
Lemma 13. (i) When max{φ , γ} < K < z, with z defined in (6), a separating equilibrium entailing sˆ1 = RJV and
sˆ2 = (sˆ2αL, sˆ2αH) = (not accept, accept) in the first stage exists and is welfare improving. (ii) For some parameters’
values such that
γ < η
′′
αL ≡
[2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
.
· [4θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
(3.23)
a pooling equilibrium in which firm 1 proposes the cooperation agreement and both type of firm 2 accept may arise
for γ < K < η ′′αL; this equilibrium is welfare improving. (iii) All the other possible equilibria in the region defined by
K > γ lead to the same outcome as if only R&D competition regime was feasible. (iv) Where equilibria defined in (i)
and (ii) do exist, they interim Pareto dominate all the other possible equilibria.
Proof.
(In Appendix)
In the welfare improving separating equilibrium, firm 1 is able to distinguish between the two types of firm 2, given
that only type αH will accept the proposed agreement. So, RJV is formed between the two equally efficient firms and
investing in R&D makes them better off (in addition to be beneficial for consumers). When α = αL, nothing changes
with respect to the subgame starting with R&D competition. Remember that in R&D competition regime the unique
equilibrium in this region is such that no firm invests. As for the welfare improving pooling equilibrium (that does not
need to arise), RJV formation leads to more investment and higher profits for all firms.
Relevant results from Lemmas 8-13 are summarized in Proposition 7, which states the effects of the possibility to
form R&D cooperation agreements. Only the intervals in which the possibility to create a RJV changes the outcomes
with respect to R&D competition are considered.
Proposition 7. (i) For max{φ , γ} < K < z, the possibility of create a RJV enhances investment in R&D and
increases welfare at least when firms are equally efficient through a) coordination and b) the possibility for the more
efficient type of firm 2 to signal its type. In the interval [max{φ , γ}, τ], with max{φ , γ} < τ < z, RJV formation
between two equally efficient firms restores the complete information setting and solves the inefficiency generated in
R&D competition regime by incomplete information. For τ < K < z more total investment and higher profits for the
efficient firms in RJV are due to spillovers internalization. (ii) A pooling equilibrium in which RJV is formed whatever
the type of firm 2, generating more total investment and higher profits for all firms and types, may arise. This happens
for γ < K < η ′′αL, if parameters’ values are such that γ < η
′′
αL. (iii) The signaling effect could also allow firm 1 to make
efficient investment decisions when it faces the less efficient firm. This can be observed if the separating equilibrium
with sˆ1 = RJV arises in [δ , γ]. In this case, the inefficient firm cannot exploit incomplete information of firm 1 to get
beneficial effect from rival’s investment.
It has been shown that different equilibria can arise according to parameters’ values; in any case, where the pos-
sibility to cooperate in R&D leads to different outcomes with respect to those existing in R&D competition regime,
the effects of this kind of agreement turn out to be positive, especially when firms are equally efficient. Note that the
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium outcomes - η ′′αL < γ
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium outcomes - η ′′αL < γ and φ < γ
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separating equilibrium entailing RJV formation between symmetric firm exists for all parameters’ values. Figures 3-5
show all possible orders of thresholds with the corresponding equilibria.
Conclusions
I developed a 3-stage model to analyze firms’ willingness to form cooperative agreements to coordinate R&D effort
and the resulting investment choices in a framework of incomplete information. Incomplete information concerns the
efficiency of firms’ R&D activity, and R&D cooperation entails committment to invest by the firms taking part to the
agreement (RJV). The analysis has focused on the case of high spillovers, since it turns out to be the more interesting
one.
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium outcomes - η ′′αL < γ and φ > γ
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The innovation enhancing effects of R&D cooperation are confirmed, at least for the case in which firms are equally
efficient. Coordination of R&D efforts allows to internalize the externality generated by spillovers and overcome free-
riding problem. Moreover, a new beneficial effect of RJVs has been identified: there is a region of parameters in which
the formation process allows the efficient type of firm 2 to signal its type, thus increasing the level of investment and
welfare. When firms are symmetric and compete in R&D, incomplete information reduces the region of parameters
in which an equilibrium with investment can be sustained; in some sense, the possibility to create a RJV tends to
solve this inefficiency, by revealing information. So, not only RJV formation allows investment (and higher profits)
in a larger region of parameters, but also it restores the complete information setting as for the level of investment. In
other words, the possibility to create a RJV leads to the same outcome as if information was complete. In this region,
investment never occurs between asymmetric firms; though, they are not worse off with respect to the outcome under
R&D competition regime (they get the same payoff). So, allowing RJV formation may lead to a Pareto-improvement,
by eliminating information asymmetry. In the other regions, for symmetric firms, the outcome in terms of investment,
is the same as if only R&D competition was feasible.
The signaling role of RJV may also help firm 1 to avoid inefficient investment choices; there is a region in which,
as long as information remains incomplete, in R&D competition firm 1 invests, and this guarantees a larger profit to
the less efficient type, thanks to the spillover effect, but firm 1’s choice is (ex post) not efficient. Cooperation proposal
may generate a separating equilibrium such that, once in R&D competition, firm 1 can recognize the less efficient type
and make optimal investment choices.
Finally, it turns out that for most of the parameters’ values, a RJV is never formed when firms are actually asymmet-
ric, so the alleged coordination effect does not actually emerge. This is due to the presence of asymmetric equilibrium
in R&D competition; in the region of parameters where this equilibrium arises, type αL prefers to exploit the benefit
from firm 1’s investment without paying the cost. This result is in line with those of Baerenss (1999), Atallah (2005a)
and Röller, Tombak and Siebert (1998).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let µ ∈ [0, 1] be a generic probability that firm 1 assigns to type αH . When firm 1 plays K1 = 0, firm 2, when its
type is αL, prefers K2αL = 0 if
(Π2αL|K1 = 0, K2αL = 0, µ)> (Π2αL|K1 = 0, K2αL = K, µ)
that is
θ 2
9
>
[2θ + t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]2
36
−K
namely
K >
t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))[4θ + t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
with α(µ) = µ+(1−µ)αL. This threshold is decreasing in µ and takes its maximal value for µ = 0; so, if
K >
tαL(2−β )[2θ + tαL(2−β )]
9
then the action K2αL = K is never a best reply to K1 = 0, so type αL will choose K2αL = 0 when K1 = 0 for any µ .
When firm 1 plays K1 = K, type αL prefers K2αL = 0 if
(Π2αL|K1 = K, K2αL = 0, µ)> (Π2αL|K1 = K, K2αL = K, µ)
that is, if
[θ + t(2β −1)]2
9
>
[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]2
36
−K
namely
K >
t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))[4θ +4t(2β −1)+ t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
The threshold takes maximal value for µ = 0; so, when
K >
tαL(2−β )[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ tαL(2−β )]
9
the action K2αL = K is never a best reply against K1 = K, so type αL will choose K2αL = 0 when K1 = K for any
µ .
Since
tαL(2−β )[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ tαL(2−β )]
9
>
tαL(2−β )[2θ + tαL(2−β )]
9
when K > (tαL/9)(2− β )[2θ + 2t(2β − 1)+ tαL(2− β )], K2αL = K is never a best reply for type αL, for any
action taken by firm 1 and any belief. Hence, K2αL = K is a dominated strategy for type αL for
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K >
tαL(2−β )[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ tαL(2−β )]
9
≡ a.
Proof of Lemma 4.
If K < γ , only s= (K, (0, K)) is possible as separating strategy profile; for it to be part of an equilibrium, it remains
to be checked that each type of firm 2 has no incentive to deviate (choosing the action played by the other type, or any
other mixed strategy), given updated beliefs of firm 1.
Let’s start with type αL. Its payoff, if it follows the “equilibrium” strategy, is Π2αL(K1 = K, K2αL = 0, µαL = 1) =
1
9 [θ + t(2β −1)]2.
If αL deviates (choosing K2 = K), firm 1, in the last stage, will think to compete with αH and it will produce
q1 = qC1 (q
αH
2 ) =
a−2c1+cαH2
3 =
θ+t1(2−β )+t2(2β−1)
3 , that is the equilibrium quantity for firm 1 in Cournot competition
when the two firms are symmetric.
Given qC1 (q
αH
2 ), type αL chooses the quantity that maximizes its profit, namely the expression
[a− θ + t1(2−β )+ t2(2β −1)
3
−q2− (c−αLt2−β t1)]q2−K2
The optimal quantity after deviation is
qD2αL =
2θ +2t1(2β −1)− t2(2β −1)+3αLt2
6
and the profit from deviation is, therefore,
ΠD2αL =
1
36
[2θ +2t1(2β −1)− t2(2β −1)+3αLt2]2−K2
In this case, t1 = t2 = t (since K1 = K2 = K), so
ΠD2αL =
1
36
[2θ + t(2β −1)+3αLt]2−K
Let ΠK02 = (Π2|K1 = K, K2 = 0) and ΠKK2 = (Π2|K1 = K, K2 = K). Then, type αL has no incentive to deviate if
(ΠK02 |α = αL, µ = 0)≥ (ΠKK2 |α = αL, µ = 1) =ΠD2αL(K1 = K2 = K)
The inequality is satisfied when
K ≥ t(3αL+1−2β )[4θ +3t(3αL+2β −1)]
36
≡ ν
Given that ν < γ , in the interval [ν , γ] type αL will not deviate20.
Now, we proceed with a similar check for type αH . Its payoff, if it follows the “equilibrium” strategy, isΠ2αH(K1 =
K, K2αH = K, µ = 1) = 19 [θ + t(1+β )]
2−K. If type αH deviates (choosing K2αH = 0), firm 1, at the last stage, will
think to compete with type αL and it will produce q1 = qC1 (q
αL
2 ) =
a−2c1+cαL2
3 =
θ+t1(2−β )+αLt2(2β−1)
3 .
Given qC1 (q
αL
2 ), type αH chooses the quantity that maximizes its profit, namely, it chooses q2 to maximize
[a− θ + t1(2−β )+αLt2(2β −1)
3
−q2− (c− t2−β t1)]q2−K2
20It will not assign a positive probability to the play of s2αL = K in any mixed strategy at equilibrium.
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The optimal quantity after deviation is
qD2αH =
2θ +2t1(2β −1)−αLt2(2β −1)+3t2
6
and the profit from deviation is
ΠD2αH =
1
36
[2θ +2t1(2β −1)+ t2(3−αL(2β −1))]2−K2
Given K1 = K and K2 = 0,
ΠD2αH =
1
9
[θ + t(2β −1)]2
Type αH has no incentive to deviate if
(ΠKK2 |α = αH , µ = 1)≥ (ΠK02 |α = αH , µ = 0) =ΠD(K0)2αH
and this condition is satisfied for K < τ , where τ is defined in (4).
Since τ > γ for β > 12 , in the interval [ν , γ] type αH will not deviate and s = (K, (0, K)) is sustainable as part of a
separating PBE in the continuation game started at the second period.
Proof of Lemma 5.
The action s1 = 0 is a best reply to sˆ2 = (0, K) only if K > γ . Type αL has no incentive to deviate in this region
since the action K2αL = K is dominated (a < γ). However, type αH has incentive to deviate (choosing K2αH =
0) since Π2αH(K1 = 0, K2 = K|µ = 1) = 19 [θ + t(2− β )]2 −K < 19θ 2 = ΠD2 (K1 = 0, K2 = 0|µ = 0) when K >
t(2−β )[2θ+t(2−β )]
9 = δ , and δ < γ if β >
1
2 . Then, s= (0, (0, K)) cannot be part of any possible separating equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Given s2 = (K, K), K1 = K only if
K <
t(2−β )[2θ + t(2−β )+ t(1+αL)(2β −1)]
9
= κ
′
If K1 = K, type αL has no incentive to deviate from the pooling strategy s2 = (K, K) if
Π2αL(K1 = K2 = K, µ =
1
2
)≥Π2αL(K = K, K2 = 0, µ = 12 )
namely,
1
36
[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL− (1+αL2 )(2β −1))]
2−K ≥ 1
9
[θ + t(2β −1)]2
or
K ≤ t(3αL− (
1+αL
2 )(2β −1))[4θ +4t(2β −1)+ t(3αL− ( 1+αL2 )(2β −1))]
36
= κ
′′
αL
In a similar way, type αH does not deviate if
Π2αH(K1 = K2 = K, µ =
1
2
)≥Π2αH(K = K, K2 = 0, µ = 12 )
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that is, if
K ≤ t(3− (
1+αL
2 )(2β −1))[4θ +4t(2β −1)+ t(3− ( 1+αL2 )(2β −1))]
36
= κ
′′
αH
Given that κ ′′αL < κ
′
< κ ′′αH , s = (s1, s2) = (K, (K, K)) can be part of a pooling PBE only if K < κ
′′
αL.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Let s a generic combination of actions in some point of the game. An equilibrium entailing s
′
interim Pareto
dominates an equilibrium entailing s
′′
if, given the available information at the time in which s
′
and s
′′
are chosen, the
payoffs following s
′
are such that no player is worse off and at least one player is better off, with respect to the payoffs
following s
′′
.
Given that, in [ν , κ ′′αL] ,
(i) for type αL
(Π2αL|s = (K, (K, K)))> (Π2αL|s = (K, (0, K)))
since
1
36
[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL− α¯(2β −1))]2−K > 19 [θ + t(2β −1)]
2
when K < κ ′′αL,
(ii) for type αH
(Π2αH |s = (K, (K, K))) = 136 [2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3−α(µ)(2β −1))]
2−K >
1
9
[θ + t(1+β )]2−K = (Π2αH |s = (K, (0, K)))
since, when spillovers are high, the profit of type αH increases as α(µ)→ αL, and
(iii) for firm 1
E(Π1|s = (K, (K, K))) = 19 [θ + t(2−β )+ tα(µ)(2β −1)]
2−K >
1
18
{[θ + t(2−β )]2+[θ + t(1+β )]2}−K = E(Π1|s = (K, (0, K)))
it follows that, for ν < K < κ ′′αL, an equilibrium with s = (K, (K, K)) at second stage interim Pareto dominates an
equilibrium with s = (K, (0, K)).
In the same way, it can be demonstrated that an equilibrium with s = (K, (0, K)) interim Pareto dominates an
equilibrium with s = (0, (0, 0)) in [δ , γ].
Proof of Lemma 8.
Let us first demonstrate that for K < κ ′′αL, equilibria involving separating strategies at the first stage do not exist. A
possible separating equilibrium has to be such that either sˆ
′
2 = (not accept, accept) or sˆ
′
2 = (accept, not accept) after
sˆ1 = RJV .
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Consider first sˆ
′
2 = (not accept, accept). Given this strategy, at the beginning of the second stage, (µ|sˆ
′
2 =
not accept) = 0 and (µ|sˆ′2 = accept) = 1. So, type αH would obtain, in RJV regime
(Π2αH |K1 = K, K2αH = K, µ = 1) = [θ + t(2β −1)+ t(2−β )]
2
9
−K
If type αH deviates, playing sˆ
′
2αH = not accept, in R&D competition firm 1 will think to face the less efficient firm.
Under complete information, the outcome with asymmetric firms under complete information is such that both firms
invest, since κ ′′αL < h21; by deviating, type αH can get22
(ΠD2αH |K1 = K, K2αH = K, µ = 0) =
[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3−αL(2β −1))]2
36
−K
Given that
[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3−αL(2β −1))]2
36
−K > [θ + t(2β −1)+ t(2−β )]
2
9
−K
type αH has incentive to deviate, hence an equilibrium with sˆ
′
2 = (not accept, accept) following sˆ1 = RJV can
never exist.
The same argument holds to prove that sˆ
′
2 = (accept, not accept) cannot be part of an equilibrium. Indeed, in
R&D competition regime, type αH ’s profit would be (Π2αH |K1 = K, K2αH = K, µ = 1)23, while, by deviating, it
could obtain (ΠD2αH |K1 = K, K2αH = K, µ = 0).
Let us consider now possible equilibria entailing pooling strategies at the first stage.
Consider first the pooling strategy in which no type of firm 2 accepts the (possible) RJV proposal by firm 1. No type
has incentive to deviate from sˆ
′
2 = (not accept, not accept) since in R&D competition under incomplete information
the outcome is such that each firm and each type invest (see Proposition 5 and Proposition 6) and in RJV regime
the two types would obtain the same profit. Given sˆ
′
2 = (not accept, not accept), firm 1 is indifferent between RJV
and nothing: it will end up in R&D competition regime under incomplete information, whatever its choice. So, both
sˆ1 = RJV followed by sˆ
′
2 = (not accept, not accept) and sˆ1 = nothing followed by sˆ
′
2 = (not accept, not accept) are
sustainable as part of a pooling equilibrium. This proves (ii) and part of (i).
Consider now sˆ
′
2 = (accept, accept) after sˆ1 = RJV ; the outcome following these strategies is such that each firm
and each type invest in RJV regime. Given that the outcome arising in R&D competition under incomplete information
is the same as in RJV regime, no type of firm 2 has incentive to deviate and firm 1 is indifferent between RJV and
nothing, given sˆ
′
2 = (accept, accept). So, both sˆ1 = RJV followed by sˆ
′
2 = (accept, accept) and sˆ1 = nothing followed
by sˆ
′
2 = (accept, accept) are sustainable as part of a pooling equilibrium. This proves (iii) and the remaining part of
(i).
Proof of Lemma 9.
Consider first sˆ
′
2 = (accept, accept). This pooling strategy cannot be part of an equilibrium since type αL can get
an higher profit in R&D competition regime. Indeed, in the interval [κ ′′αL, γ], the outcome in R&D competition under
incomplete information entails s = (K, (0, K)) and so (Π2αL|K1 = K, K2αL = 0, µ = 12 ) = (1/9)[θ + t(2β − 1)]2;
in RJV regime, type αL’ profits would be (Π2αL|K1 = K, K2αL = 0, µ = 12 ) = (1/36)[2θ + 2t(2β − 1) + t(3αL−
α(µ)(2β −1))]2−K. Given that
21See Proposition 2.
22See proof of Lemma 4.
23Both firms invest under complete information since κ ′′αL < τ (See Proposition 1).
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[θ + t(2β −1)]2
9
>
[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]2
36
−K
when K > κ ′′αL (see proof of Proposition 5), type αL has incentive to deviate from sˆ
′
2 = (accept, accept), so a
pooling equilibrium with RJV formation cannot obtain in [κ ′′αL, γ].
Consider now sˆ
′
2 =(not accept, not accept). Following this strategy, type αH , in R&D competition, gets (Π2αH |K1 =
K, K2αH = K, µ = 1), while, by deviating, it can obtain (Π2αH |K1 = K, K2αH = K, µ = 12 ); given that (Π2αH |K1 =
K, K2αH = K) is decreasing in µ (see equation (16)), type αH has incentive to deviate, so a pooling equilibrium in
which both types of firm 2 reject firm 1’s proposal to cooperate in R&D does not exist.
Proof of Lemma 10.
The same arguments for which separating strategies after firm 1’s proposal cannot be part of an equilibrium for
K < κ ′′αL (see proof of Lemma 8) hold also in the interval we are considering, namely [κ
′′
αL, h]. Given that, in this
interval, also pooling strategies after sˆ1 = RJV are not possible (see Lemma 9), here I demonstrate that an equilibrium
entailing sˆ1 = nothing at the first stage and s = (K, (0, K)) at the second stage does exist.
Since a separating strategy of firm 2 at first stage following sˆ1 = RJV cannot be part of an equilibrium, firm
1 will not be able to distinguish between the two types of firm 2 after a possible cooperation proposal, so assume
that, after sˆ1 = RJV , beliefs are such that µ = 12 (out of the equilibrium path beliefs could be whatever) and sˆ
′
2 =
(not accept, accept) (consistent strategy with µ = 12 ). Given this, firm 1 has no incentive to deviate from sˆ1 = nothing
since its expected profit in R&D competition regime, namely
E(Π1|sˆ1 = nothing) = 12{
[θ + t(2−β )]2
9
}+ 1
2
{ [θ + t(2β −1)+ t(2−β )]
2
9
−K}
is larger than its expected profit by deviation, (that leads firm 1 in R&D competition regime with type αL with
probability 12 and in RJV regime with type αH with the same probability), that is
E(Π1|sˆ1 = RJV ) = 12{
[θ + t(2−β )]2
9
}+ 1
2
{ [θ +α(µ)t(2β −1)+ t(2−β )]
2
9
−K}
Therefore, in the interval [κ ′′αL, h] it does exist an equilibrium such that firm 1 plays sˆ1 = nothing and the game
ends up with the outcomes of R&D competition regime.
Proof of Lemma 11.
According to Lemma 9, pooling strategies by firm 2 at the first stage after sˆ1 = RJV cannot be part of an equi-
librium, so it has to be checked if sˆ2 = (accept, not accept) and sˆ2 = (not accept, accept) can be sustainable as
equilibrium strategies following firm 1’s cooperation proposal.
It is easy to show first that sˆ2 = (accept, not accept) can never be an equilibrium strategy. Infact, type αL has
incentive to deviate since its profit in RJV regime with beliefs updating (following the strategy sˆ2αL = accept) is lower
than the profit it would obtain by deviation (in R&D competition firm 1 invests and the less efficient firm finds optimal
do not invest, so revealing its type in the last stage):
(Π2αL|K1 = K, K2αL = K, µ = 0) = 19 [θ +αLt(2−β )+ t(2β −1)]
2−K <
1
9
[θ + t(2β −1))]2 = (Π2αL|K1 = K, K2αL = 0, µ)
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when K > h. Therefore, sˆ2 = (accept, not accept) can be ruled out as possible equilibrium strategy.
Consider now sˆ2 = (not accept, accept). I demonstrate first that no type of firm 2 has incentive to deviate and
then that, given sˆ2 = (not accept, accept), firm 1 has no incentive to deviate from sˆ1 = RJV . If type αL follows
sˆ2 = (not accept, accept), it will end up in R&D competition and its profit will be (Π2αL|K1 = K, K2αL = 0, µ = 0) =
1
9 [θ + t(2β −1)]2; if type αL deviates, playing sˆ2αL = accept, in RJV it would get (ΠD2αL|K1 = K, K2αL = K, µ =
1) = 136 [2θ + t(2β −1)+3tαL)]2−K. Given that
1
9
[θ + t(2β −1)]2 > 1
36
[2θ + t(2β −1)+3tαL)]2−K
when K > ν (where ν is defined in (21)) and that ν < h, type αL will not deviate.
As for type αH , if it follows sˆ2 = (not accept, accept), its profit in RJV regime will be (Π2αH |K1 = K, K2αH =
K, µ = 1) = 19 [θ + t(2−β )+ t(2β −1)]2−K. If type αH deviates, the second stage in R&D competition regime starts
with µ = 0. Given that K1 = K, if type αH mimics the less efficient firm, the profit of type αH will be (Π2αH |K1 =
K, K2αH = 0, µ = 0) = 19 [θ + t(2β −1)]2, that is lower than (Π2αH |K1 = K, K2αH = K, µ = 1) since
1
9
[θ + t(2β −1)]2 < 1
9
[θ + t(2−β )+ t(2β −1)]2−K
when K < τ , and and τ > δ . If, in R&D competition, type αH plays K2αH = K, it will obtain the same profit
as following sˆ2 = (not accept, accept) (firm 1 updates its beliefs at the last stage). Hence, type αH has no incentive
to deviate from sˆ2 = (not accept, accept), that turns out to be the unique possible equilibrium of firm 2 following
sˆ1 = RJV .
It remains to be checked whether firm 1 can have incentive to deviate from sˆ1 = RJV . Note that firm 1’s expected
profit when it plays sˆ1 = RJV is the same as after playing sˆ1 = nothing. The RJV is going to be formed only when
α = αH , leading to the some outcome arising when R&D competition starts with incomplete information (where
s = (K, (0, K))).
It follows that, for h < K < δ , there are only two possible equilibrium strategies at the first stage, namely sˆ1 =
RJV followed by sˆ2 = (not accept, accept) and sˆ1 = nothing, after which R&D competition starts under incomplete
information. The two equilibria are outcome equivalent: the two efficient firms invest, while the less efficient firm
does not and there is perfect updating at the beginning of the last stage, irrespective of the possibility to form a RJV.
Proof of Lemma 12.
Looking for possible equilibria entailing sˆ1 = RJV in the interval [δ , γ], we focus only on separating strategies by
firm 2, since no pooling strategies after firm 1’s cooperation proposal are sustainable as part of an equilibrium (see
Lemma 9).
Considersˆ2 = (accept, not accept). In the interval under consideration, the equilibrium arising in R&D compe-
tition implies investment by firm 1 and type αH with beliefs updating (µ = 1); in terms of investment choices, the
equilibrium in RJV regime leads to the same outcome as for the two efficient firms, but, if type αH deviates from
sˆ2 = (accept, not accept), in RJV regime µ = 0. Given that (Π2αH |K1 = K, K2αH = K) is decreasing in µ (see equa-
tion (16)), sˆ2 = (accept, not accept) has to be ruled out as possible equilibrium strategies after sˆ1 = RJV since type
αH would have incentive to deviate.
Therefore if an equilibrium with a separating strategy by firm 2 after firm 1’s cooperation proposal exists, it has to
be such that sˆ2 = (not accept, accept). If sˆ2 = (not accept, accept), firm 1 would have no incentive to deviate from
sˆ1 = RJV since
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E(Π1|sˆ1 = RJV ) = 12{
θ 2
9
}+ 1
2
{1
9
[θ + t(1+β )]2−K}>
1
2
{1
9
[θ + t(2−β )]2−K}+ 1
2
{1
9
[θ + t(1+β )]2−K}= E(Π1|sˆ1 = nothing)
when K > δ . It has to be checked if the two types of firm 2 have incentive to deviate from sˆ2 =(not accept, accept).
Consider type αH first. If it follows sˆ2 = (not accept, accept), in RJV it gets (Π2αH |K1 = K, K2αH = K, µ = 1) =
1
9 [θ + t(1+β )]
2−K. It it deviates, R&D competition starts with µ = 0 and firm 1 would not invest (see Proposition
2); given K1 = 0, type αH ’s best reply will be K2αH = 0, leading to (Π2αH |K1 = K2αH = 0) = θ29 (see Proposition 1).
Given that
1
9
[θ + t(1+β )]2−K > θ
2
9
when K < z, with z defined in (6), and that z > γ , type αH will not deviate.
Consider now type αL. Following sˆ2 = (not accept, accept), type αL obtains (Π2αL|K1 = K2αL = 0) = θ29 in R&D
competition, while, it it deviates, in RJV regime µ = 1 and type αL’s profit will be (ΠD2αL|K1 = K2αL = K, µ = 1) =
1
36 [2θ + t(2β −1)+3tαL]2−K. So, type αL has incentive to deviate if
K <
t(2β −1+3αL)[4θ + t(2β −1+3αL)]
36
≡ φ
According to the parameters’ values, the threshold φcan be higher or lower than δ and γ , so we analyse three
possible cases.
Case 1: δ < γ < φ
In this case, an equilibrium with sˆ1 = RJV followed by sˆ2 = (not accept, accept) does not exist since type αL has
incentive to deviate.
Case 2: φ < δ < γ
In this case, type αL has no incentive to deviate, so an equilibrium such that the RJV is formed only if α = αH
obtains.
Case 3: δ < φ < γ
The same result as in Case 1 holds in the interval [φ , γ], while in [δ , φ ] we have the same result as in Case 2.
Summing up the three case, it turns out that an equilibrium with sˆ1 = RJV and sˆ2 = (not accept, accept) may exist
only if the parameters’ values are such that φ < γ , for max{δ , φ}< K < γ . Where this equilibrium cannot obtain, the
only possible equilibrium entails sˆ1 = nothing; given sˆ2 = (not accept, accept) and µ = 12 after sˆ1 = RJV (out of the
equilibrium path), firm 1 has no incentive to deviate from sˆ1 = nothing.
Proof of Lemma 13.
Consider the region of parameters in which K > γ; here the equilibrium arising when only R&D competition
regime is feasible is such that no firm invests. Let us start by analyzing possible equilibria with separating strategies
of firm 2 at stage 1.
We check first if sˆ2 = (accept, not accept) after sˆ1 = RJV can be part of an equilibrium strategy.
Consider type αH . If it follows the strategy sˆ2 = (accept, not accept), in R&D competition it gets (Π2αL|K1 =
K2αH = K, µ = 1) = 19 [θ + t(2−β )+ t(2β −1)]2−K in the interval [γ, τ] and (Π2αL|K1 = K2αH = 0, µ = 1) = θ
2
9
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for K > τ . In the interval [γ, τ], type αH has incentive to deviate since (Π2αH |K1 = K2αH = K, µ = 1)< (ΠD2αH |K1 =
K2αH = K, µ = 0). For K > τ , type αH will not deviate if
(Π2αH |K1 = K2αH = 0, µ = 1) = θ
2
9
>
1
36
[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3−αL(2β −1))]2−K = (ΠD2αH |K1 = K2αH = K, µ = 0)
that is if
K >
1
36
[2t(2β −1)+ t(3−αL(2β −1))][4θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3−αL(2β −1))]≡ ξ
Consider now type αL. If it follows the strategy sˆ2 = (accept, not accept) it gets (Π2αL|K1 = K2αL = K, µ = 0) =
1
9 [θ +αLt(2−β )+ t(2β −1)]2−K. If type αL deviates, at the investment stage in R&D competition firm 1 will play
K1 = K if K < τ and K1 = 0 if K > τ , given that µ = 1. We do not take into account the region in which K < τ since
here type αL deviates, so the equilibrium breaks down. When K > τ , type αL will not deviate if
(Π2αL|K1 = K2αL = K, µ = 0) = 19 [θ +αLt(2−β )+ t(2β −1)]
2−K >
θ 2
9
= (ΠD2αL|K1 = K2αL = 0µ = 1)
that is if
K <
1
9
[t(2β −1)+αLt(2−β ))][2θ + t(2β −1)+αLt(2−β ))]≡ ρ
Given that ρ < ξ , it does not exist a region for K > γ in which no type of firm 2 has no incentive to deviate from
sˆ2 = (accept, not accept), that can be ruled out as possible equilibrium strategy after sˆ1 = RJV .
Let us proceed with the other separating strategy, namely sˆ2 = (not accept, accept). Following this strategy, type
αH ’s profit in RJV is (Π2αH |K1 = K2αH = K, µ = 1) = 19 [θ + t(1+β )]2−K; if it deviates, in R&D competition, it
gets (Π2αH |K1 = K2αH = 0, µ = 0) = θ29 . Hence, type αH will not deviate if
K <
t(1+β )[2θ + t(1+β )]
9
≡ z
Type αL has no incentive to deviate if (Π2αL|K1 = K2αL = K, µ = 0)> (Π2αL|K1 = K2αL = K, µ = 1), that is if
K >
t(2β −1+3αL)[4θ + t(2β −1+3αL)]
36
≡ φ
Since φ can be higher or lower than γ , according to the parameters’ values, we define the region of parameters in
which no type has incentive to deviate from sˆ2 = (not accept, accept) as max{φ , γ} < K < z. It remains to check is
sˆ1 = RJV is actually an equilibrium strategy in this interval. Given sˆ2 = (not accept, accept), firm 1 will not deviate if
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E(Π1|sˆ1 = RJV ) = 12{
θ 2
9
}+ 1
2
{ t(1+β )[2θ + t(1+β )]
9
}>
1
2
{θ
2
9
}+ 1
2
{θ
2
9
}= E(Π1|sˆ1 = nothing)
that is if K < z. Therefore, sˆ1 = RJV followed by sˆ2 = (not accept, accept) can be part of an equilibrium for
max{φ , γ}< K < z. With respect to the outcome arising when only RJV regime is feasible (no investment at all), this
equilibrium is welfare improving since, when α = αL nothing changes with the possibility to form a RJV, but, α = αH
the efficient firms makes higher profits and the total investment increases. This proves part (i).
Let consider now possible equilibria with pooling strategies of firm 2 at stage 1, starting with sˆ2 =(accept, accept).
Type αL has no incentive to deviate if
(Π2αL|K1 = K2αL = K, µ = 12 ) =
1
36
[2θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]2−K > (Π2αL|K1 = K2αL = K, µ = 1)
θ 2
9
= (Π2αL|K1 = K2αL = 0, µ = 12 )
that is if
K <
[2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
.
.
[4θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3αL−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
≡ η ′′αL
The threshold η ′′αL can be higher or lower than γ , according to the parameters’ values.
If η ′′αL > γ , for γ < K < η
′′
αL, type αL will not deviate from sˆ2 = (accept, accept). Similarly, type αH does not
deviate if
K <
[2t(2β −1)+ t(3−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
.
.
[4θ +2t(2β −1)+ t(3−α(µ)(2β −1))]
36
≡ η ′′αH
Since η ′′αL < η
′′
αH , for γ < K < η
′′
αL, no type has incentive to deviate from sˆ2 = (accept, accept). Given this
strategy of firm 2, firm 1 will play sˆ1 = RJV since
E(Π1|K1 = K2αL = K2αH = K, µ = 12 ) =
1
9
[θ + t(2−β )+ tα(µ)(2β −1)]2−K >
θ 2
9
= E(Π1|K1 = K2αL = K2αH = 0, µ = 12 )
when
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K <
[t(2−β )+ tα(µ)(2β −1)][2θ + t(2−β )+ tα(µ)(2β −1)]
9
= η
′
and η ′ > η ′′αL. So, if η
′′
αL > γ , for γ < K < η
′′
αL, and equilibrium with sˆ1 = RJV followed by sˆ2 = (accept, accept)
exists. The RJV is formed whatever the type of firm 2 and leads to a welfare improvement with respect to a situation
in which only R&D competition is feasible (where no firm invests) since each firm gets an higher profit and the total
investment increases. This proves part (ii).
If η ′′αL < γ , a pooling equilibrium such that the RJV is formed whatever the type of firm 2 can never exist. In this
case, firm 1 plays sˆ1 = nothing and the outcome is the same as if only R&D competition is feasible.
All the other possible equilibria for K > γ would entail sˆ2 = (not accept, not accept), leading to the same outcome
as that arising when there is no possibility to cooperate in R&D. This proves part (iii).
It remains to demonstrate that the separating equilibrium in which the RJV is formed between the two efficient
firms and the pooling equilibrium with RJV formation (provided that it exist), interim Pareto dominate all the other
possible equilibria. The proof is straightforward for the pooling equilibrium, since it does exist because each firm
expects higher profits with respect to the profits obtainable in R&D competition, and these latter are equal to those
arising from possible equilibria other than the equilibria defined in (i) and (ii). As for the separating equilibrium
defined in (i), simply note that
(Π2αL|sˆ1 = RJV, sˆ2 = (not accept, accept)) = θ
2
9
(Π2αH |sˆ1 = RJV, sˆ2 = (not accept, accept)) = [θ + t(1+β )]
2
9
−K > θ
2
9
E(Π1|sˆ1 = RJV, sˆ2 = (not accept, accept)) = 12{
θ 2
9
}+ 1
2
{ [θ + t(1+β )]
2
9
−K}> θ
2
9
where the r.h.s represents the payoffs delivered by any equilibrium different from those defined in (i) and (ii). This
complete the proof of part (iv).
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Chapter 4
Immigration, Population Diversity
and Innovation of Italian regions1
Introduction
At the turn of the century, 4.6% of world population was born in a different country from the one where it currently
lived. In the OECD countries this share rises to 8.9%. 31.4 million of immigrants were living in the U.S.; 7.8 million in
Germany; 5.6 million in France; 5.3 million in Canada; 2 million in Italy. Several non-OECD countries also had very
large foreign-born populations. 11 million live in Russia; 6 million in India; 1.8 million in Israel. In relative terms,
high shares of immigrants were recorded in several OECD countries in 2000 (in Luxembourg 37% of the population
was foreign-born; in Australia 27%), but also among non-OECD countries (Singapore: 23%, Estonia: 22%, Belize:
21%, and Latvia: 21%).
Owing to the size of the phenomenon, immigration has been recently at the centre of the political and economic
debate. Economists have studied extensively the potential impact of immigration on a variety of economic and social
indicators of host countries, such as natives’ wages (Borjas 2003; 2005, Ottaviano and Peri 2012) and employment
opportunities (Pischke and Velling 1997, Card 2001; 2005), firm productivity [Peri(2012)], trade creation (Gould
1994, Rauch and Trinidade 2002, Peri and Requena-Silvente 2010) and crime [Bell et al.(2010)Bell, Machin, and
Fasani, Bianchi et al.(2012)Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti], just to take a few examples. Until very recently the effect
of immigration on innovation and technical change was instead much less studied. Yet innovation is surely one of the
key factors for a country’s economic growth (Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992, Acemoglu 2002, Jones 2002).
Although new evidence is progressively accumulating, it remains nonetheless mostly limited to the impact of
skilled immigration in the U.S. In recent work [Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle(2010)] and [Stuen et al.(2012)Stuen, Mo-
barak, and Maskus], for instance, focus on skilled immigration —immigrant college population and doctoral students
respectively— and find positive effects on U.S. innovation, measured by the count of patents or publications, and
the citations they received.2 Evidence that immigration may drive the direction of technological change is provided
1Joint with Massimiliano Bratti, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, Università degli Studi di Milano, Via
Conservatorio 7, 20122 Milano, Italy, and CHILD (Turin), IZA (Bonn), Ld’A (Milan).
2Other studies for the U.S. obtain similar findings. [Chellaraj et al.(2008)Chellaraj, Maskus, and Mattoo] find a positive effect of foreign
students on patent applications using time-series data. [Hunt(2011)] finds that immigrants who entered the U.S. with certain types of visas —related
to training, study, and temporary work— patent more innovation than natives. [Kerr and Lincoln(2010)] exploit the 1990 Immigration act and show
that the increase in patenting from Chinese and Indian immigrants is positively correlated with H-1B type visas (‘specialty occupations’ requiring
at least a bachelor’s degree).
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for the U.S. by [Lewis(2011)] who shows that plants in areas rich in immigrants adopted during the 80s and the 90s
significantly less machinery, because of the relative abundance of less-skilled labour force. Consistent evidence is also
reported for the same country by [Peri(2012)].
A related stream of literature expressely focuses on a specific aspect of immigration, the greater cultural diversity
that it produces in the population. [Ottaviano and Peri(2006)] do not expressely focus on innovation, but on wages
and rents; however, from the positive effect of immigrants’ diversity on both variables they infer a positive effect on
productivity of U.S. cities. A more direct focus of cultural diversity on innovation is provided by [Niebuhr(2009)]
who analyzes German regions. She reports significant positive effects of cultural diversity in both total and high-
skilled immigrants working in R&D — hence, the focus is again on skilled immigration — on patents percapita
using instrumental variables (IVs, hereafter), but not including region fixed effects. Except for the U.S. and Germany,
published work for other countries is almost non-existent.
In this paper we make an attempt to contribute to this important stream of literature. In addition to providing
evidence for a country which was exposed to a very fast and large wave of immigrations during the 2000s —Italy (see
section 4)—, we also use a very small geographical scale of analysis —Italian provinces corresponding to NUTS-3
regions — , which presumably enables us to better control for differences in institutional and socio-economic factors
which are difficult to observe but which may simultaneously contribute to both attracting new immigrants and increase
the innovation potential of a region. Moreover, unlike most papers in the literature which only considered the effect of
skilled immigration, (i) we first focus on the general impact of immigration, and then (ii) separately look at the effects
of low-educated and high-educated immigrants on innovation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 4 sets the conceptual framework for our analysis. The existing
work on the effect of immigration on innovation is surveyed in Section 4. Section 4 describes the Italian context and
the main features of Italy’s immigration, and Section 4 the data used in the empirical analysis. The main results on
the effect of immigration on patents’ applications are included in Sections 4 and 4, reporting OLS and IVs estimates,
respectively. Section 4 extends the analysis by separately considering the differential effects of low-educated and
high-educated immigrants. The last section summarizes our main findings, and concludes.
4.1 Immigration and innovation: Theory and empirics
4.1.1 Theory and conceptual framework
There are several reasons why immigration may have an effect on innovation. Immigration entails an inflow of foreign
population into a region, and produces changes (i) in the size of the population; (ii) in the average skill level of the
population; (iii) in the age structure of the population, as immigrants tend to be of working age. The direction of
the first two changes is unknown apriori, as new immigrants could increase the size of the population or decrease it
in case natives abandon a region owing to the high concentration of immigrants, the so-called ‘native flight’ (on this
specific point see Card and DiNardo 2000). The change in the average skill level in the population depends instead
on the average levels of human capital of immigrants compared to that of natives. Both population and human capital
are powerful predictors of innovation. Population is likely to spur innovation through the advantages produced by the
agglomeration of economic activities [Becker et al.(1999)Becker, Glaeser, and Murphy, Glaeser(1999)] and market
size [Acemoglu and Linn(2004)]. Human capital is considered theoretically [Romer(1990)] and found empirically
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(Faggian and McCann 2009, Andersson et al. 2009, Zinovyeva and Cowan 2012) an important input into the produc-
tion of new ideas, and therefore innovation. Thus, population’s size and average skill level are key mediating factors
for the effect of immigration on innovation. The same can be said for the age structure of the population, from which
we expect younger individuals to be more creative and innovative3. Since changes in these mediating variables due to
immigrants’ inflow are almost ‘mechanical’, i.e. they do not require economic agents (individuals, firms) to change
their behavior, we expect their effect to be relevant also in the short and medium run.
One aspect of immigration on which most of previous articles have focused is the fact that it produces a more
culturally diverse population. Individuals coming from different countries usually have different, complementary skills
with respect to natives, and the production of new ideas may be positively influenced by contacts and interchanges
between culturally diverse individuals [Jacobs(1969)]. Moreover, a more ‘diverse’ cultural environment may attract
more creative individuals [Florida(2002)]. Diversity is not necessarily an advantage though. Cultural diversity could
also entail difficulties in communication, especially when immigrants and natives do not share the same language (as it
is likely to be the case for low skill immigrants in Italy), reduce social capital, and act as an obstacle to innovation and
growth [Alesina and La Ferrara(2005)]. Positive effects on innovation are expected mainly by diversity in the skilled
population, and many studies have focused accordigly on skilled immigration only (see section 4).
However, there are other mechanisms through which one may expect negative effects of immigration on innovation.
A large inflow of low-skilled immigration within a region may affect firms’ choices concerning technology adoption
and investments in physical capital. [Lewis(2011)] focus on U.S. metro areas, and finds ‘that plants added technlogy
more slowly between 1988 and 1993 where immigration induced the ratio of high school dropouts to graduates to
grown more quickly’ (p. 1031). [Lewis(2011)] also finds that the increases in the relative supply of low-skill workers
are associated with slower growth in capital-labor and capital-output ratios. On the grounds of this recent evidence,
we will not focus on skilled immigration only, but we will consider in our study both the effect of overall immigration,
and the separate effects of skilled and unskilled immigrants. This work is likely to operate especially in the medium
and long run, as it is related to technological change and physical capital accumulation.
Hence, when considering the causal effect of immigration on innovation there are many potential pathways to be
considered, some of which have opposite effects. The conceptual framework which will represent the starting point
for our analysis is depicted in Figure 4.1. As we already pointed out, immigrants have an indirect effect on innovation
through various mediating factors. These factors have been distinguished in two groups. ‘Mechanical’ factors are
collected in the white box, while factors which requires economic agents to change their behavior in the grey box.
Immigration also has a direct effect on innovation through cultural diversity. A first complication with this framework
is that the variables in the two boxes of Figure 4.1 may also be affected by confounding factors. This happens if they
depend on a ‘third variable’ which is also a determinant of immigration. An immediate consequence for the analysis
is that although a common modelling approach to assessing the causal effect of immigration on innovation would be
to omit mediating factors (i.e. post-treatment variables), this may generate an omitted variables bias in case they also
are confounding factors. Just to take an example, immigrants may settle in large cities as they offer better employment
opportunities, but these cities also benefit from agglomeration economies (the ‘third variable’), which have in turn
a positive impact on innovation. Omitting population from the analysis may then generate a spurious correlation
between immigration and innovation, which is only driven by ‘agglomeration economies’. Another example may be
represented by positive shocks to the demand of low-skilled workers, which both change the product mix of a region,
driving it towards more labour-intensive production processes, and the stock of low skilled workers in the region
3In fact, studies on the effect of population ageing on innovation are almost non-existent, while there is some evidence that older populations
are less productive [Lindh and Malmberg(1999), Feyrer(2008)].
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework: Effect of immigrants on innovation
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through immigrants’ inflow [Lewis(2011)].
In what follows we write down the conceptual framework in a more formal way. Let us define the primary equation
of interest, the determinants of innovation (yit ):
yit = β0+β1immit +β2xit +β3 popit +uyit (4.1)
where i and t are region and time subscripts, immit the share of immigrants on the population, xit a vector of exogenous
variables, popit population and u
y
it an error term. The share of immigrants is modelled as
immit = λ0+λ1xit +λ2zit +λ3cit +uimmit (4.2)
where zit is a variable which enters the immigrants’ share equation only (‘excluded instrument’), cit is another determi-
nant of immigration, and uimmit an error term. If u
y
it and u
imm
it are correlated, then the share of immigrants is endogenous
with respect to innovation. Let us now model population as a linear function
popit = α0+α1immit +α2xit +α3cit +upopit (4.3)
where upopit is an error term. Popit is defined a mediating factor for immit if α1 6= 0 and β3 6= 0. Popit is defined a
confounding factor for immit if λ3 6= 0, α3 6= 0, β1 6= 0 and β3 6= 0. This means that if popit is omitted from equation
(4.1), its effect will be captured by immit . What are the modelling alternatives for the researcher? First, if popit is a
mediating factor for immit , it is as endogenous as the latter variable is. Thus, in case mediating variables are included in
the regression, they must be treated as endogenous variables, e.g., instrumented if the researcher uses an IVs strategy.
Moreover, if all mediating factors are included, the researcher will estimate only the direct effects (e.g., ‘diversity’ in
our conceptual framework) and not the gross effect of the independent variable (‘treatment’) of interest. Since it is
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difficult to find suitable instruments for all endogenous variables, the researcher may be tempted to omit the mediating
factors and focus on the gross effect (‘gross-effect’ approach), which allows her to focus only on the endogeneity of
immit . As in this case the ‘third variable’ cit , which makes popit a confounding factor, enter the error term of equation
(4.1) instrumental variables will produce consistent estimates only if the excluded instrument zit and the confounding
factor cit are not correlated. In any case, also in this best case scenario, using the ‘gross-effect’ approach the effects of
immit and popit cannot be separately identified.
As we do not have instruments for all potential mediating factors (e.g., population, average skill level in the
population, working age population) we focus on a slight modification of the ‘gross-effect approach’. Although we
do not include in the primary equation contemporaneous or one-period lagged potential mediating factors, we do
include the value of these factors in a pre-estimation period (2001). The rationale for doing this is to try to control
for time-invariant or very time-persistent confouding factors, avoiding at the same time to include variables which are
likely to be affected by immigration during the estimation period. This also has the advantage of making the excluded
instruments we use for immigration more credible. Indeed, we will use to build instruments for our main independent
variables of interest (immigrants’ share and diversity) a shift and share approach which is based on the distribution
of immigrants by nationality across provinces in 1995 and the idea of immigrant enclaves (see section 4). The main
concern with this instrument is that also in 1995 immigrants (of all nationalities) may have located in more populated
provinces, and since population is quite persistent overtime the instrument may be correlated with the error term in the
innovation equation —if population is an important determinant of innovation— violating the instrument’s exogeneity
assumption. As we will see in the following section, in which we report a brief summary of the past literature, our
approach partly differs from the one adopted by most researchers who have included potential mediating factors (e.g.,
population, human capital levels) in the estimation equation but treating them as exogenous variables.4
4.1.2 Past empirical evidence
The link between immigration, cultural diversity and economic performance has attracted considerable attention over
the past decade. Most of the works in this field of research focused on the role of high skilled immigrants, defined in
many ways. The impact of immigrants as a whole on host country’s economic activity has been investigated only in
[Ottaviano and Peri(2006)] and [Prarolo et al.(2009)Prarolo, Bellini, Ottaviano, and Pinelli]. However, these works
are not focused on innovation but, more generally, on potential beneficial effects of a culturally diverse population
on productivity. The analysis of [Ottaviano and Peri(2006)] aims to assess how diversity of American cities affects
productivity, through its effect on natives wages and rental prices. Diversity is proxied by the ’fractionalization index’5,
initially computed for the whole population and then splitted in its two components: the share of immigrants and the
index computed only for immigrants. The authors use a panel of U.S. metropolitan areas (MSA) for the years 1970
and 1990 and handle potential endogeneity of the share of immigrants with the ’shift and share’ methodology: they
construct their main instrument building on the fact that foreigners tend to settle in ’enclaves’ where other people from
their country already live. They use the share of residents in a MSA in 1970 for each country of birth and attribute to
4In the estimated innovation equation, [Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle(2010)] consider for the population variable only its value at the beginning
of the time period spanned by the analysis, but insert a contemporaneous variable for the average age of working age population. Measures of
population size, composition of the working age population and human capital are included in the regression as contemporaneous variables in
[Ozgen et al.(2012)Ozgen, Nijkamp, and Poot] and [Niebuhr(2009)]. However, none of these works took into account the possible endogeneity of
these mediating factors.
5The ’fractionalization index’ is also called ’diversity index’ and is computed as the complement to one of a HH concentration index calculated
on the shares of immigrants from different countries of birth. In the paper, we use indifferently one of the two terms to indicate the same index.
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each group the growth rate of that group within the whole U.S. population in 1970-1990 time period. They compute
the predicted composition of the city based on its 1970 composition attributing to each group the average growth rate
of its share in the U.S. population. The predicted number of immigrants is then used to construct the instrument,
that is the predicted diversity index. An additional instrument used in IV regression is the distance from the main
gateways into U.S. The results show a positive effect of diversity on wages and rents, though the effect is mainly
driven by the share of immigrants as a whole rather than diversity; IV regression allows to establish a causal relation
between the presence of immigrants and productivity. [Prarolo et al.(2009)Prarolo, Bellini, Ottaviano, and Pinelli] find
similar results for European regions (NUTS-3) from 12 countries of the EU15. Using a similar empirical framework,
[Suedekum et al.(2009)Suedekum, Wolf, and Blien] estimate the effect of diversity on natives’ wages and employment
in a panel of German regions (NUTS-3) during the period 1995-2006, but, differently from the above works, they try
also to separate the effect of low skilled immigrants from that of high skilled immigrants (defined as those who have
completed tertiary education). They use region and year fixed effects and address the endogeneity problem using
second order time lags in addition to other instruments (fertility of regional foreign population, regional vote share
of Green party and historical regional employment shares of classic guest workers industries, included in separate
regressions). Their results highlight a negative effect of the share of immigrants and a positive effect of diversity on
wages and employment, when all foreigners from a given country are considered as an homogeneous group. The
analysis by skill level shows the two groups of immigrants affect productivity in an opposite way: the authors observe
significant positive effects only when migrants are high skilled, while the effect of the share of low skilled immigrants
is negative and drives the effect of total immigration.
When object of interest are the consequences of the changes in the ‘ethnic’ composition of population or labor
force on innovation, mainly proxied by the number of patents applications, most of the existing studies focus only
on high skill immigration, and basically refer to the U.S. context. In particular, U.S. based analyses do not take into
account diversity as a potential driver of innovation (with the exception of [Stuen et al.(2012)Stuen, Mobarak, and
Maskus]); they are more interested in the ‘skill content’ of immigrants. [Chellaraj et al.(2008)Chellaraj, Maskus,
and Mattoo], using U.S. annual data for the period 1965-2001 (with regressors lagged 5-7 years), find a positive
effect of skilled immigration and foreign graduate students on patents applications and grants. The share of skilled
immigrants results to be beneficial for U.S. invention also in the work of [Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle(2010)]; they
use U.S. state panel data for the period 1940-2000 (Census decennial data) and consider 10 to 50 years differences
to account for short-run and long-run effects. They apply the same methodology as [Ottaviano and Peri(2006)] (shift
and share) to create an instrument for the share of immigrants; the IV estimate of the effect of the share of high skilled
immigrants turns out to be larger than the OLS coefficient. [Kerr and Lincoln(2010)] analyze how the change in H-
1B worker population influences ethnic patenting in U.S. cities during the period 1995-2008. They divide inventors
in four groups according to their names and run separate regressions; according to their estimates, total invention
increases with higher admissions of high skilled immigrants primarily through the direct contribution of Chinese
and Indian inventors. The effect on native patenting is limited, but there is no evidence of displacement effects.
[Moser et al.(2011)Moser, Voena, and Waldinger] finds a positive effect of German jewish émigrés on U.S. patenting
during the period 1920-1970; changes in patenting are examined at the level of research fields, rather than locations.
Pre-1933 research fields of dismissed scientists are used as instruments for the fields of U.S. émigrés; as in [Hunt
and Gauthier-Loiselle(2010)], IV estimates are larger than OLS estimates. [Stuen et al.(2012)Stuen, Mobarak, and
Maskus], analyzing American Science&Engineering departments from 1973 to 1998, try to identify the contribution
of natives and foreign doctoral students to academic innovation, measured by publications and citations. The effect
of foreign students on innovation turns out to be positive and significant, though not significantly different from that
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of natives. Using economic and policy shocks in the students’ origin countries to instrument foreign enrollments the
authors find that OLS underestimate the impact of foreign doctoral students, but again this effect is not statistically
different with respect to natives. Also, they incorporate in the regression the ’fractionalization index’ computed on
regional shares to capture the degree of diversity in international doctoral students enrollments. OLS regression shows
that diversity has a positive and significant effect on both publications and citations, but the index becomes no more
significant with instrumental variables. Overall, it seems that the beneficial effect of foreigners on innovation comes
from their provision of highly skilled work, not from cultural diversity per se.
Recently, similar studies have been developed also in the EU context6. [Bosetti et al.(2012)Bosetti, Cattaneo, and
Verdolini] estimate a positive effect of the share of immigrants employed in top skilled occupations on patenting and
scientific publications7. The shift-share procedure is exploited to create the predicted share of immigrants, which is
the instrument for the main regressor in IV estimation. An index measuring the tightness of national policy towards
immigrations is used as additional instrument. Units of observations are 19 EU countries and the time period spans
from 1997 to 2007. Other studies put particular interest on diversity as a potential determinant of innovation. [Ozgen
et al.(2012)Ozgen, Nijkamp, and Poot] does not focus only on high skilled immigration and considers, in separate
regression, the effect of the whole share of migrants and of population diversity (proxied by the fractionalization
index) on innovativeness of EU regions, measured by patents applications. Further, he tries to separate the effect of
low skilled migrants from that of high skilled migrants. Due to the lack of information about immigrants’ skill levels,
he groups migrants on the basis of the average skill level of the ‘global region’ from which the are from (Africa,
Asia, America, Europe and Oceania). The panel is composed of EU NUTS-2 regions; the variables are average
values over two five-year periods (1991-95 and 2001-2005). The number of McDonald’s per million of inhabitants,
a dummy for presence of capital cities and the total area represent the instruments to handle the endogeneity of the
share of immigrants (diversity index is not treated as endogenous regressor). Pooled OLS and IV estimations find
the share of total immigrant not significant, while the effect of population diversity turns out to be positive but non-
linear. As for analysis by skill level, a higher share of skilled immigrants seems to be beneficial for innovation.
The work of [Niebuhr(2009)] considers only German regions, but using smaller units of observation (NUTS-3), and
aims to establish a causal relationship between the diversity of the labor force and patents applications for the years
1997 and 1999. Again, the focus is on high skilled foreign workers; only R&D employees and high skilled R&D
employees are included in the computation of diversity index. Three different indexes are (separately) used to take
into account diversity: the standard ’fractionalization index’, the Theil index and the Krugman index. Lagged cultural
diversity of low skilled workers in neighbouring regions and, as alternative, the lagged shares of foreigners in low
skilled employment constitute the instruments for diversity indexes in IV regressions. OLS and IV estimations show a
positive effect of diversity on patenting though this effect is no more significant once fixed effects are included in the
regression.
From the review of the literature on the relation between migration and innovation, it does emerge that not only
our work is the first one analysing the Italian case, but also that none of the previous papers involves at the same time
very small geographical units of analysis (NUTS-3), the use of patents’ data to proxy innovation, the analysis of the
separate effects of low skilled and high skilled immigrants, and an attempt to address the endogeneity of immigration
using a shift and share methodology to build instruments for both the share of migrants and the diversity index.
6As for the European context, most of the studies in this field of the literature are conducted at firm level and are based on surveys data, basically
CIS data (Ozgen 2011, Parrotta et al. 2011, Brunow and Blien 2011, Simonen and McCann 2008, Lee Neil 2010). [Nathan(2011)] analyzes the
effect of diversity of inventor communities on individual patenting (panel of UK-resident inventor’s patenting activities between 1993 and 2004).
7The number of citations is used in some specifications to account for patents’ ‘quality’.
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Figure 4.2: Italy: Foreigners on total residents (percentage values) by regions
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Source: our data.
4.2 The country context8
Italy has been exposed to a very fast and large wave of immigration during the 2000s, as many other European
countries. The share of foreigners on Italian population grew from 2.7% in 2003 to 5% in 2007, though significant
growth rates have been registered in Northern and Central Italian regions, while in the South the share of immigrants
did not show relevant changes (Figure 4). At the beginning of 2007, foreigners accounted for 6.8% of population in
Northern-Central regions, while they represented 1.6% of residents in South Italy. In fact, immigrant population results
to be unevenly distributed across Italian territory; not surprisingly, foreign people moving to Italy tend to settle in the
richer regions and in big cities, that offer better opportunity of employment; 86.9% of immigrants are concentrated
in Northern and Central Italy, 23.2% live in Lombardy, 11.8% in Lazio, 19.2% just in the provinces of Milan and
Rome. Nowadays foreigners are roughly 7% of total Italian population; in some areas in the Center and the North of
the country they exceed the level of 10% 9.
Figure 4 shows a map of Italy where provinces are colored according to the share of foreign-born population in
the total population, with ‘darker’ provinces hosting a higher share of immigrants. The map of Italy also reveals some
spatial clustering of immigrants: provinces richer in immigrants are more likely to be close to each other.
Foreigners turn out to be an important resource for the Italian economic system. In 2008 immigrants accounted
for 12.1% of GDP formation; also, they are relatively young (32.6% of foreign employees is aged between 25 and
8The main source of the information provided in this section is ’Rapporto annuale sull’economia dell’immigrazione - Edizione 2011’, il Mulino.
9The percentage of foreigners on resident population is 12.9% in Brescia, 12.7% in Prato, 12.5% in Piacenza.
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34, whereas for Italian employees the percentage is 20.9%) and represent 6.5% of entrepreneurs. However, the big
majority of them tend to take manual-intensive and routine-type occupations (e.g. in construction, agriculture and
personal-household sectors). One third of low skilled labor force is composed by immigrants (the share in high
skilled workforce is 1.9%); 37.7% of foreign workers are employed in low skilled jobs (this percentage is 7.1% for
Italian workers), 89.9% are blue collars. This is mainly due to low schooling levels that characterize most of foreign
population in Italy, which fails to attract high skilled workers and students10 Apart from the fact that immigrants in
Italy are prevalently low skilled, the Italian context is peculiar also in another respect: also high educated immigrants
often takes low skilled job. It has been shown that, given similar characteristics (in terms of sex, age, education and
experience), foreigners are three times more likely to fill low skilled positions. For low skilled jobs, firms seem to
prefer immigrants: even if foreigners are 9% of the total workforce, they are more than 80% of agricultural workers,
and represent 40% of workers in low skilled personal services and 18% of workers in the construction sector. This
phenomenon has been called ’Job Ethnicization’.
The described situation is reflected on wages: immigrants’ wages are 23% lower than Italians’ and, differently
from Italian employees, there seems to be no correlation between wage and the education level of foreign employees.
To put it in other words immigrants are affected by substantial over-education.
So, it emerges that the characteristics of immigration in Italy are such that immigrants mainly appear as a source
of low-skilled or cheap labour force, which is employed in traditional (i.e. low value added) economic sectors. As we
will see later, this fact is very likely to be reflected on the role that immigration plays for Italy’s innovation.
4.3 Data
Our dataset contains information on demographic and economic indicators for 103 Italian provinces (NUTS-3 level)
and covers the time period 2002-200811. The main sources of data used in this study are ISTAT (Italian National
Statistical Institute) and EUROSTAT. All data (except those regarding R&D intensity) are taken at NUTS-3 level
of aggregation. During the period covered by our dataset the number of Italian provinces has changed: the data
are recorded according to 103 provinces before 2006 and to 107 provinces thereafter in the source databases12. So,
data from 2006 onward have been manipulated in order to have 103 units of observation for the whole time period
considered in our analysis. More precisely, the values referring to the four new provinces have been imputed to the
provinces from which they ’exited’ (so, for example, data post-2006 of Carbonia and Medio Campidano have been
assigned to Cagliari).
As a proxy for innovative performance of Italian provinces we use the number of patents applications to European
Patents Office (EPO)13. These data are available in EUROSTAT database-regional science&technology statistics for
the time period 2002-2009 at the NUTS-3 level of aggregation. However, available data for the year 2009 display a
10Consider that the top five countries by the number of immigrants in 2009 were Romania, Albania, Morocco, China
and Ukraine, accounting for about 50 percent of the total foreign-born population. According to Docquier-Markouf database
(http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm), the shares of high skilled emigrants (those with completed tertiary education) on total
emigrant to Italy in 1991 and 2001 (basically constant across the two periods) were 10% for Romania and Albania, 6% for Morocco and China,
35% for Ukraine.
11Due to some missing data, we have an unbalanced panel of 607 observations.
12The number of Italian provinces changed in recent times. In the mid 1990s the number of Italian provinces was 103. In 2001 the autonomous
region of Sardinia established 4 new provinces, that became operative in 2005. In 2004 the Italian Parliament established 3 new provinces that
became operative in 2009. The total actual number of provinces is 110. Since our dataset does not include observations for the years after 2009, the
latter change does not affect our dataset.
13We use this information to build our dependent variable, that is the logarithm of patents’ application per 1000 inhabitants.
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Figure 4.3: Shares of immigrants in italian provinces, 2003 (Top), and 2008 (Bottom)
Note: Provinces with dark colors correspond to those in higher quintiles of the distribution. From the figure it can be noted that provinces with high
(low) shares of immigrants tend to be clustered.
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sharp decline with respect to the previous year, suggesting that this data are likely to be still incomplete. This potential
problem, given the short time period covered by our dataset, may affect the results in a significant way; for this reason,
in our regressions, the observations referring to this year are not taken into account. The EPO data used in this paper
refer to all patents applications by priority year. Priority year refers to the first date the patent application was filed any-
where in the world. The OECD recommends using priority year as the closest to the actual timing of innovation. The
distribution of patents applications is assigned according to the inventor’s province of residence. If one application has
more than one inventor, the application is divided equally among all of them and subsequently among their province
of residence (fractional count), thus avoiding multiple counting. Using the residence of inventors rather than that of
proponents (usually the headquarter) allows not to under-estimate peripherical regions innovation activity [Moreno
et al.(2005)Moreno, Paci, and Usai] and makes more likely that innovations, related to the characteristics of the sor-
rounding territory, are imputed to the regions where they actually have been produced. Although they represent up to
now the single best available measure of innovative output, commonly used in empirical research, patent numbers are
an imperfect indicator of overall innovative activity. [Griliches(1990)] highlights the limitations of using patents as
a proxy of innovation: (i) not all innovations are patented14, thus patent data is only a partial indicator of innovative
activity, (ii) not all patented innovations have the same level of quality15, and (iii) propensity to patent changes across
areas, sectors and time. As an extreme case, patents may even be an obstacle to innovation if they slow down the
diffusion of knowledge or pose prohibitive barriers to market entry. International comparisons are also affected by
differences in procedures and standards across patenting offices. Despite all the above mentioned limitations, patents
continue to be considered the most reliable measure of innovation output. [Moreno et al.(2005)Moreno, Paci, and
Usai] argue that applications to EPO account for patents of homogeneously high quality, because applying is diffi-
cult, time consuming and expensive, so the related innovations are likely to be potentially highly remunerative. The
problem arising from the fact that different sectors have intrinsecally different propensities to patent can be handled
by controlling for the industrial structure in regression analysis, as we do. Moreover, there seems to exist a positive
relationship between patent counts and other indicators related to innovative performance (OECD Patent Statistics
Manual).
Figure 4 gives an idea of the distribution of patents applications across Italian provinces. It is evident that patents
applications are not evenly distributed and a clustered pattern emerges: provinces with higher patents applications per
1000 inhabitants are located close to each other. A similar pattern can be found in the distribution of immigrants across
provinces (see section 4)16.
The two variables used in our analysis to assess the impact of immigration on innovation are the share of immi-
grants on resident population and the ’diversity index’, an indicator that accounts for the ’variety’ of province popula-
tion (the construction of the index is described in subsection 4). Immigrants are defined as residents born abroad with
a foreign nationality. Data on foreign born residents by province (NUTS-3) are taken from the demographic portal of
ISTAT, that contains information on the stock of legal immigrants from 195 country of origin (home-country) resident
in each province at 31 of December (data are available for all the years under consideration). Here a clarification is
worth to be done. As mentioned before, in analyzing the effects of immigration on innovation, an important aspect
is the degree of diversity immigrants bring to the community in which they decide to settle. ’Cultural diversity’ is
14For example firms often choose to keep secret innovations that are strategic or commercially sensitive, or some innovations are simply non-
patentable.
15However there are no generally recognised, easily applicable methods for measuring the value of patents. Some authors [Bosetti
et al.(2012)Bosetti, Cattaneo, and Verdolini, Stuen et al.(2012)Stuen, Mobarak, and Maskus] used the number of citations to account for patents’
‘quality’; in our case, given the short time period covered by our dataset — 6 years — and the (not negligible) time lag between applications and
grants, it would not be clear how to use this kind of information.
16 We will take into account this fact in our analysis by correcting the standard errors through the cluster option.
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Figure 4.4: Logarithm of patents per capita in Italian provinces, 2003 (Top) and 2008 (Bottom)
Note: Different colors account for the quintile to which each province belongs; darker colors represent higher quintiles.
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what could affect positively (complementarities) or negatively (increased transaction cost) the efficiency of an eco-
nomic system. Unfortunately, there is no general agreement on the criteria to distinguish ’cultural groups’ within
the population; language, race, natural origin or other characteristics are alternatively taken into account in related
studies17. However, [Ottaviano and Peri(2006)] show that, for the U.S., measures of urban diversity based on country-
of-birth, language-spoken-at-home, citizenship and race are highly correlated across cities. Given the information in
our dataset, we use the country of origin as the indicator of cultural identity used to compute the ’diversity index’.
Information on immigrants disaggregated at level of country of birth is also the reference point to construct the in-
struments for IV estimation, based on the shares of immigrants from 195 countries in each province in 1995; data
regarding the distribution of immigrants by country of origin across provinces in 1995 are provided by the Italian
Ministry of Interior (foreign residence permits).
To build the time-varying control variables used in the regressions, we relied upon the dataset ’ISTAT-Sistemi
Indicatori Territoriali’ (Systems of Territorial Indicators). We took data on the value added generated by each province
divided by sectors (agriculture, services, manufacturing and construction) to construct the shares of valued added
accounted by each sectors; this should allow to control for the provinces’ industrial structure and so for different
propensities to patent across sectors. These variables are included in the regression as contemporaneous variables
since the industrial structure might be affected by immigration, but this is likely to happen only in the long run
(industry structure is very time persistent); so endogeneity issues are less likely to arise for this variable. Data on value
added are available only until 2007; however, since we lagged by one year all the time-varying covariates, this does
not represent a problem for our estimates. From ISTAT database are also the data we used to build the time-invariant
(2001 values) control variables (resident population, working-age population and number of graduates18).
Finally, data on R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP are not available at NUTS-3 level of aggregation; we took
the data at NUTS-2 level (corresponding to Italian regions) and assigned to each province the R&D expenditure of the
region to which it belongs.
4.4 Empirical strategy and main results
4.4.1 Ordinary least squares
Following the discussion in section 4, we propose the following linear specification of the data generating process of
patents’ applications,
lnPAT Ni jt = α0+δt +δ j +α1MIGshit−1+α3Xit−1+α4X jt−1+α5Di2001+ εi jt (4.4)
where i, j and t are province (NUTS-3), region (NUTS-2) and time subscripts, respectively. lnPAT Nit are patents’
applications per 1000 inhabitants in logarithms; δt and δ j are year and region (NUTS-2) fixed effects; MIGshit−1 is
the share of immigrants on the population; Xit−1 is a vector of time-varying province characteristics, including the
17Also the level of aggregation is often different. For example [Prarolo et al.(2009)Prarolo, Bellini, Ottaviano, and Pinelli] use information about
country of birth to aggregate the immigrants in larger groups: EU countries, Africa, America, Asia, Oceania, unknown. [Ozgen et al.(2012)Ozgen,
Nijkamp, and Poot] operates a similar aggregation.
18The number of graduates is from Census 2001.
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provinces’ industrial structure (the shares of valued added accounted for by agriculture, construction and services)19;
X jt−1 includes the R&D intensity on regional GDP (the same variable is not available at NUTS-3 level). Di2001 is a
vector of covariates which may represent both mediating and confouding factors, and whose values have been included
at a year pre-dating the estimation period (2001): population size, the share of active age population and the college
share in the population, as a proxy of human capital. All these latter variables are expected to have a positive effect on
innovation. Our data spans the years 2003-2008 (6 years), and has a panel structure. Since for some years information
on patents’ applications is not available for all provinces, we have a unbalanced panel of 607 observations.20 All time-
variant regressors have been lagged one period to make them predetermined with respect to the dependent variable. εit
is an error term. As in the regression we are including some covariates which are more aggregated with respect to the
panel unit of analysis (i.e., X jt−1), the standard errors are clustered at the region by time level [Moulton(1990)].
In analogy with the study of [Ottaviano and Peri(2006)] on the effect of immigrants’ diversity on wages and rents,
we do not limit our analysis to skilled immigrants only, like most previous literature did, but consider all immigrants
irrespective of their educational level. Indeed, although skilled immigration is expected to have a positive impact on
innovation (see section 4), this does no exclude that unskilled immigration can have a negative effect by reducing
social capital, creating communication problems among workers or pushing firms to lower their efforts to introduce
product and process innovations. Firms located in provinces rich in low skilled immigrants might indeed concentrate
on the production of traditional (low-value added) goods, using production processes which make a more intense use
of unskilled workers. Including all the immigrants, irrespective of their skill level, allows to assess their overall impact
on provinces innovativeness.
One thing is worth noting. Because of the short time interval spanned by our data, we preferred not to include in
the benchmark specification (4.4) province fixed effects. MIGshit is quite persistent overtime, and the within estimator
would use only very limited time variation in this variable.21 We use a mid-way approach. Indeed, we do not include
NUTS-3 fixed effects but we do include NUTS-2 fixed effects. This enables us not only to use time variation but also
cross-sectional variation between provinces within the same region. Region fixed effects, in turn, enable to catch all
potential unobserved differences existing across Italian regions, which are likely to be important especially because
of the strong North-South geographical divide. 22 For the same reason, owing to the short time span considered, our
estimates only refer to the short- and medium-run effects of immigrants on innovation.
As a proxy of the diversity of a province’s population we do not only use the immigrants’ share, but also the
so-called Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index [Mauro(1995)], specifically:
POPdivit = 1−
Git
∑
g=1
(
Pgit
Pit
)2
(4.5)
where g is the subscript for country of origin, Git the total number of countries (including Italy since also natives are
considered as ethnic group) present in province i in year t, Pgit the population of ethnic group g residing in province i
at time t and Pit the total population of province i at time t. The value of this index is determined both by the ‘richness’
19The main rationale for including this variable is that a province’s patenting capacity is likely to be highly correlated with its industrial structure
— as the degree of innovation strongly differs across industries [Klevorick et al.(1995)Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, and Winter] — which is in turn
correlated with immigrants’ employment opportunities and geographical location.
20Out of a 618 (103 provinces multiplied by 6 years) theoretical number of observations.
21This problem is stressed, for instance, in [Niebuhr(2009)], who dismisses the results of the fixed effects model because of the very low time
variation in her data, and the potential large attenuation bias caused by measurement error.
22A similar approach is used, for instance, by [Wagner et al.(2002)Wagner, Head, and Ries] and [Bratti et al.(2012)Bratti, De Benedictis, and
Santoni], in their analyses of the effect of immigration on trade. Fixed-effects specifications are instead used by the authors who consider Census
data and a long time span (see, for instance, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010).
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(number of groups) of the local population and by its ‘evenness’ (similar distribution of individuals across groups),
and can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in the population will not belong to the
same ethnic group. Higher values of the index means a more diverse population. As a matter of fact, most of the
variation in POPdivit is driven by the share of immigrants in a province, and a simple OLS regression of the former
on the latter returns an R-squared of 0.9923.
Table 4 reports the OLS estimates. Column (1) shows the specification without control variables. A very significant
correlation between the share of immigrants and patents’ applications emerges. Rising the share of immigrants by
one percent point (p.p.) is associated with a 0.36 percent increase in patents’ applications (per 1,000 inhabitants);
however, provinces’ unobserved factors could be responsible for this correlation. In column (2) we control for year
and region fixed effects. The coefficient on the share of immigrants is one third the one in column (1) and the R-
squared increases by 0.30, suggesting that a great deal of the variation in patents’ applications is accounted for by
regional differences and time trends. In column (3) we add two important potential determinants of innovation, R&D
intensity on GDP and the province’s industrial structure. Inclusion of these further controls has little effect of the
coefficient of immigrant share. Column (4) reports our benchmark specification, which includes variables which may
act as both confounding and mediating factors for the effect of immigration: log population, the share of active age
population and the college share in the province. We try to isolate their mediating role by including their values
in 2001, i.e. before the estimation period, so as they are not affected by changes in immigrants’ shares. All three
variables turn out to be key determinants of patents’ applications, and more importantly the coefficient on the share of
immigrants is greatly reduced in magnitude, changes in sign, falling to -.017, and becomes statistically insignificant.
These results suggest that in the previous columns immigrants’ share may be picking up the fact that immigrants tend
to settle in highly populated provinces, in provinces with higher shares of active age population and college graduates,
provinces which are ex-ante more innovative. In column (5) we use the population diversity index instead of the share
of immigrants, and the results are very similar.
4.4.2 Endogeneity and identification: Two-stage least squares estimation
OLS give consistent estimates only if, conditional on the observables included in the innovation equation, the error
term is uncorrelated with the immigrant’s share. There may be several reasons why this assumption fails. It may
happen, for instance, that shocks to local demand, e.g. an increased foreign demand for a low-skilled good produced in
the province, will attract more immigrants locally and also have negative consequences for innovation. Identification of
the effect of immigrants requires therefore a presumably exogenous shock in the supply of immigrants at the province
level. The shock does not necessarily need to be completely random, but uncorrelated with the innovation capacity of
a province.
Here, to build an ‘instrument’ for the share of immigrants on the population we follow the procedure proposed in
[Altonji and Card(1991)], which has been already intensively employed in the empirical literature on immigration (see,
for some recent applications, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010, Lewis 2011, Peri 2012), and is based on immigrants’
enclaves. The idea is that immigrants tend to settle where individuals of the same nationality are already located.
This may happen for a variety of reasons. For instance, immigrant networks may provide newly arrived individuals
23The diversity index computed including natives can be considered as composed by two parts: the share of immigrants on the population and
the diversity index computed only on foreigners. In the regressions for wages and rental prices, [Ottaviano and Peri(2006)] consider first the overall
index and then separately its components, concluding that the positive effect found for the overall index is mainly driven by the share of immigrants.
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with important information on the local labour market and the availability of vacancies, increasing the returns to
migration, or providing hospitality thereby reducing the costs of migration. Although MIGshit relates to the total
share of immigrants on the population, separate information by country of origin is provided by the Italian National
Statistical Institute (ISTAT). Our instrument has been built as follows. We took the yearly stock of immigrants by
nationality in Italy as a whole (Mgt ) and imputed it to provinces (Mgit ) according to the distribution of nationalities
across provinces in 1995 (θi1995), computed using foreign residence permits data provided by the Italian Ministry of
Interior24:
M̂git = θi1995Mgt (4.6)
We then aggregated at the province level all immigrants’ predicted stocks by nationality (M̂git ) across all nation-
alities present in each province in 1995 (Gi1995) to compute the total stock of immigrants of province i at time t, and
divided the latter by the predicted total province’s population obtaining the instrument, the predicted immigrants’ share
M̂IGshit = (∑
Gi1995
g=1 M̂git)/P̂OPit . As we did for immigrants, also the predicted total population P̂OPit was computed
apportitioning to provinces the population of each year according to the 1995 provincial distribution.
The same procedure was followed to compute an instrument for population diversity. Indeed the predicted stocks
of immigrants by nationality can be used to compute a ‘predicted’ ELF index25 [Ottaviano and Peri(2006)]:
̂POPdivit = 1−
Gi1995
∑
g=1
(
P̂git
P̂it
)2
. (4.7)
Both instruments are based on two components. The first is the total stock of individuals by nationality in Italy,
which should be uncorrelated with single provinces’ supply and demand shocks impacting on local innovation. The
second component is the distribution of immigrants and of the total population in 1995. We claim that the distribution
of immigrants (or the population) in 1995 should be uncorrelated with unobserved factors affecting patenting more
than 7 years later, conditional on the observables we included in the regressions. The main identifying assumption
is that, conditional on the observables, within-region differences26 in the distribution of immigrants by different na-
tionality in 1995 are approximately random with respect to provinces’ future innovation prospects. We posit that the
main factors which could be responsible for very persisting differences in innovativeness across provinces are their
industrial structure, and the existence of agglomeration economies, both of which have been controlled for in our
benchamark specification.
Table 4 reports the 2SLS results. In all cases we adopted the benchmark specification and clustered the standard
errors at the region by time level. In column (1) we use the predicted share of immigrants. The F-test in the first stage
is quite high at 181.76, confirming the strength of the excluded instrument (the predicted share of immigrants). The
instrument’s t-value is 13.48, and the coefficient is 0.38 suggesting that although immigrant enclaves contributes to
explaining immigrants’ location, there are other factors which also affect immigrants’ choices of residential location.
From the second stage we estimate that a one p.p. increase in a province’s immigrant share reduces patents’ applica-
tions per 1000 inhabitants by 0.06 percent. In column (2), we use the ELF index. The first stage is equally strong with
an F-test of 170.56. From the second stage we estimate that a one-standard-deviation (0.047) increase in population
diversity reduces patents’ applications by 0.16 percent.
The results in this section suggests that, at least for Italy, immigration has overall a negative effect on innovation,
24As disaggregated data on residents by foreign nationality is only available for Italian provinces since 2002 through the Italian National Statistical
Institute (ISTAT). We focus on 1995’s data as in that year there were 103 provinces, while the number of provinces was 95 before.
25Predicted natives are computed as the difference between predicted population and predicted total number of immigrants.
26Since we control for region fixed effects.
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proxied by patents’ applications per 1000 inhabitants. This finding is likely to be the result of the characteristics of
Italian immigration which, as we outlined in section 4, is prevalently unskilled. As a matter of fact, almost all studies
who have found a positive effect of immigration on innovation have focussed on skilled immigration, e.g., immigrants
with a university education (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010, Stuen et al. 2012) or working in high profile occupations
(Kerr and Lincoln 2010, Niebuhr 2009). For this reason, in the following section we try to investigate the separate
effects on innovation of high skilled and low skilled immigrants. Our prediction is that the overall negative effect is
mostly driven by (i) a negative effect of low educated immigrants on innovation and (ii) the prevalence in Italy of
unskilled immigration.
4.4.3 Differences by immigrants’ skill levels
The 2SLS results in the previous section suggests that the overall share of immigrants and the ’diversity’ they create
in the society have a negative impact on Italian provinces’ innovativeness. This could seem to be at odds with the
existing literature, but we have to keep in mind that we were considering immigrant as whole, while previous works,
mostly concordant in finding a positive effect of immigrants on innovation, were restricting the analysis only to a
subset of the immigrant population, namely its high skilled component. Actually, our estimate of an overall negative
effect may hide more complex dynamics related to the large heterogeneity in immigrants’ levels of skill, which can
generate different effects working in opposite directions. For this reason, in the current section we try to disantangle
the (possibly different) effects on innovation of low skilled and high skilled immigrants. To this aim, we need to split
the population of immigrants resident in each province into its high skilled and low skilled component. Unfortunately,
our dataset does not contain information that can be used to infer the skill level of immigrants by nationality (such as
the level of education or occupation), so we had to rely on external data and some simplifying assumptions. We used
the dataset provided by Docquier and Marfoukof27 which contains detailed information on international migration by
educational attainment. This dataset provides the number of emigrants to Italy in 1991 and 2001 from 195 countries,
divided in low, medium and high skilled. The authors count as migrants all working-aged (25 and over) foreign-born
individuals living in an OECD country; high skilled migrants are those with at least tertiary educational attainment
wherever they completed their schooling28. We took the data regarding 2001, that have less missing values, to compute
for each country of origin the share of medium-high skilled emigrants on total emigrants to Italy29. Then, we used
two different procedures to assign the skill level to individual immigrants, in order to create the shares of low skilled
and high skilled immigrants for each province30. The first procedure consists in dividing the immigrants between
high skilled and low skilled according to their country of origin, that is, after having classified a given country as
source of high or low skilled immigrant, we impute the same skill level to all the immigrants from that country31. We
define a country as a source of high skilled individuals if its share of medium-high skilled emigrants to Italy is larger
27http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm
28Medium and low skilled migrants are those with secondary and primary education respectively. The source of these data can be different ac-
cording to the country of origin of migrants. Detailed information can be found in the document ’International Migration by Educational Attainment
(1990-2000) - Release 1.1’ by Frédéric Docquiera and Abdeslam Marfoukb, p.14. http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm
29We refer to the share of medium and high skilled to obtain information about the immigrants that will be defined ’high skilled’; this is justified
by the fact that natives’ average level of education is the medium one, so, with respect to the Italian case, immigrants whose education level is not
lower than medium can be classified among the high skilled workforce.
30In the regressions by skill level the diversity index is not taken into account as we have seen in the previous section that most variation in the
diversity index is driven by the share of immigrants.
31A similar procedure is followed by [Ozgen et al.(2012)Ozgen, Nijkamp, and Poot] which group migrants on the basis of the average skill
level of the ‘global region’ from which they are from (Africa, Asia, America, Europe and Oceania). We consider here a finer classification using
individual countries of origin.
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than the median value (0.56). With the second procedure, we tried to divide the immigrants by skill level in a more
precise way. In this case, the total number of immigrants from a given country is splitted by skill level according to the
shares of high-medium skilled and low skilled emigrants on total emigrants from that country to Italy. We run separate
regressions to estimate the coefficients of the variables created according to the described procedures, obtaining similar
results, which will be discussed below32. To build the instrumental variables M̂IGshit for the two groups, high skilled
and low skilled, we started by the ‘predicted number of immigrants’ in a province from a given country, obtained using
the ‘shift and share’ method described in section 4. We then applied to the ‘predicted number of immigrants’ the two
procedures described above, in this case using data of 1991 in the Docquier-Marfoukof database, and get the ‘predicted
high skilled immigrants’ by nationality. Summing up this latter for each province across nationalities and dividing by
the province’s predicted population we obtained the instrument for the share of high skilled immigrants (‘predicted
share of high skilled immigrants’). In the same way we computed the ‘predicted share of low skilled immigrants’.
We estimated the benchmark model using the lagged share of low skilled and the lagged share of high skilled
immigrants instead of the lagged share of immigrants as a whole. For the sake of completeness we report the results
of both OLS and 2SLS estimates; Table 4 displays the regression output for the case in which the variables related
to immigrants are computed with the first procedure, while Table 4 refers to the second procedure. OLS estimates of
the coefficients of the lagged share of high skilled and low skilled immigrants are not significant, whatever the skill
level of immigrants and the procedure adopted to split them is. The sign of the coefficient of the share of low skilled
immigrants is always negative, while the sign of the coefficient on the share of high skilled immigrants becomes non-
negative (actually very close to zero) when they are computed according to the share of medium-high skilled emigrants
from their country of origin to Italy. Given the endogeneity of the variables related to immigrants (see section 4), we
also estimate an IV regression. Results from the first stage confirm also in this case the strength of the instruments: the
F-tests take value 57.78 for the share of high skilled immigrants and 176.88 for the share of low skilled immigrants,
when the the first procedure to split the immigrants is used; as for the other procedure, the corresponding values of the
F-tests are 70.63 and 165.81. The excluded instruments are highly significant, with the exception of the predicted share
of low skilled immigrants in the first stage regression for the share of high skilled immigrants, when the first procedure
is used to divide by skill level (Table 4). In the second stage, the coefficient of the share of low skilled immigrants
is negative and significant. In the case in which we use dummy variables to define ‘high skilled countries of origin’
(Table 4) it is significant at 1% and indicates that an increase of the share of low skilled immigrants of one percent
point induces a decrease in patents’ application per 1,000 inhabitants of 0.09 percent. In the case in which immigrants
from the same country of origin are divided in high skilled and low skilled (Table 4), the coefficient on the share of low
skilled immigrants is significant at 5% and double in magnitude: a rise in the share of low skilled immigrants of one
p.p. generates a reduction in patents’ applications per 1,000 inhabitants of 0.19 percent. The coefficient of the share of
high skilled immigrants is positive but not significant in both cases; it could suggest an increase in patents’ applications
per 1,000 inhabitants in a range between 0.03 and 0.11 percent (according to the method used to divide immigrants
between skill levels) following an increase of 1 p.p. in the share of high skilled immigrants, but this effect is not
precisely estimated in our sample. These results are consistent with the analysis of [Lewis(2011)] and [Peri(2012)];
they find evidence that a rise in the supply of low skilled workforce caused by large inflows of foreigners hampered
investments in physical capital in the U.S. and favored the adoption of labor-intensive production technologies, thus
reducing firms’ incentives to innovate. The strongly significant negative effect of low skilled immigrants and the fact
that the positive impact of high skilled immigrants turns out to be insignificant in our regressions can be explained by
32We tried also a finer division of immigrants in three groups (low, medium and high skilled); results do not change significantly, confirming the
negative and significant effect of low skilled immigrants on patents’ applications.
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the particular features of the immigration phenomenon in Italy, characterized by thelarge prevalence of low educated
immigrants and underutilization of immgrants’ human capital. This point will be furtherly discussed more in the
concluding remarks.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate the effect of the share of immigrants in the population and of the population diversity (en-
hanced by immigration) on Italian provinces’ patent applications, as a proxy for innovation performance. We aim to
address the potential endogeneity of these variables by employing a well established procedure in the literature based
on immigrants’ enclaves, which uses a ‘shift and share’ approach. Differently from most works in this literature, we
do not limit the analysis to the effects of skilled immigration, but we look at the general impact of immigration, and
at the separate effects of low-educated and high-educated immigrants on innovation. This choice has been determined
by the consideration that, in addition to possible positive effects on the production of new ideas arising from skills’
complementarities, the most recent literatures has suggested that there may also be adverse effects on innovation gen-
erated by the inflow of foreign population [Lewis(2011)]. Increasing transaction and communication costs, reduction
of social capital and the scarce incentive to the adoption of new capital-intensive technologies, owing to the abundance
of cheap low-skilled labor force, may all act as obstacles to innovation and growth, in particular when immigrants
are characterized by low levels of education and skills. We have shown that this is likely to be the case for Italy,
which mostly attract low-skilled immigrants who are employed in traditional sectors. So, excluding the low skilled
component of immigration from the analysis would give a very misleading picture of the overall effect of immigration
on innovation. In fact, our analysis suggests that as far as total immigration is concerned, the positive association be-
tween the presence of immigrants and patenting, dominant in the past literature focused on skilled migration, does not
emerge in Italian provinces. We find an overall negative effect of the share of immigrants and of population diversity:
rising immigrants’ share by 1 p.p. produces a 0.064 percent reduction in patents’ applications per 1,000 inhabitants.
Investigating the separate effects on innovation of high skilled and low skilled immigrants, our results support the
hypothesis that the overall negative effect is mostly driven by a negative effect of low educated immigrants on inno-
vation (consistent with the findings of [Lewis(2011)], [Peri(2012)] and [Suedekum et al.(2009)Suedekum, Wolf, and
Blien]), and the prevalence in Italy of unskilled immigration. Indeed, the impact of low skilled immigrants turns out to
be negative, highly in magnitude and highly significant, while the effect of high skilled immigrants, though positive,
cannot be precisely estimated. A one p.p. increase in the share of low-skilled immigrants is estimated to cause a 0.094
to 0.186 reduction in patenting, according to the procedure used to assign immigrants to skill groups. The fact that
the positive impact of high skilled immigrants turns out to be positive (0.113) but not significant can be explained
by the particular features of immigration phenomenon in Italy. We have seen that on top of Italy’s mainly attracting
skilled immigrants, even high-skilled immigrants are often employed in traditional sectors and fill low-skilled posi-
tions, suffering from substantial overeducation. So, due to their scarce presence and the ‘waste’ of their human capital
the (potentially) positive effect of high skilled immigrants on innovation does not emerge in our country and results to
be overshadowed by the negative effect of low skilled foreign population.
Our results point to the importance of immigration policies, given the assessed impact of foreign population on
a main driver of economic performance, and the importance of a correct functioning of the labour market in order
to grant a good match between immigrants workers’ skill levels and the work positions they fill, in order to fully
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exploit their innovative potential, as other countries seems to do, in Italy. Also, given the short-time spanned by our
data, all the effects we estimated should be interpreted as medium-run/short-run effects and this does not exclude
that, considering longer periods, additional effects on the economy may emerge, for instance mediated by capital
accumulation and technological changes [Lewis(2011)]. This is particularly important because the negative effect of
low skilled immigrants on innovation can intensify in the long run, if the economic system adapts its technological
choices to the availability of a large share of unskilled workforce. A greater exploitation of the competencies of skilled
immigrants and the valorisation of their human capital could help to compensate the discussed short and long run
negative effects, by attracting educated immigrants, giving complementary skills the possibility to emerge and shifting
firms’ decisions towards investment in the production and adoption of innovative technologies.
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Table 4.1: OLS estimates of the effect of immigrants on patents’ applications
benchmark
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
share of immigrants 0.364*** 0.107*** 0.093*** -0.017
(0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
population diversity (ELF) -0.933
(1.020)
RD expenditures (% GDP)(a) 1.071*** 1.034*** 1.033***
(0.397) (0.391) (0.390)
share VA agriculture -0.119*** -0.032** -0.032**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
share VA services -0.021*** -0.064*** -0.064***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
share VA construction -0.126*** -0.021 -0.021
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
log pop 2001 0.277*** 0.277***
(0.051) (0.051)
active age pop share 2001 0.056** 0.056**
(0.024) (0.024)
% of graduates on pop 18-64 0.191*** 0.191***
(0.019) (0.019)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-2) fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. observations 607 607 607 607 607
R-squared .46 .76 .80 .85 .85
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Note. The dependent variable is log patents’ applications per 1000 inhabitants at the province
(NUTS-3) level for Italy, 2003-2008. When not differently specified all independent variables are
lagged one year. Standard errors are clustered at the region× year level because of the inclusion of
an ‘aggregated’ variable [Moulton(1990)] and robust to heteroskedasticity. Diversity of immigrants
is measured using the ELF index [Mauro(1995)].
(a) only available at the NUTS-2 level.
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Table 4.2: 2SLS estimates of the effect of immigrants on patents’ applications
(1) (2)
Second stage
share of immigrants -0.064**
(0.031)
population diversity (ELF) -3.457**
(1.693)
RD expenditures (% GDP)(a) 0.944** 0.942**
(0.378) (0.378)
share VA agriculture -0.025* -0.025*
(0.014) (0.014)
share VA services -0.069*** -0.069***
(0.007) (0.007)
share VA constructions -0.022 -0.022
(0.025) (0.025)
log pop 2001 0.316*** 0.317***
(0.050) (0.050)
active age pop share 2001 0.055** 0.055**
(0.024) (0.024)
% of graduates on pop 18-64 0.199*** 0.199***
(0.019) (0.019)
First stage
predicted share of immigrants 0.375***
(0.028)
predicted population diversity 0.374***
(0.029)
F-test excluded instrument 181.76 170.56
N. observations 607 607
R-squared .37 .37
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Note. The dependent variable is log patents’ applications per 1000 inhabitants at the province
(NUTS-3) level for Italy, 2003-2008. When not differently specified all independent variables are
lagged one year. All models include year and region (NUTS-3) fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the region× year level because of the inclusion of an ‘aggregated’ variable [Moul-
ton(1990)] and robust to heteroskedasticity. Diversity of immigrants is measured using the ELF
index [Mauro(1995)].
(a) only available at the NUTS-2 level.
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Table 4.3: OLS and IV estimates by skill level (1)
2SLS
OLS 1st stage: high skilled 1st stage: low skilled 2nd stage
share of immigrants: high skilled(b) -0.079 0.025
(0.055) (0.102)
share of immigrants: low skilled -0.001 -0.094***
(0.023) (0.036)
RD expenditures (% GDP)(a) 0.998** -0.355 -0.908* 0.988**
(0.384) (0.314) (0.546) (0.391)
share VA agriculture -0.027* 0.061*** 0.037* -0.031**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.022) (0.015)
share VA services -0.061*** 0.013*** -0.081*** -.073***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
share VA construction -0.015 0.044** -0.093* -0.031
(0.026) (0.018) (0.048) (0.026)
log population (2001) 0.281*** 0.099** 0.193** 0.313***
(0.052) (0.039) (0.095) (0.051)
15-65 population share (2001) 0.058** 0.038*** 0.142*** 0.052**
(0.025) (0.014) (0.047) (0.023)
% of graduates on pop 18-64 (2001) 0.194*** 0.022 -0.045** 0.195***
(0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
predicted share of immigrants: high skilled(c) 0.337*** -0.213***
(0.032) (0.049)
predicted share of immigrants: low skilled -0.027 0.528***
(0.020) (0.028)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Region (NUTS-2) fixed effects yes yes yes yes
F-test (1st stage) 57.78 176.88
N. obs. 607 607 607 607
R2 0.846 0.409 0.467 0.364
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Note. The dependent variable is log patents’ applications per 1000 inhabitants at the province (NUTS-3) level for Italy,
2003-2008. When not differently specified all independent variables are lagged one year. All models include year and region
(NUTS-3) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region× year level because of the inclusion of an ‘aggregated’
variable [Moulton(1990)] and robust to heteroskedasticity.
(a) only available at the NUTS-2 level.
(b) the skill level is assigned to immigrants according to their country of origin: all immigrants from a country with the
share of high-medium skilled emigrants on total emigrants to Italy in 2001 (Docquier-Marfoukof database)larger than 0.56
(median value) are considered high skilled.
(c) for the construction of the instruments the year of reference is 1991 (Docquier-Marfoukof database).
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Table 4.4: OLS and IV estimates by skill level (2)
2SLS
OLS 1st stage: high skilled 1st stage: low skilled 2nd stage
share of immigrants: high skilled(b) 0.001 0.113
(0.083) (0.154)
share of immigrants: low skilled -0.029 -0.186**
(0.053) (0.091)
RD expenditures (% GDP)(a) 1.041*** -0.617* -0.688 1.010**
(0.389) (0.356) (0.433) (0.394)
share VA agriculture -0.033** 0.062*** 0.027 -0.033**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015)
share VA services -0.064*** -0.017*** -0.049*** -.073***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
share VA construction 0.002 -0.008 -0.053 -0.027
(0.026) (0.024) (0.034) (0.026)
log population (2001) 0.275*** 0.159*** 0.105 0.304***
(0.052) (0.041) (0.066) (0.053)
15-65 population share (2001) 0.056** 0.069*** 0.104*** 0.053**
(0.024) (0.016) (0.032) (0.024)
% of graduates on pop 18-64 (2001) 0.190*** -0.016 -0.020 0.190***
(0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020)
predicted share of immigrants: high skilled(c) 0.163*** -0.401***
(0.055) (0.063)
predicted share of immigrants: low skilled 0.145*** 0.742***
(0.044) (0.051)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Region (NUTS-2) fixed effects yes yes yes yes
F-test (1st stage) 70.63 165.81
N. obs. 607 607 607 607
R2 0.846 0.429 0.462 0.368
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Note. The dependent variable is log patents’ applications per 1000 inhabitants at the province (NUTS-3) level for Italy,
2003-2008. When not differently specified all independent variables are lagged one year. All models include year and region
(NUTS-3) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region× year level because of the inclusion of an ‘aggregated’
variable [Moulton(1990)] and robust to heteroskedasticity.
(a) only available at the NUTS-2 level.
(b) for each province, the total number of immigrants from a given country is splitted by skill level according to the shares of
high-medium skilled and low skilled emigrants on total emigrants from that country to Italy in 2001 (Docquier-Marfoukof
database).
(c) for the construction of the instruments the year of reference is 1991 (Docquier-Marfoukof database).
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